Showing posts with label Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Show all posts

Thursday, February 27, 2020

Sudan: Military has far too much power (Eric Reeves)

  • The RSF is still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue. 
  • What about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago? 
  • If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.
  • Will Hemeti disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?
  • Will all arrests be made only by policemen?
  • One of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.  Read full story:
Analysis from Radio Dabanga.org
By Dr Eric Reeves - NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA
Published Wednesday 07 August 2019
The Constitutional Charter and the future of Sudan
FCC leader Ahmed Rabee and Hemeti with copies of the Constitutional Declaration during the signing ceremony in Khartoum on August 4 (Picture SUNA).

The “Constitutional Charter” (CC) signed on August 4 is an inspiring read, if stripped from the grim context in which it has been brought into being—if we forget the many hundreds who have been killed, wounded, raped, and tortured in the course of the uprising that has brought at least the hope of civilian governance into sight. The insistence on human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, press freedoms, tolerance, and indeed the priority of peace—all of this provides at least the ghostly outline of a what a free and just Sudan—truly at peace with itself—might look like.

But what has been stipulated in the CC and what seems likely in the near future seem to me two very different things, and I am far from alone in my misgivings. Canvassing Sudanese social media over the past three days—and for months prior to this—I find two major concerns, fundamental issues that many feel have not been addressed by the CC.

The first, and most frequent, is that far too much power has been left in the hands of the military, now a hybrid military, with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nominally under the command of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” (CC §34).* Moreover, many have observed that the RSF is left fully intact, a force unto itself, and still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue.

In Khartoum itself, all evidence points to a concerted plan by the RSF to undertake what has come to be known as the “June 3 Massacre,” in which more than 150 people were killed (perhaps many more), dozens of women and girls raped, and widespread violence of a sort not seen even during the uprising of September 2013. It is impossible to believe that the orders for the deadly clearance of protesters in front of army headquarters did not come from the Transitional Military Council, and indeed “Lt. General” Hemeti (he has no formal military training, a fact reflected in the lack of discipline throughout the RSF). Unsurprisingly, the RSF was again responsible for the deadly violence in El Obeid on July 29.

The second criticism, voiced in various forms, is that the fundamental economic issues in Sudan—a nation struggling under the burden of an economy that has largely collapsed—are nowhere addressed with any specificity. This is perhaps to be expected of an interim constitutional document, but the greatest hindrance to economic rehabilitation in Sudan has long been the inordinate amount of the national budget devoted to the military and security services. All independent Sudanese economists I’ve encountered estimate that the percentage is between 50% and 70% of all national expenditures.

Will the military men who play such a large role in what was to have been a movement to bring about civilian governance in Sudan willingly give up this previously compulsory largesse, provided by the ordinary people of Sudan? Senior officers have enjoyed what is by Sudanese standards a lavish salary and lifestyle: will they give this up in the interest of the nation? And what about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region, about which so much has been made in recent years? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago?

The point many Sudanese seem to be making is that the greatest obstacle—both to peace in the country and to economic rehabilitation—is the continuing central role of the armed forces in Sudan’s governance over the next 39 months. It may be that the members of the soon-to-be-dissolve Transitional Military Council (TMC) will no longer be able to move with the same ease of executive fiat as was the case during the al-Bashir years. But there are all too many “work-arounds” evident in the constitutional text, as well as the massive inherent power of the “deep state” that so many Sudanese worry about. 30 years of tyranny, corruption, war, and kleptocracy cannot be whisked away with any document, no matter how eloquent or impressively democratic. And Hemeti has proved himself at once hugely ambitious and unreservedly deceitful and expedient.

Here it is important to remember that the al-Bashir regime abided by not one of the agreements it signed during its long tenure: not the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (annexation of Abyei is only the most egregious violation of the various Protocols of the CPA, signed in January 2005); the Nuba Mountain ceasefire (January, 2002); the Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006); the peace agreement with the Eastern Front (October 2006); the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011); and the list goes on and on. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.

But such an outcome has one terrible downside for the military, if it indeed seizes national power: the economy will continue its collapse, and we may be sure that protests will resume, with anger even greater, political frustration even more intense. It’s hard to say what the economic consequences of eight months of sustained demonstrations, protests, and strikes has been—but it has been enormous, and the people of Sudan have seen just how powerful they are. Without a massive shift in economic priorities, which will entail cooperation from Sudan’s work force, agriculture will continue to decline; the ability to finance critical imports—including food, medicine, and refined petroleum products—will further diminish; and inflation that has brought so many Sudanese families to the very edge of survival continues to roar ahead, even as the Sudanese Pound continues its precipitous collapse.

More Challenges
Even now, of course, we must note Sudanese concern about what is not in the CC, and that is the July agreement between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The armed opposition has universally rejected the CC of August 4, and several political parties in Khartoum have now insisted that any real path forward requires much more participation from those in the armed movements, and especially civil society elements from the regions where the movements have been most active: Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Pessimism is in no short supply.

How will we know if this broadly shared pessimism is warranted? Usefully, the text of the CC provides for some early tests of the military’s willingness to embrace the ideals set forth:

[1] “All people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law” (§ 5.i). Will we see any change in Darfur, where the rule of law has been only a vague rumour for two decades and more? Where rape, murder, abduction, and pillaging are virtually daily events?

[2] “Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law”(§18.i). Does this apply to RSF commander Hemeti? Will he disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?

[3] “The General Intelligence Service is a uniformed agency that is competent in national security. Its duties are limited to gathering and analysing information and providing it to the competent bodies. The law defines its obligations and duties, and it is subject to the sovereign and executive authorities by law” (§36). Can we expect to see an end to the arrests and torture for which the “former” National Intelligence and Security Services are notorious? Will all arrests be made only by policemen? These questions are also raised by §45: “Every person has the right to freedom and security. No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention, or deprived of freedom or restricted therefrom except for cause in accordance with procedures defined by law.”

[4] §56 speaks of “the right to access the internet, without prejudice to public order, safety, and morals…” Will we see this? And who decides what is a threat to “to public order, safety, and morals”? Is the conditionality of this language a way to justify future internet shutdowns?

[5] §64 speaks of the State undertaking “to provide primary health care and emergency services free of charge for all citizens, develop public health, and establish, develop and qualify basic treatment and diagnostic institutions.” Does this mean that the ghastly humanitarian embargo imposed by the al-Bashir regime will at long last be lifted from large areas of South Kordofan, after eight years of suffering, hunger, and denial of assistance?

This last test of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.

In short, we could know very soon whether the Transitional Military Council, prior to its dissolution, means to send a signal of good faith. I’m not holding my breath.

* All citations are from a translation of the version of the Constitutional Charter that was signed on 4 August 2019, prepared by International IDEA (www.idea.int).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributing author or media and do not necessarily reflect the position of Radio Dabanga.

Eric Reeves is a regular contributor and commentator to Radio Dabanga. He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, who has spent the past 20+ years as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the USA and internationally **.
His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

Monday, February 17, 2020

Sudan: Salah Gosh in Egypt, his ex-agents attempt Sudan coup - Army retakes intelligence buildings

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: The following news from Reuters dated 14 January 2020 says Sudan's former head of intelligence Mr Salah Gosh is believed to be in Egypt. Also, the Sudanese army quelled an armed revolt in Sudan by Gosh's former security agents on 14 January 2020. Wondering whether Alex de Waal would class the 'revolt' as an attempted coup and add it, plus the one last July (see below), to his list of others in Sudan (see History of coups in Khartoum Sudan by Alex de Waal - Sudan Watch, 21 April 2019 https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/04/history-of-coups-in-khartoum-sudan-alex.html)

Copy of news report from Reuters.com
Publication date: Tuesday 14 January 2020, 11:27 AM 
By: Khaled Abelaziz, El Tayeb Siddig
Title: UPDATE 6-Sudan quells revolt of former spy service men after clashes

* Gunfire heard in capital, two oilfields shut down
* Sudan in middle of transition after ousting of Bashir
* Paramilitary head says will not accept any coup (Adds army retakes intelligence buildings, details)

KHARTOUM, Jan 14 (Reuters) - Armed ex-security agents linked to Sudan’s toppled ruler Omar al-Bashir fought soldiers in the capital Khartoum for hours until government forces quelled the revolt late on Tuesday, residents and a military source said.

The violence was the biggest confrontation so far between the old guard and supporters of the new administration, which helped topple Bashir in April after 30 years in power.

The former employees of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) also shut two small oilfields in Darfur in protest about their severance packages, a government source told Reuters. They had an output of around 5,000 barrels per day.

Late Tuesday, soldiers seized back control of all buildings where ex-NISS agents had hours earlier opened fire on government forces, a military source told Reuters.

The former NISS staff surrendered after negotiations, the source said.

Restructuring the once feared security apparatus blamed for suppressing dissent under Bashir was among the key demands of the uprising that forced his removal.

However, once dismissed by the new transitional government, many of the security agents returned to their barracks without being disarmed after leaving the ministries and streets they once controlled.

Residents said the clashes broke out at noon between the former security staff and forces loyal to the transitional government in a northern district of Khartoum where gunfire could be heard for hours.

In a second location next to the airport, ex-NISS staff seized a security building, which was then surrounded by government forces and where gunfire could also be heard, witnesses said.

Four people suffered gunshot wounds but were in stable condition, a doctors’ committee linked to the civilian government said in a statement.

Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s most powerful paramilitary group, which supports the new government, said while he would not consider Tuesday’s incident a coup attempt, any such action would not be tolerated.

“We will not accept any coup, we will not accept any illegal change. The only change will come from the Sudanese people,” he said before his troops helped end the revolt.

AIRSPACE CLOSED
Information Minister Faisal Mohamed Saleh said the gunmen were former employees angry at the terms they had been offered upon their dismissal.

Authorities closed Sudan’s airspace for five hours as a precautionary measure after the start of the shooting, a Civil Aviation Ministry spokesman said.

Dagalo said that former Sudan intelligence chief Salah Gosh and a member of Bashir’s old ruling party was behind the NISS unrest.

“This is a coordinated plan by Salah Gosh and another member of the National Congress party including some generals from intelligence service,” he told a news conference during a visit to South Sudan’s capital Juba on Tuesday.

“The person behind this shooting today is Salah Gosh. He has many generals active within the security sector with an aim to create confusion and fighting.”

Gosh, believed to be in Egypt, could not be immediately reached for comment. 

(Reporting by Khalid Abdelaziz, Eltayeb Siddig and Nayera Abdallah with additional reporting by Denis Dumo in Juba; Writing by Amina Ismail and Ulf Laessing; Editing by William Maclean, Alison Williams, and Marguerita Choy)

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Copy of news report by Reuters
Publication date: Tuesday 14 January 2020, 9:54 PM 
Title: Sudanese government forces retake all intelligence buildings in capital - military source
KHARTOUM (Reuters) - Sudanese government forces managed late on Tuesday to retake all intelligence buildings in capital held by security agents in revolt, a military source said.

The security agents surrendered after negotiations with their leaders, the source said. They had opened fire to protest against their severance packages.

(Reporting by Khaled Abdelaziz; Writing by Ulf Laessing; Editing by Jonathan Oatis)
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Report from The Guardian UK 
By AFP in Khartoum, Sudan
Publication date: Thu 11 July 2019 23.04 BST
Last modified on Thu 11 July 2019 23.27 BST
Title: Sudan's ruling militia says it's survived coup attempt
Photo: Gen Jamal Omar of Sudan’s ruling military council says 16 soldiers have been arrested. Photograph: Ashraf Shazly/AFP/Getty

Excerpts: Sudan’s ruling military council has foiled a coup attempt, a top general has announced on state television, saying that 12 officers and four soldiers have been arrested.
“Officers and soldiers from the army and national intelligence and security service, some of them retired, were trying to carry out a coup,” Gen Jamal Omar of the ruling military council said in a statement broadcast live on state television. “The regular forces were able to foil the attempt.” He did not say when the attempt was made.

Monday, September 16, 2019

Sudan: Hemeti and RSF, Sudan's ticking time bomb (Part 5)

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor:  The below copied article from The New Arab is dated 25 May 2015. It is published here as part of a series of blog posts featuring Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur, Sudan.  

Musa Hilal and his relatives and comrades have spent the past two years incarcerated in Omdurman prison, not far from Sudan's capital Khartoum. They were arrested in North Darfur in November 2017 by Hemeti's Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hemeti ordered his RSF, formerly known as Janjaweed, to arrest his cousin and former boss, Musa Hilal, and bring him to Khartoum alive or dead. Some points from the article:
  • Observers feared Hemeti's ambition, which some said could end up destroying the country after the concessions the government has granted him.
  • The Janjaweed have played a major role in quelling rebellions in Sudan.
  • They are associated with the Sudanese Armed Forces.
  • The Janjaweed militia emerged as a powerful political player in Sudan, but the history of militias getting involved in politics suggests all may not end well.
  • The Sudanese government allowed 3,000 Janjaweed to deploy in various areas of Khartoum.
  • In 2014 the Janjaweed militias were brought under a united command and given their new official name - the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  Read more:
Article from and by The New Arab www.alaraby.co.uk
Dated 25 May 2015
The Janjaweed, Sudan's ticking time bomb
The Janjaweed have played a major role in quelling rebellions in Sudan [AFP]

Analysis: The Janjaweed militia has emerged as a powerful political player in Sudan, but the history of militias getting involved in politics suggests all may not end well.

The name Janjaweed strikes fear into the hearts of many Sudanese people. 

The Janjaweed, now formally known as the Rapid Support Forces, first gained international notoriety in 2003 at the beginning of the Darfur conflict. Today, the Janjaweed are being accused of new violations - accusations that their leaders and the Sudanese government strongly deny.

The Janjaweed established their presence on the Sudanese political scene very quickly. They are associated with the Sudanese Armed Forces, fighting alongside them in the Sudanese states of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan, as well as in the Darfur region.

A spoiled child or a ticking bomb?
The Janjaweed, however, also enjoy advantages over the official Sudanese army. Their equipment is more advanced and their salaries are higher. Some people here call them the "spoiled child of the Sudanese regime".

However, others see the Janjaweed as a ticking time bomb. By supporting them, the Khartoum government is digging its own grave, they believe, especially as the government has allowed 3,000 Janjaweed to deploy in various areas of the capital itself.

The Janjaweed started out as Arab tribal militia which the government used to suppress the 2003 Darfur rebellion. The government relied on them heavily for this, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir stated they were responsible for quelling the revolt.

On an international level, the Janjaweed, who have also been known by several other names including the "Border Guards", have been accused of human rights violations in Darfur, including rape and burning villages. These accusations have led the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials, including Defence Minister Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein.

The Janjaweed have also been accused of recruiting foreigners from Arab tribes in Niger, Chad and Mali. 

The government denies this, however, while the leader of the Janjaweed, Mohamed Hamdan Hamidati [aka Hemeti or Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo], says most of his forces are from the Arab tribes of Darfur - and there are no foreigners among them. 

He says he is willing to provide the government with 100,000 fighters if it requests them, and considers fighting for the government a form of paid employment.

In a documentary, Hamidati, who is 43 years old, said he was called to a meeting with Bashir, who requested his help in quelling rebellions in Darfur, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan, offering him money in exchange.

In 2014, the Janjaweed militias were brought under a united command and given their new official name - the Rapid Support Forces. In order to regularise their status, they were placed under the command of the security forces.

It is believed the Sudanese army refused to integrate the Janjaweed within its ranks, because it considered the Janjaweed to be a chaotic militia following a tribal code, rather than a code of combat.

Hamidati admitted as much when he was sacked as a security adviser in South Darfur. "I am a free human being," he said at the time. "I have my clan and my own army and resources. The state governor cannot reduce my authority."

Official status
At the end of 2014, the Sudanese parliament amended the country's interim constitution, turning the security forces into an official state force, like the army and police. This allowed the Rapid Support Forces to become the military branch of the security forces, fighting in several areas.

Most recently, the Janjaweed played a key role in the Battle of Nakhara in south Darfur, inflicting heavy losses on the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). President Bashir celebrated with the Janjaweed near the front lines, rewarding them, promoting their leaders and handing out medals.

Some sources say Hamidati made any participation by the Janjaweed in battle on the government side conditional on the regularisation of their status.

A source close to him said he "learned from the experience of his cousin, Musa Hilal, who took part in the creation of the Border Guards and participated in the government's military campaigns, before being purposely sidelined by the government - despite his status as an MP and his appointment to a federal ministerial post".

Before the constitutional amendment, Hamidati said that he had asked for a law to be passed allowing the Border Guards, whose intelligence operations he headed, to have powers and military ranks similar to those of the regular forces.

Hamidati demanded participation in government and the development of the areas inhabited by Rihal Arabs in Darfur, pointing to their role in ending the rebellion there and making a success of the Khartoum and Doha negotiations with armed Darfur rebel groups.

Hamidati holds the rank of brigadier and says he achieved it through his military successes, despite having never attended a military academy. He is also a leader of Darfur's Arab tribes, which fought against the rebels in that area.

He became a leader of the Border Guards, which Musa Hilal formed in 2003, and was appointed as a security adviser in South Darfur state. He was later sacked after being accused of involvement in violence in South Darfur.

His sacking occurred after his dispute with the former governor of South Darfur, Hamad Ismail. Ismail had targeted Hamidati's Ruzayqat al-Abalah tribe, the Janjaweed ledaer claimed. After the two men fell out, violence broke out in South Darfur.

After the latest violence, Hamidati became a more important figure, especially as Hilal's fortunes with the government waned. Hamidati said that if his tribe were disempowered in South Darfur, the rebellion would return.

He has become a rising star in the Sudanese press - and, at the same time, a widely feared figure.

Accusations of abuses
In addition to the human rights violations they are accused of in Darfur, his forces are accused of looting and killing people in areas they passed through when they returned from the battlefields of South Kordofan.

"Our forces are disciplined and do not commit violations," he said. "These violations are committed by others who happen to be leaving at the same time. There may be some indiscipline, but these are individual cases which we deal with straight away. Our troops are not angels and similar things happen in other armed forces."

Observers are concerned, however, with Hamidati's ambition, which some say could end up destroying the country after the concessions the government has granted him.

The government has shown its weakness by turning the Janjaweed into a force above criticism, punishing politicians who have expressed concerns about them, say analysts.

Their promotion has dealt a blow to national dialogue efforts, especially following the arrest of the opposition Umma Party leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi. Mahdi, one of the main figures expected to participate in this dialogue, had accused the Janjaweed of committing crimes and recruiting foreigners.

When Mahdi was arrested, Hamidati said the Janjaweed were now in charge of the country - and they were the ones who could decide whether to release Mahdi or keep him in prison.

Previously, Hamidati used to make statements portraying himself as a source of security and stability. 

When the 3,000 Janjaweed were deployed in Khartoum, Hamidati said they would be the main protection force for the Sudanese capital, allowing denizens to live in peace.

"We came to defend you and you should thank us," he said. "We could have left the rebels to attack you."

The Sudanese government is accused of using the Janjaweed to suppress the September 2013 protests against fuel prices. Hundreds of demonstrators were killed and injured.

In the 1980s the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi armed the Masiriya and Ruzayqat tribes to fight against the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), then led by John Garang. 

These became known as "Sadiq's militias".

They were resented by the army. In 1989, under Bashir's command, the army carried out a successful coup against Mahdi. On the day of the coup, Bashir challenged these militias to fight against the army. Some observers believe that the Rapid Response Units may now bring about the fall of the regime.

One military analyst, who asked not to be named in this article, told al-Araby al-Jadeed the bureacracy of the official state forces keeps them less favoured by officials.

"The police and army have well-established systems and traditions that can't be bypassed," he said. "The government has decided that militia warfare is best because of its flexibility. Armies were created to fight other armies and it is difficult for them to fight rebel guerrillas. However, mobilising militias comes at a price - they demand land, power, and money."

The analyst said arming militias always led to problems. He said the government needed to collect the 4,000,000 weapons in the country before the situation gets further out of control. If the situation stayed as now, there will be a new rebellion against the government, he said, leading to new alliances in Darfur that would lead to the region separating from Sudan, like South Sudan did.

Analysts said the inevitable outcome of the Janjaweed's deployment in Khartoum and the conflict zones will be a crisis which would bring chaos to Khartoum, as the Janjaweed are an undisciplined militia and their leader wants to gain power.

Some high-ranking officials from the ruling National Congress Party reportedly want to ally with him, explicitly for this purpose - and this makes the Janjaweed a ticking time bomb.

This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition.


View original: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/5/25/the-janjaweed-sudans-ticking-time-bomb

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FROM THE ARCHIVE OF SUDAN WATCH

African Sheikh Musa Hilal & Janjaweed - Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes sign peace deal in W. Darfur, W. Sudan
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Video Transcript of 2004 interview with alleged Janjaweed leader Sudan warlord Musa Hilal
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Here is a copy of the video transcript of a Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Hilal in September 2004. Last paragraph refers to a list of individuals alleged to be guilty of crimes against humanity. Musa Hilal's name is on the list. 
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Sudan Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal interview in Darfur 2004 and Khartoum 2005
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Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Sudan's Gold: Hemedti's untold power - Hilal’s militia made up to $54m pa controlling Jebel Amer goldmine

Article from Zimfocus.net - African Business Magazine
Written by TOM COLLINS
Dated 08 JULY 2019
SUDAN’S GOLD: HEMEDTI’S UNTOLD POWER

The power of Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagolo, who has led the violent suppression of demonstrators in Sudan, is based not only on leadership of a militia but also his control of valuable gold resources. Tom Collins reports

After weeks of peaceful sit-ins outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, the uneasy truce between Sudan’s security forces and thousands of protestors demanding change was finally ruptured at dawn on 3 June. Members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a militia widely condemned for human rights violations in its suppression of rebels in the western province of Darfur – fanned out across the city and proceeded to kill over 100 demonstrators.

A grim warning had been given just days before by Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagolo, the leader of the RSF and vice-president of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the body that has controlled the country since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April. “My patience has limits,” he said.

Hemedti, along with the head of the army, Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, has emerged as a key figure within the TMC. With a violent past and control of a paramilitary force estimated to number as many as 40,000, many fear that he has set his ambitions on more than simply preventing Sudan’s transition to democracy.

His reported vast personal wealth – accrued from the gold trade, along with outsourcing his militia to the former regime and Saudi Arabia to fight the war in Yemen – under­pins his power.

In 2017, Sudan produced 107 tonnes of gold, making it the third-largest producer on the continent after Ghana and South Africa. Some 70% of output is estimated to be smuggled abroad, although the true size of the illicit trade is hard to quantify. Through his militia, Hemedti controls one of the country’s most lucrative gold mines – Jebel Amer in North Darfur.

By origin a member of the Rezeigat tribe in the Darfur region, Hemedti rose from humble origins as a trader of cloth and camels. In 2003, he joined the Janjaweed, a local militia that was waging a brutal campaign against Darfuri rebels on behalf of the government under the leadership of tribal chief Musa Hilal. The conflict has left 300,000 dead, according to UN estimates.

Through his role in the war, he gained favour with President Bashir, who in 2014 put him in charge of the RSF, which had been formed as an offshoot of the Janjaweed. The group was given the status of a regular force but retained its violent modus operandi, and Bashir began to use it as a bulwark against the strength of Sudan’s military.

“That’s when Hemedti became quite strong,” says Omer Ismail, senior advisor at the Washington-based NGO Enough Project. “Bashir was not confident in the army because the economy was deteriorating rapidly and there were many problems.”

Yet along with a position of almost unparalleled power, Hemedti’s ascendance was accompanied by access to riches. In 2015, a report drawn up for the UN Security Council found that Hilal’s militia was making up to $54m a year from control of the Jebel Amer goldmine. The following year, Hemedti moved against Hilal, who had come into conflict with the government, and seized control of the lucrative mine. Ismail estimates that his earnings may now outstrip those of his former boss.

With this money, the militia kingpin has been able to recruit jobless youths from the across the Sahel to the RSF, resulting in an ever-growing force which Ismail claims is presently “occupying” Sudan: “I would say that Sudan is occupied now because the troops that he is using to control and monopolise power, most of them are not even Sudanese. They are recruited from Chad, Mali and Niger. They are from the Sahel.”

As the RSF continues to sow terror, much of the gold coming from the Jebel Amer mine, which supports a surrounding settlement of around 70,000 people, is exported clandestinely to various international buyers via a shady and complicated web of smuggling activities.

“Almost everything makes its way east to Khartoum,” says Ismail. “From there it is almost exclusively sold to traders in the UAE.”

With very little capacity for smelting and refining gold in Sudan, the metal travels onwards in rough kilogram bricks to countries including Dubai, which act as a gateway for much of Africa’s illicit gold trade.

Comtrade data shows that the UAE imported $15.1bn worth of gold from Africa in 2016, more than any other country and up from $1.3bn in 2006. The share of African gold in the UAE’S gold imports increased from 18% to nearly 50% over the same period and the industry accounts for approximately one fifth of the country’s total GDP.

The substantial offtake of Sudanese gold in Dubai’s markets suggests that economic considerations are part of the UAE’s chequebook diplomacy, which saw a joint $3bn aid package pumped into Khartoum alongside Saudi Arabia.

Hemedti has close links with both Gulf countries as the agent who recruited around 15,000 of his troops to fight the war in Yemen against Houthi-led militia. Ismail speculates that he may receive anywhere between $2,000 to $3,000 a month per person as payment for outsourcing his troops.

Other gold routes, according to Ismail, include the “40-day route” through the desert, historically used to smuggle slaves and ivory to either Tripoli in Libya or Cairo in Egypt. Ismail estimates that the country has around 440 remote airstrips used in the clandestine trade.

“They put the gold in a Land Cruiser and smuggle the gold outside the city of Khartoum,” he explains. “Then one of the smaller companies who have licences to fly out of Sudan will set up a local flight. They will put the gold in the belly of the plane. The gold will then come back through Khartoum airport and onwards to its final destination.”

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT
One of these destinations is Russia. Ramping up its presence across Central Africa and the Horn, Moscow has begun gold mining operations in Sudan over the last two years – predominantly in the northeastern region away from Darfur.

Sim Tack, global security analyst for Stratfor, says that the Wagner Group, a Russian private-military outfit with close links to the Kremlin, has been providing security to Russian companies working in the region.

“Russia has become very involved in mineral extraction in Sudan,” he says. “We have seen big accounts of Russia doing this in the Central African Republic (CAR) but at the same time they are doing it in Sudan. Sudan is the entry point into Africa which Russia is using to support its presence in CAR.” 

Data from the Russian central bank cited by Bloomberg show that its gold reserves have nearly quadrupled over the past 10 years, and that 2018 marked the most “ambitious year yet” for Russian gold-buying.

Much of Russia’s activities across Sudan and the CAR are shrouded in secrecy, and the Enough Project’s Ismail believes there is “no way of knowing” how large the trade is.

As for Hemedti, it’s clear that the vast amount of money earned from his gold-mining activities is a key enabler of the fearsome power he continues to wield in Khartoum and beyond.