Friday, July 28, 2006

Pronk's statement on oil fields protection is inexact - Sudanese MP

July 28, 2006 SMC/ST article says a Sudanese member of parliament claims a statement made by UN SGSR Jan Pronk on the issue of the protection of oil fields in southern Sudan is inexact [see previous entry here below] - excerpt:
The Energy and Mining Committee at the National Assembly has expressed its surprise at the statements made by the UN secretary-general's representative, Jan Pronk, were he warned against the disruption of security in the south because of what he termed was an oil protecting militia.

In a statement to pro ruling National Congress Party, The Sudanese Media Centre, the chairman of the energy and mining committee in parliament, Hussein Marnot, said the protection of oil companies was the direct responsibility of the armed forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

He described Pronk's statement regarding these militia forces as "incorrect".

Marnot said the militia Pronk was referring to was in the process of adopting a legal status by joining the SPLM or the armed forces, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

He noted that the groups operating under the name "oil security" were regular forces that protected oil fields and companies.

He said, "This takes place through coordination between the Ministry of Oil, police, as well as the armed forces. The description of militia does not befit these forces".
New oil platforms

Photo: New oil platforms are constructed, Saturday, Dec. 17, 2005 near Kotch in southern Sudan.

Tribal violence in South Sudan is more complex - UN Pronk

Click here for a must-read near verbatim transcript of a press conference by UN SRSG Jan Pronk held on 26 July 2006 at UNMIS Press Briefing Room, Ramsis Building. - via Sudan Tribune 28 July 2006. Excerpt from Q&A:
Q Two questions: one: you mentioned that oil companies in the south have their own militias. Could you elaborate on that? Who are these oil companies; are they foreign or national and is anyone negotiating with them on their militias?

Secondly; how seriously do you take the threats from AlQaeda that they will move in Sudan if the UN deployed in Darfur and what has the Government said to you about these threats?

SRSG Pronk: No details about the oil companies and those militias. I see it as a problem and today I am not going further than that. I am highlighting the complexity of the violence in the South. Many people say it is more than tribal, it is economic. Economic not only in the traditional sense of the word - that is the fight for water and all that - but also fight for other resources; fight for land which has been occupied for security reasons for instance by oil companies. People returning to the places where they came from find that the land has been occupied by the oil companies sometimes a decade or fifteen years after they had left and they are being denied access to their title by people in uniform. It is a problem and it will have to be discussed.

I don't know about new [AlQaeda] threats ...
[Note to self to take time out to digest this report. Light blogging over next few days]

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

Jan Pronk: Two new Darfur rebel groups G19 & NRF - SLM Abdel Wahid al-Nur declares his aim is to become President of Sudan

Here is the answer to my question about Minnawi and Nur: if Minni Minnawi takes up the top position in Darfur, what becomes of his rival Abdel Wahid al-Nur? UN SGSR Jan Pronk, in his latest blog entry, reveals that this week, Abdel Wahid al-Nur declared that his aim is to become President of Sudan.

Note also, Mr Pronk confirms JEM's aim is not peace but power in Khartoum. Some days I think the Sudanese rebels are all part of one group/strategy.

Jan Pronk blog entry July 22, 2006 - copied here in full:

Ten weeks after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement the situation is still quite bleak. As I wrote a month ago, the main problems are the lack of implementation and the lack of support. Violations of the agreement continue. Intra SLA fighting has not stopped. Two new movements have emerged. One is called the G19, a group which originally consisted of nineteen people, who were present in Abuja as members or advisors of the SLA delegation, but who increasingly disagreed with the leadership. In Abuja this led to a further split within the SLA, this time without consequences for the negotiations, because the dissenters were not considered strong on the ground. That may have been the case, but the G19 received more and more support amongst those who disagreed with the outcome of the talks. They were able to establish a stronghold in the north-western part of North Darfur, around Musbat and Birmasa. About one month after the signing of the agreement Minnie Minawi's forces attacked them, allegedly with some support from the Sudanese Armed Forces. They fought back, became stronger and presently they seem to be in control of the area concerned.

A second new group is the New Redemption Front (NRF). They seem to have their base in the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had participated in the Abuja talks. The JEM has never been strong on the ground, but the movement had quite knowledgeable negotiators with well articulated political objectives. They are supposed to have close ties with the Islamist. However, during the negotiations they never took a religiously inspired or ideological position. Their political demands did not include the establishment of a religious governance system in Darfur. Neither did they have specific religious claims with regard to the negotiations themselves (for instance special considerations for prayer time or during Ramadan). The JEM negotiators were both clever and flexible, up to a point. During the negotiations I more and more got the impression that they were not interested in reaching a result. Their objective did not seem to be peace in Darfur, but power in Khartoum. Because a solution in Darfur would also strengthen the position of the ruling party, the NCP, they would not join a peace agreement and always try to convince the other movements to do likewise.

That is the reason why the JEM could so easily change alliances. First, the movement joined forces with the MRND, a relatively small rebel group with a base close to the Chadian border, which was prevented by SLA to participate in the talks and had declared to fight itself a place at the negotiations table. When the SLA split into two factions which could not decide on common representatives, the JEM became their common spokesman, cleverly retarding any progress in the talks. Later JEM became the prime ally of the SLA faction led by Minnie Minawi, despite the fact that the latter's forces had driven them out of their stronghold around Gereida in South Darfur. Until a week before the closure of the talks the new allies were staunchly rejecting the draft agreement. However, when Minnie Minawi and Abdul Wahid traded places at the table, whereby the former signed the agreement and the latter rejected it, the JEM sided with the faction led by Abdul Wahid. After Abuja the JEM declared its intention to join the struggle of the Beja and the Rashaida in Hamesh Koreib in East Sudan. They brought their (little) forces from Darfur to the East. However, the Beja and Rashaida, who together had formed the Eastern Front, started consultations about peace talks with the Government and declared that the JEM was not welcome in the East.

Shortly thereafter, in June this year, the NRF attacked Hamrat al Sheikh, a small town in North Kordofan. It was a shock. For the first time a place outside Darfur had been attacked. Was this an exception, a guerilla attack to surprise and confuse, or would this be the beginning of the extension of the war in Darfur to other regions of Sudan? It had to be strongly condemned, as a brutal violation of the peace agreements, not only the DPA, but also the previous agreements, based on the N'Djamena cease fire, to which not only the Government and the Minie Minawi faction of the SLA are bound, but also the others, including the JEM, Abdul Wahid's faction of the SLA and all those commanders who at that time were part of SLA, but since then have joined either the G19 or the NRF.

Abdul Wahid must have understood this. He does not want to sign, but he also does not want to violate agreements which he has signed in the past. He has publicly dissociated himself from the NRF, keeping the door open for talks. Some secret overtures have been made, but so far to no avail. In the meantime Abdul Wahid is increasing his demands. This week he declared that his aim is to become President of Sudan. It may have been his answer to the nomination of Minnie Minawi, last week, to the post of Chief Advisor of the Presidency, a position created by the Darfur Peace Agreement. This would make Minnie Minawi officially the number four in the hierarchy in Khartoum and also number one in Darfur, heading the provisional government of Darfur, to be established in due time. Talks after the signing of the DPA could have resulted in a deal between Minnie Minawi and Abdul Wahid to split this powerful new position into two functions, one in Darfur and the other in Khartoum. However, this seems to be a foregone option after Minnie Minawi's official nomination (as of today he has not yet been appointed) and his invitation by President Bush to meet him in the White House. As a signatory to the peace agreement he certainly deserves credit. However, it remains to be seen whether these political and diplomatic steps will contribute to lasting peace. Abdul Wahid does not seem to be interested anymore to share power with Minnie Minawi. I am afraid that each week the chances to get more support to the DPA diminish.

In the meantime there are indications that the NRF and the G19 are closing ranks.The G19, after having been attacked by Minnie Minawi's forces, needed support from where ever they could get it. It means that the JEM, which seems to have access to ample financial resources in the Middle East and thus can provide weapons, has found a new ally. There also seem to be Chadian troops involved, but it is not clear whether they receive instructions from their government or from other power groups in Chad. According to the DPA all combating forces should have disclosed there whereabouts and stay in the areas which they controlled at M-day, when the agreement became operational. After verification of these zones by the African Union stability would be guaranteed by the freezing of the status quo and by demarcating buffer zones, demilitarized zones and humanitarian corridors. Instead Minie Minawi's faction has chosen to attack the G19 as well as the troops belonging to Abdul Wahid's faction. In this situation it will be difficult to verify the positions held by the parties on M-day. It seems that all parties, those who signed and those who did not sign, are trying to expand the area under their control.

In particular Minnie Minawi's faction has been accused of attacking civilians as well, with gross violations of human rights. Minnie Minawi has denied this and as long as an investigation has not taken place he should be given the benefit of the doubt. It is possible that his troops acted against his instructions. It would not be the first time that this has happened on either side of the conflict .The AU has refrained from carrying out an investigation, which makes it difficult to ascertain the truth. However, thousands of people have fled their homes. They have told stories which resemble those of last year, when they were attacked by militia.

All these violations should be a first issue on the agenda of the Cease Fire Commission, but so far it has they have not been addressed. Violations always take place after the signing of such an agreement. That cannot be avoided. However, a good cease fire agreement includes the establishment of institutions which can address such violations, if and when they take place. The Cease Fire Commission provided for in the DPA is such an institution. However, it does not yet function properly, because the two signatory parties - the Government and the Minnie Minawi faction - deny access to that commission to the non-signatories. This is understandable, but it is not wise. If the Abdul Wahid faction, the JEM and the new split factions violate the cease fire, which they have done, they should be taken to task. Denying them access to forums which have been established for that very purpose results in ongoing violations, not addressed, giving all parties, including the Government and Minnie Minawi's faction, an excuse to continue fighting, despite their signature. Is that the intention? We do not know, but we do know that we are caught in a vicious circle.

In my discussions during the peace talks in Abuja I have argued that a peace agreement would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for peace. We jumped across a hurdle, a high one, but after that hurdle there was a further track towards the finish. However, parties seem to think that the hurdle is the finish. Many international observers who signed the agreement as a witness declare that those who did not yet sign simply should do so, without further ado. That is a justifiable legal position, but politically it will not work. That has become clear in the ten weeks since the signing of the DPA. In many camps the people simply do not trust the parties that signed.

In some camps this has led to violence and to polarization along tribal lines. The anger is also directed against the African Union, which is not being seen as neutral. Instead the AU is being accused of having taken sides. G19 commanders speak about the AU as 'the enemy'. Troops loyal to Abdul Wahid have denied the AU access to regions which they control. AU escorts and convoys have been ambushed. It is not AMIS fault. The AU is only doing what is has to do according the peace agreement, within its limited capacity. But it is high time to invest in confidence building, by addressing all violations without exception, by allowing non-signatories to participate in talks to implement the cease fire, by starting all-inclusive preparations for the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and by including all displaced people, irrespective of their tribe or of their political affiliation, in the reconstruction of their villages. Last but not least confidence building requires a quick, serious, transparent and credible start with the disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed. Without demobilization of the militia and a visible disarmament of the Janjaweed the victims of the atrocities will not believe that the Darfur Peace Agreement, upon its signing, was meant to be a jump stride forward on the road towards sustainable peace.

UN envoy condemns killing of Sudanese officials at Hassa Hissa camp, W Darfur

July 25, 2006 UN News Centre report:
In a formal statement today, Jan Pronk, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Representative for Sudan, expressed concern about the lack of security and the resulting deterioration in conditions in IDP camps that last Thursday led to the three members of the State Water Corporation, who were testing water at the Hissa Hissa camp, being beaten to death by IDPs.

In many such camps, Mr Pronk said, "the conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities are no long available or significantly affected by insecurity, which has been worsened by a wide availability of weapons."

According to the recently signed Darfur Peace Agreement, responsibility for the internal security of those IDP camps under Government control falls to the Government in cooperation with the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission.

Mr Pronk expressed hope that the AU will soon be able to re-establish its police presence in the camps, after it was suspended due to attacks on its personnel. "AU deployment inside IDP camps is crucial to ensure security within the camps and provide the adequate environment for humanitarian work," he said.

SLA arms inside Zamzam camp N Darfur raising concern

UN humanitarian staff in Darfur cannot reach at least one in five of those in need of assistance because of the ongoing violence and insecurity there, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) reported today, July 24 2006. UN News Centre report excerpt:
Direct attacks against humanitarian workers, acts of banditry and fighting among rebel groups mean the UN has access to less than 80 per cent of beneficiaries, well below the rates achieved in 2004, according to UNMIS.

The mission said it is also worried that the security conditions inside some camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) are so poor that humanitarian operations there have been placed at risk. In Zamzam camp in North Darfur, the presence of arms belonging to elements of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), one of the region's rebel groups, is raising concerns. Last Thursday IDPs killed three government workers and a police officer at Zalengi camp in West Darfur.

The reports come as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, completed a two-day tour of South Darfur as part of his regular visits to the three states in the region.

Monday, July 24, 2006

Darfur conflict can be resolved within AU - Sudanese Ambassador

Excerpt from AND/Zambian Post report July 24, 2006:
The Darfur conflict can be solved within the African Union, Sudanese Ambassador to Zambia Salah Mohamed Ali has said.

In an interview with The Post, Ambassador Ali said there was no need for a United Nations intervention force to move into the war ravaged Darfur region.

"Our position is that the African Union Military Intervention Force (AMIS) should be helped to continue with its mandate by making available to it more resources and logistics," he said.

"The AU should continue other than switching to the UN because that will be a testimony to the failure of the AU and Africa as a whole to solve our own problems. Darfur conflict is an African problem and it should be solved within the African context."

Ambassador Ali said Sudan would soon come up with a road map for resolving the conflict.

"Our President made our position on changing mandate to UN very clear when he met Koffi Anan during the AU summit in Banjul. Within a month, we will draw up a road map and submit it to the UN which will consider our envisaged plan on resolving the conflict and give its position," he said.

Ambassador Ali said the AU had played a big role in the peace process and would succeed more if resources were made available.

"The AU helped us reach ceasefire between government and three rebel movements, unfortunately two other movements didn't sign in May but the government is doing its best to bring them to join the peace process," he said.

"The AU would succeed more with increased resources and logistics because the real problem is shortage of funds. At the donors' conference on July, 18 in Belgium the AU requested for about $400million and the conference managed to secure $250 million and we are hopeful that it will help them perform better."

Ambassador Ali said the pace of implementing provisions of the peace agreement was satisfactory and things were going well.

"The process suffered a major setback in July last year with the death of John Garang, he had an ambitious vision to establish a new Sudan as he called it and his death was not just a loss to SPLMA (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army) and Sudan but the whole of Africa," he said.

"But we are getting somewhere and even Sudan's mediation between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) means that we have a fully fledged government which has assumed its role not only locally but in the region as well."

Salva Kiir speech to Sudanese community in US Omaha

Excerpt from speech of Sudanese First Vice-President Salva Kiir in a meeting with the Sudanese community in Omaha, Nebraska on July 22, 2006:
Lastly, but not least, my most important message to all of our people inside Sudan and those of you in the Diaspora is that, unite! Our disunity is our greater enemy. I appeal to you all to reject your tribes, and unite under one tribe, the SPLM!!! Our disunity will not overcome the challenges ahead of us. Our disunity will not make us vote properly, and wisely when the day of the referendum comes. You all know that our final destiny depends on our unity. No nation in Africa and other parts of the world is built by one tribe. SPLM Oyeee! Thank you.
Salva Kiir

Photo: Salva Kiir is addressing the SPLM Chapter leaders in North America at the Marriott Hotel in Washington, USA. Full speech (Sudan Tribune)

SLM/A's Minnawi heads to Washington with chief of Dar Zaghawa tribe

The chairman of Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), Mani Arkoi Minawi, has made a stopover, in Khartoum Airport, for seven hours on his way to USA. Minawi held a meeting with leaders of the SLM advanced delegation, in Khartoum, where he briefed them on the situation in the field, Sudan Tribune reported July 23, 2006:
According to Al-Khartoum newspaper, Minawi received a briefing from the advanced delegation about the being carried out by the delegation regarding the implementation of the agreement and preparation of his swearing in as president's assistant, after he returns from USA, which will last in a week.

Minawi would be accompanied, in his visits to USA, by a number of advanced delegation members including Mariam Tex, Mustafa Abdallah Jamil and the supreme chief of Dar Zaghawa tribe. The SLM Secretary General Mustafa Tairab and the chief commanders of the SLA Juma Haggar will be part of his delegation.

The US President George W. Bush is expected to meet Minawi on 27 July. Minawi will discuss the Darfur Peace Agreement implementation and the role of the UN force in peace implementation.

Among rebel leaders in Darfur, only Minawi was persuaded by U.S. negotiator Robert Zoellick to support the power-sharing agreement in May. Now Minnawi is facing rising opposition to his leadership among commanders in northern Darfur, including those from his Zaghawa ethnic group, according to the United Nations.

Darfur holdout group JEM/NRF claims it controls N Darfur

July 24 2006 Sudan Tribune report excerpt:
The National Redemption Front (NRF) declared that the State of North Darfur is now entirely clear of any forces belonging to Minni Minawi, the signatory to the Abuja Agreement, DPA in last May.

But Minni Minawi the leader of one of the SPLM groups, denied the NRF statement. Minawi said Khalil has been, during the last four years, alleging that his troops were controlling regions in Darfur, but that was not true. "I believe Dr Khalil's statements would be like his previous ones" he added.

Khalil Ibrahim, a member of the NRF Leadership Authority and President of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) said that the NRF had to repel continuous attacks by "Minawi's forces and his Janjaweed and government allies".

"The mission is now accomplished leaving the NRF in full control of the entire State of North Darfur. Minawi's forces have been driven out of Forawya, Umbaru, Kornoi, Bir Mazza, Amo, Khazzan Abu Gimra, Muzbad, Amarai, Kutum, Seyah and Atroon areas. 200 fighters have deserted Minawi and joined the NRF while another 84 soldiers taken as war prisoners".

Ibrahim stated that "Minawi's weight in the Darfur Military Equation now equals zero". "He can no longer deceive the world as he once did".

The statement invited the UN and the African Union to verify their entire control of the region. "The UN Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk and Representatives of the AU are cordially invited to visit NRF sites in the specified areas and review the "DPA" in accordance with these new realities".

Sunday, July 23, 2006

Slovene president envoy held in Darfur

Tomo Kriznar, President Janez Drnovsek's special envoy to Darfur, has said that court proceedings against him have been started in the Sudanese city of Al Fasher, Drnovsek's office reported. - via SudanTribune 21 July 2006:
According to Kriznar, who was arrested on Wednesday for lacking a valid visa for Sudan, he is being dealt with in a correct manner and is expecting a hearing.

Drnovsek's office has already called on the president of the African Union commission, the Sudanese embassy in Vienna, which also covers Slovenia, as well as other foreign institutions for assistance in securing Kriznar's release.

Drnovsek sent Kriznar to Sudan in early February. He has also presented a plan to solve the crisis in the province as well as launched a humanitarian initiative.

Sudan considers international Muslim troops for Darfur

According to the Dutch development minister, Agnes van Ardenne, the EU, together with the UN and the US, had succeeded in getting Khartoum to agree to the establishment of a UN force in Darfur, Radio Netherlands Vanessa Mock reported July 18, 2006 - excerpt:
Speaking at an international conference on Darfur in Brussels, van Ardenne said Khartoum had now bowed to international pressure, but only on condition that AU forces would form part of the UN mission. "[The Sudan government] will not accept a new force. They will only accept the same force under the umbrella of the UN. And now we've understood more clearly what was hampering them before. ... AU troops will remain on the ground, they will be strengthened, more equipped and will operate under the UN umbrella."

Ms Van Ardenne said she was hopeful that the new mission would be ready by the end of the year and said the Netherlands would help train AU troops for deployment under the UN.
On or around 19 July 2006 Sudan's Foreign Minister, Dr Lam Akol, announced that the Sudanese government will submit to the United Nations on 1 Aug a plan to change the situation on the ground in Darfur.

According to an article at the Sudan Tribune 23 July 2006, London based Asharq Alawsat daily newspaper says a plan to deploy Arab and Muslim troops in Darfur is being prepared by the Sudanese security and intelligence organs as well the armed forces. The article points out that former US President Bill Clinton suggested on Sunday 16 July that Sudan accepts UN forces from Muslim countries. "Sudan should be pressured to accept international troops from Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh and others to help maintain peace and order in Darfur," Clinton told an audience at AU headquarters.

On 18 July 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he will propose to the Security Council a new level of support to AMIS - UN peacekeepers will come from Africa and Asia as helpers.

Further reading

Jul 20 2006 New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

Jul 22 2006 US's Frazer: US still hoped for transition to UN end of Sept and would not extend financial support after that date.

Saturday, July 22, 2006

Eric Reeves: U.S. led coalition force with Chapter 7 mandate will be required in Darfur to militarily defeat the rebels and militias

Eric Reeves

At long last, in his latest opinion piece, warmongering American academic Eric Reeves (pictured above) admits that if people really understood what they are calling for to protect Darfuris, they'd desist in their demands. No wonder he and other Western activists do not spell things out to their readers: they would not receive the same amount of attention or have many followers to donate to their cause, read their columns, visit their websites, buy their books, promote their awards, subscribe to their writings, watch their plays. I'd be right behind them, promoting their writings if what they wrote was accurate, sensible and not looking to set the tinder box of Africa alight. Their calls for international troops in Darfur does not make any sense to me because what they are proposing is military intervention (an act of war) in Sudan without a UN resolution - China and Russia would never approve such a resolution. The time and effort they've spent on backing the rebels and publishing what they want to hear, could have been better spent on pulling people together to support the fledgling African Union Mission in Darfur.

Excerpt from the opinion piece July 21, 2006:
Perhaps in understanding what is really militarily at stake in protecting Dafuris, those who have so often and loudly demanded such protection---including UN and government officials, humanitarian and human rights organizations, and advocacy groups---will desist in their demands. But they cannot have it both ways: they cannot demand that civilians and humanitarians be protected and then fail to accept the extraordinary military requirements and difficulties entailed in providing that protection.
Also, in the following edited excerpt, Reeves outlines what (It seems to me) he appears to believe: that a U.S. led coalition force with Chapter 7 mandate will be required in Darfur to militarily defeat the rebels and militias. Note how he chose to use a sub-title that misleads readers into believing it is the view of the U.S. and not just one American official:
THE REAL U.S. VIEW FROM KHARTOUM

Cable written by U.S. Foreign Service Officer Ron Capps, Deputy Chief of the Political/Economic Section in Embassy Khartoum. Capps' analysis was distributed confidentially on April 28, 2006 (a week before the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja):
"An Abuja peace accord is unlikely to stop the violence in Darfur. There are several reasons why:

[1] Rebel field commanders have lost faith in the leadership of the movements. Nineteen SLA/[Abdel] Wahid [el-Nur] commanders have publicly broken with Wahid. SLA/[Minni] Minawi has splintered, with breaks by Sulieman Jamooz, Sharif Harir, Sulieman Marajan, Khamis Abdullah and seventeen other commanders. Other commanders have defected to Wahid. At least one has joined the government in fighting the SLA; [ ]

[2] Government of Sudan negotiators do not represent the Arab tribal militias of the Janjaweit leaders, nor does the Government have a sufficient level of control over those militias to guarantee their compliance;

[3] fighting between SLA factions will continue and could degrade into a tribal war which would eventually draw in the Arab tribals."
Three months ago, Capps drew inescapable conclusions from the violence he predicted, and which is now all too evident:
"A weak international force with a limited mandate will be powerless to stop the violence. In this scenario, Internally Displaced Persons and refugees will be unable to return home, rebels and militias will continue to kill with impunity, and all our work in Abuja will have been futile."

"Regardless of whether Abuja produces an enhanced cease-fire agreement or a complete peace accord --- or even if the talks completely collapse --- in order to stop the violence, rebel forces and militias will have to be mapped, counted, cantoned and disarmed. Given the lack of cohesion among the rebels and the lack of Government control over the militias, it seems likely that the groups will resist these steps, particularly disarmament. In this event, the international peace and security force will be required to militarily defeat them. This is not a Chapter VI mission. The force will require the combat power and prowess to enforce a peace accord if it is to provide a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees. It will require the right mandate. Seven UN Security Council Resolutions have been issued under Chapter VII. This must be the starting point for the follow-on force."
Capps here characterizes the force necessary in Darfur:
"Stopping the violence in Darfur will require a military force with first-world leadership, first-world assets, and first-world experience. US and coalition experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq is relevant here. Putting together such a coalition and getting it into place to do its work will require that the United States government and our military take a lead role, at least initially. Our NATO and other first-world military partners will not be keen to step forward without our participation, and many of the traditional UN troop contributing countries lack the military capability to successfully complete the mission."
- - -

Signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement implementing the deal is seen by Eric Reeves as an "ominous collaboration"

Excerpt from Eric Reeves's July 21 2006 opinion piece (see above)
"There is an increasing body of evidence, including from eyewitnesses, which makes overwhelmingly clear that an ominous collaboration between SLA/Minawi and Khartoum's regular forces defined recent fighting in Bir Mazza and Um Sidir, North Darfur."
What is ominous about parties to a peace agreeement implementing what they had agreed? I guess it can be viewed as "ominous" if you are anti the Darfur Peace Agreement/GoS/SLA-Minnawi but pro SLM-Nur and all the others who are against Darfur's peace deal.
- - -

July 22 2006 When did Sudanese VP Ali Taha say Sudan would allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur?

When did Sudanese VP Ali Taha say Sudan would allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur?

Khartoum protests

Photo: Aug 4 2004 (AFP) CBS News Sudan Protests U.N. Ultimatum: More than 100,000 people staged a state-orgainsed protest Wednesday against a UN Security Council resolution giving Sudan 30 days to stop militia violence in Darfur or fact economic and diplomatic penalties. -- "Targeting Sudan means you will fall into a third swamp, after Afghanistan and Iraq," said a senior member of the ruling party, Mohammed Ali Abdullah, in comments directed at President Bush and British leader Tony Blair.

Khartoum demo

Photo: Mar 8 2006 (Reuters) Thousands of Sudanese protest against UN force

capt.sge.kjo33.250606193738.photo00.photo.default-512x341.jpg

Photo: Jun 25 2006 (AFP/Isam al-Hag) Sudanese from student and youth organisations rally in front of the parliament building in Khartoum, to protest against UN plans to deploy peacekeepers in Darfur. See report Jun 26 2006 Thousands of protestors gathered in Khartoum to protest against UN and its proposed peacekeepers: Up to 5,000 protesters, mainly from the youth and student organisations of the ruling National Congress, gathered in front of parliament in Khartoum Sunday to protest against the proposed deployment. "Down, Down United Nations", "Down, Down, USA", "We will not be ruled by the CIA", they chanted, as some of them torched a life-size dummy with the words UN and USA inscribed on it.

When did VP Ali Taha say Sudan would allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur?

The photos here above are just a few of many showing demos in Khartoum against the UN over the past two years. I am still trying to get to the root of where Western activists got the information they keep spreading that Khartoum agreed to UN peacekeeepers for Darfur. If their information is based on something that I have missed, I am interested in finding it, to see for myself how it could be construed as a commitment by Khartoum. Western activists keep claiming that Khartoum is backtracking, reneging, going back on a "commitment" that, so far from what I can gather, was never made.

For example, note this excerpt from Eric Reeves' latest opinon piece entitled Security in Darfur: Donors' Conference in Brussels Fails to Take Action
"'(Second Vice President) Ali Osman Mohamed Taha was absolutely categorical that once a peace deal was signed [in Abuja] ... Sudan would allow UN peace keepers in Darfur. There was no ambiguity at all,' said [Chief Editor] Patrick Smith of the Africa Confidential political newsletter in London." (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 11, 2006).

Of course once Khartoum secured in Abuja the deal it found most advantageous, it promptly reneged on Taha's commitment. "
A commitment eh? What commitment? When and where did Second VP Ali Osman Taha say Sudan would allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur? I challenge Eric Reeves and Patrick Smith to back up such claims or admit they've made it up to suit their opinion pieces.

So far, all I can find is this excerpt from a Reuters AlertNet piece by Mohammed Abbas 11 July 2006:
Analysis-Little sign of peace or agreement after Darfur deal:

"(Second Vice President) Ali Osman Mohamed Taha was absolutely categorical that once a peace deal was signed ... Sudan would allow UN peace keepers in Darfur. There was no ambiguity at all," said Patrick Smith of the Africa Confidential political newsletter in London.
Further reading

Jun 22 2006 Human Rights Watch incorrectly says Khartoum is backtracking - I challenge Human Rights Watch to point out when and where the Sudanese Government agreed to accept UN troops in Darfur and monitor a peace agreement.

Jun 27 2006 Human Rights Watch wants more troops in Darfur - - When did the Sudanese government say it would support the transition to a UN force? How can the Sudanese government renege on a commitment it never made?

Jul 2 2006 Washington Post continues to publish propaganda on Darfur - On reading the editorial closely, I saw no fact based news but a piece of activism calling for UN troops in Darfur and the isolation of Khartoum regime. Clearly it states, quote: "This year, Sudan's government declared that it would allow United Nations peacekeepers into the western region of Darfur."

capt.sge.kjo33.250606193738.photo01.photo.default-361x512.jpg

June 25, 2006 photo: A Sudanese youth holds a banner reading in Arabic," America stop", during a rally in front of the parliament building in Khartoum, to protest against UN plans to deploy peacekeepers in the troubled region of Darfur. The UN's bid to gain backing for its Darfur peacekeeping plan suffered a fresh blow when Khartoum accused the world body of providing cover for a rebel leader who rejects a recent peace deal. (AFP/Isam al-Hag)

Demos in Sheiriya Gereida via Jan Pronk Weblog

Mar 8 2006 Sudanese students offers reward for head of UN envoy

3 photos: Demonstration in Nyala against a potential AMIS-UN transition. (Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg) Source: March 13, 2006 entry at Jan Pronk's weblog." See Jan Pronk's weblog accuses Sudanese government of a political campaign against the United Nations

Sheiriya Gereida

Sheiriya Gereida

Sheiriya Gereida

May 7 2006 Protests greet UN's Egeland in Darfur, before Gereida visit: As Jan Egeland stepped off his plane, several dozen protesters chanted and waved banners saying "No to international interference," an apparent reference to a proposal to send U.N. peacekeepers to Darfur to calm the violence that has killed 180,000 people and displaced 2 million others. Saturday, a spokesman for the Sudanese government suggested that Sudan would welcome U.N. peacekeepers, but a foreign ministry spokesman told Reuters on Sunday that the government had not yet decided whether to allow the so-called "blue helmets" into the region.

US's Frazer: US still hoped for transition to UN end of Sept and would not extend financial support after that date

Despite Sudan's resistance of pressure from world powers this week to accept a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur to replace an African Union force, leaders at a conference in Brussels are optimistic of a Khartoum change of heart, reports African News Dimension today, quoting Guardian newspapers as its source, in an article entitled World powers optimistic on UN force for Darfur:
"To protect innocent lives in Darfur, we need an international peacekeeping operation with the capability to address the complexity of the challenges," US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer said.

Frazer said the US still hoped for a transition to the UN at the end of September and would otherwise not extend financial support after that date.
Note, People's Daily Online/Xinhua July 19, 2006 - EU foreign policy chief says Sudanese government closer to change of position on UN mission in Darfur - excerpt:
A Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Monday that Akol was not traveling to Brussels to give a nod to a UN mission.

The leaders are meeting in Brussels to discuss the security situation in the war-torn Darfur region and the implementation of a fragile peace agreement. Donors are also expected to pledge support for the AU mission in Darfur, both financially and in technology and logistics.

U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazer, said her country is ready to give assurances to the Sudanese government on the nature of the UN mission.

"We try to give some assurances to President (Omar Hassan) Bashir -- through his foreign minister -- about what the intent of a UN mission would be," she told the same press conference.

She met separately with Akol in the morning.

"I think it's important that we also be transparent with the government of Sudan and explain what our intension is ... There is no hidden agenda here. There is no ulterior motive."

She said the goal of the UN mission is to support and protect civilian lives in the region and allow the displaced to return to normal life. "We are there and we want a capable force given the complexity of the challenges."
See July 21 2006 - New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

Friday, July 21, 2006

New York Times' Kristof and Miller dramatise Darfur revelations

Minnesota Public Radio report - Times writers dramatize Darfur revelations - by Marianne Combs, July 20, 2006:
How do you write a play about genocide that both delivers an important political message and a compelling evening of theater? A New York Times staffer has come to the Twin Cities hoping to do just that.

St. Paul, Minn. - In the Darfur region of Sudan, people are dying by the hundreds of thousands in a blatant act of genocide. New York Times researcher Winter Miller has studied the Darfur crisis for years, but she still wasn't prepared for the reality when she travelled to the Sudanese border earlier this year.

"People talk about the resilience of the Sudanese, and there's no better word," says Miller. "It's the most punishing environmental conditions. It's unimaginable to me how people forage in peaceful times. Add a genocide, and they're getting raped and killed every time they step outside to get firewood. It's beyond comprehension."

Miller is also a playwright. She found an opportunity to bridge her two worlds in Minneapolis at the Playwrights' Center's "Two-Headed Challenge." Each year the Playwrights' Center chooses a writer who wants to collaborate with someone knowledgeable on a difficult topic.

Winter Miller chose to work with her colleague, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. Kristof says he was happy to help.

"Since Winter knows the world of theater, and since it is a way of dramatizing really awful things that people don't always want to focus on, I thought it was terrific," says Kristof.

Many a movie has dealt with genocide: "Hotel Rwanda," "Schindler's List." But how do you convey the horror of genocide on the stage? Playwrights' Center Director Polly Carl says this has got to be one of the very hardest kinds of plays to write.

"Plays are really about the imagination," says Carl. "Films can show you lots of bodies and can give you the horrific visual images without saying much. But with a play, you really have to figure out a way that you can take an issue that's enormous, shrink it down so it fits on a stage, and still let it have the impact. You still have to feel that enormity."

Carl and a director sit with Miller through several readings of her play, suggesting revisions to make it more dramatic and more accessible.

Miller says she wants her audience to connect with the people of Darfur by seeing individual characters on stage, instead of a sea of nameless faces on the news. And so she created Hawa, a young teacher and translator who's lost her family and is struggling to survive.

Hawa's plight unfolds alongside the story of a Swedish journalist desperate to report the crisis, and an American doctor trying to provide aid to the wounded.

The title for Winter Miller's play is "Never Again, Again." She says in the wake of past genocides, people have declared "Never again!" But still genocides continue.

Miller says with her other plays, she's used to being patient, waiting for the work to find a home on stage. But not this time.

"I wrote this play now, so quickly and for this reason, because something needs to be done now. Something needs to be done yesterday," says Miller. "So in an ideal world somebody says, 'Let me see that script,' great! I love the idea of it, let's do it."

The Playwrights' Center in Minneapolis has scheduled a dramatic reading of "Never Again, Again" as part of its PlayLabs festival. Then Winter Miller will have to wait and see if a theater is willing to mount a full production.
Labwork

The Playwrights' Center's Polly Carl, writer Winter Miller and a director discuss the latest draft of "Never Again, Again." Winter Miller's play addresses the genocide of black Africans by their Arab neighbors over land use. (Photo and caption by MPR/Marianne Combs)

Nicholas Kristof
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof has covered the Darfur crisis for years, with help from researcher and playwright Winter Miller. Miller was inspired by the experience to write the play "Never Again, Again." (Photo by Fred Conrad - caption by MPR/Marianne Combs)

Genocide on stage
Actress Sonja Parks plays the role of Hawa in Winter Miller's play "Never Again, Again." The play is being developed as part of the Playwrights' Center's annual Playlab Festival. (Photo and caption by MPR/Marianne Combs)

Peace boards

Peace board installation asks "Does anyone have any helpful suggestions for non-violent forms of conflict resolution? On personal, group, national or international level"

Peace boards

It would be interesting to read what is posted on a peace post installation. Not sure what I would write on a peace board. Probably something by the late great Mahatma Gandhi.

From Clare White of Never Again International July 16, 2006:
Peace boards, based on Basia Forrest's Peace Posts that have been received enthusiastically by many members of Never Again, got to Stoke-on-Trent, UK, this weekend. The boards were accompanied by three soldiers sitting outwardly in the blazing sun.

They will stay for a few more weeks, giving us the opportunity to see how the people of Stoke respond to the chance to contribute their ideas to peacebuilding.
Peace boards on Flickr originally uploaded by cmwhite July 16 2006.

Obasanjo, El Bashir meet to end Darfur crisis

President Olusegun Obasanjo has met with the President of Sudan, Omar El-Bashir, to review on-going efforts to resolve crisis in Darfur. El Bashir, who was in Nigeria for the 7th Leon Sullivan Summit, also discussed the ongoing implementation of the CPA with rebel groups in the south of the country. - allAfrica July 21, 2006.

AU briefs African envoys on Darfur peace implementation

The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) convened a meeting with the African Group of Ambassadors on 18 July, 2006. The meeting was held to update the group on the activities of AMIS and also exchange ideas and view points regarding the efforts of the Mission in the Sudan.

The meeting was chaired by the Acting Head of Mission Madam Monique Mukaruliza and attended by the Head of the DPA Implementation Team Ambassador Sam Ibok and senior personnel of AMIS, said the AU spokesperson, Noureddine Mezni, in a press release. - Full story ST July 21 2006.

Aid work suspended in Zalinge, Darfur after killing - UN

International aid operations in refugee camps in the Zalinge area of Darfur have been suspended after three water workers were killed by a mob, UNHCR said today - Reuters report via Sudan Tribune:
UNHCR said the three were beaten to death on Thursday in the region near the border with Chad in circumstances that were still unclear.

The incident follows an attack on two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Djebel Mara area, north of Zalinge, two days ago and the fatal shooting of an NGO driver attacked by bandits in Darfur's El Geneina last week, the UNHCR said.

Thursday, July 20, 2006

UN workshop aims to help Sudan plan and manage natural environment

UN workshop aims to help Sudan plan and manage natural environment, UN News Centre reported 20 July 2006:
"This country has endured years of turmoil and years of misery," Achim Steiner, UNEP's Executive Director, said in a news release. "A new chance for the people of Sudan will hinge on numerous factors, including strengthening the ability of the Sudanese authorities to sustainably manage their natural resources."

He emphasized that restoring and rehabilitating Sudan's economically important and productive land, forests, river systems, and other crucial ecosystems, which so many people depend on, will play an important role in ensuring stability and a lasting peace.

"Environmental issues in Sudan such as desertification, land degradation and deforestation greatly contribute to the scarcity of vital resources such as water for drinking and irrigation, animal fodder and fuelwood," he said. "This scarcity can drive and exacerbate conflicts and population displacement, which may in turn then result in accelerated environmental degradation and human suffering."

He pledged UNEP's readiness to help the Sudanese authorities to address these problems. The agency is currently conducting a detailed assessment of Sudan's challenges with the aim of identifying environmental issues and priorities that require priority attention. That study is due to be published in October.

Remarks by President Bush and Salva Kiir

Click here for transcript of remarks by President Bush and Salva Kiir, First Vice President of the Government National Unity of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan. White House Press Office July 20, 2006 (via PR Newswire/Yahoo)

Bush and Kiir

Photo: US President George W. Bush with Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir pictured here in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC. Bush said that there was "a lot of work to be done" before an international force can go to Darfur to help beleaguered African Union (AU) troops. (AFP/Jim Watson)

In a meeting with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Chapters' leaders in the USA and Canada, the Sudanese First Vice President Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir admitted that there is slow progress in CPA implementation.

Sudan to provide UN with plan for change in Darfur

Khartoum, July 19 (SUNA):
The Foreign Minister, Dr Lam Akol, announced that the government will submit to the United Nations on the 1st of next August a plan to change the situation on the ground in Darfur region.

In a press statement at Khartoum airport upon his return from Brussels Wednesday evening, Dr Akol said that he participated in the Donors Conference, which was intended to attract aid for the African Union forces Darfur.

He said that the donors pledged to extend more than 200 million dollars for Darfur, adding that this sum is sufficient for the requirements of the African Union forces in Darfur till after the 30th of next September.

He said that Sudan delegation has met at the conference with the UN Secretary General and senior officials of the European union and explained Sudan vision concerning peace in Darfur and the arrival of international forces in the region.

He said that the government delegation held in Brussels meetings with the American, Dutch delegation and the delegation of the European Union and discussed progress of the bilateral relations. The minister described the meeting as a successful one as it came out with recommendations supporting to the African Union forces in Darfur. He said that the meeting has appreciated the efforts of Sudan government concerning implementation of Darfur peace agreement on the ground. - via ReliefWeb & CFD

US, UK government statements on AMIS Donor Conference

July 19 2006 US Department of State press release via ReliefWeb, excerpt:
United States commits $116 million at Sudan donors conference: The United States maintains a strong partnership with the African Union on the Darfur issue, and we commend the efforts of the AMIS peacekeepers and their leaders. Conference participants expressed broad agreement that the transition of the AMIS to a United Nations Mission should go forward as soon as possible. They universally called for all parties in Sudan to respect the cease-fire agreements and to halt all hostilities.
July 19 2006 UK government statement on African Union Mission in Sudan: Donor conference, Brussels:
The British Government is gravely concerned at the tragic situation in Darfur. It is playing an active part in the response to the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. Britain has provided over GBP 126 million in humanitarian assistance since September 2003, and continues to support the peace process in every way it can.

The African Union has played the leading international role in Darfur. The troops and civilian police of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) are playing a vital role in easing the suffering of the people of Darfur. The Darfur Peace Agreement provides the only basis for lasting peace in Darfur. Its signature at Abuja in May was a tribute to the African Union mediation. AMIS is critical to the success of the Darfur Peace Agreement and has already reduced large-scale violence and increased security where it operates.

Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, said:

"AMIS has done an impressive job in very difficult circumstances. The UK is proud to support the AU in its first major peace keeping operation. Today we are confirming our additional commitment of GBP 20 million, bringing our total financial support to AMIS to GBP 52 million. This support, together with the welcome contribution from others, will enable AMIS to continue its vital operations as it prepares to hand over to the UN."

Lord Triesman, Foreign Office Minister for Africa, said:

"AMIS' record in Darfur has been impressive. We are extremely grateful to them for what they have done. However the Darfur Peace Agreement has led to AMIS having substantial new tasks added to its mandate, which the AU itself recognises a UN force is best placed to implement. The UN will be able to deploy a larger force which will have a much better chance of preventing future violence, and prevent more people being forced to leave their homes. The United Nations, the African Union and Sudan's international partners all want AMIS to hand over to a UN force. I urge President Bashir to accept this."

Notes to Editors

1. The AMIS Donors'' Conference is an international conference hosted jointly by the African Union and the European Union being held in Brussels on 18 July.

2. Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, announced the contribution of GBP 20 million additional funding for AMIS during a visit to Sudan in 21-23 February 2006. This brings the total UK contribution to GBP 52 million. The UK will work with AMIS to ensure that the additional funding is put to the best use.

3. The UK was the first donor to AMIS in 2004, and has continued to play a leading role since then. UK assistance to AMIS has already provided 1,000 vehicles, help with airlifting AU troops into and out of Darfur, and funding ground fuel. We have provided civilian police as part of the EU supporting action to AMIS in Darfur, which has contributed significant technical expertise and training, and we have provided military experts. The UK has also provided training for AU troops deploying to Darfur.

4. The UK is also expanding its Khartoum-based Police Training and Development Programme into Darfur to train over 400 officers across Darfur. It has also put forward a proposal to assist the AU in readying itself for its role in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process which will help former rebels return to normal society.

For further information, contact 020 7023 0600, e-mail pressoffice@dfid.gov.uk or call our Public Enquiries Point on 0845 300 4100. - via ReliefWeb
July 20 2006 New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

In response to the $200 million pledged to the African Union force at yesterday's donor conference, a group of leading international aid agencies (CAFOD, CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, IRC, Oxfam and Tearfund) working in Darfur issued a joint statement. A spokesperson for the group said:
"Yesterday donors were asked to respond generously to the desperate situation in Darfur, but instead the African Union force is still $150 million short of what it asked for.

The African Union force is the only protection civilians have in Darfur, yet due in part to the lack of funding, many of their patrols have stopped and come nightfall the troops retreat to barracks.

Even if the money pledged is delivered, according to the chairperson of the African Union it will only keep the mission afloat until September. What then?

If donors continue to opt for protection on the cheap, it will be the men, women and children of Darfur who will pay the price.

With few exceptions, the AU is still dependent on just five donors (the United Kingdom, United States, the EU, Canada and the Netherlands) for the vast bulk of funding for the force.

We urge all the other donor countries who are concerned about what is happening in Darfur to donate generously and work with the African Union to ensure we avert an even greater protection catastrophe."- via ReliefWeb
Jul 18 2006 Annan will propose to the Security Council a new level of support to AMIS - UN peacekeepers will come from Africa and Asia as helpers

Jul 18 2006 EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

Jul 19 2006 EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

Jul 19 2006 Donors pledge US $220m to boost African force in Darfur

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Donors pledge US $220m to boost African force in Darfur

IRIN report 19 July 2006 - excerpt:
Aid donors meeting in the Belgian capital have pledged about US $220 million in additional funding to the African Union (AU) force in Darfur.

During Tuesday's pledging conference in Brussels, representatives of the international donor community insisted that the AU peacekeeping mandate must be transferred to the United Nations by 1 January 2007.

"I can't foresee any realistic exit of the Darfur conflict without such a transition [from AU to UN peacekeeping], and I can't either imagine that the government of Sudan would continue to oppose it," the EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana said at the conference.

The United States said it would give $116 million to be used to strengthen the Africa Mission in Sudan, while the EU will make available $31.2 million to the Mission on top of an additional $50 million for the humanitarian effort in Darfur. The Netherlands pledged $31.2 million, Britain $36.6 million, France $2.5 million and Belgium $1.25 million.

The pledges would only be enough to sustain the Mission until the end of September; it needs an extra $450 million to operate until year-end, to pay for extra soldiers to be deployed, communications equipment, air support capability and more vehicles.

"The situation is precarious. The strengthening of [the Africa Mission] should be our priority because the next six months are critical," said the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno. "If we have a strong [Africa Mission], we will have a strong UN mission," he added.

A senior European Commission official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the real problem was that the "the AU is snowed under with the complexities of financial management".
Annan and EU's Solana

Photo: European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana (L) and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan hold a joint news conference during an International Conference on Darfur at the European Council in Brussels July 18, 2006. Reuters/Francois Lenoir

Annan will propose to the Security Council a new level of support to AMIS - UN peacekeepers will come from Africa and Asia as helpers

July 18 2006 report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan - excerpt:
I will propose to the Security Council that the United Nations be authorized to provide a new level of support to AMIS, as agreed during our joint assessment mission. But, this support will complement -- not substitute for -- what is being asked of you today. We cannot afford to lose another day before we start giving AMIS the extra resources that it needs.

AMIS must be able to concentrate on the many complex tasks that the Peace Agreement requires it to undertake; on protecting civilians, and on responding to ceasefire violations.

United Nations peacekeeping forces -- which will come primarily from Africa and Asia, with some additional, and much needed, support from developed countries -- will come to Darfur not as occupiers, but as helpers.
Jul 18 2006 EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

Jul 19 2006 EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

Jul 19 2006 AND/Gaberone Bureau report - Botswana to send troops to Darfur ony under UN auspices - Speaking to the local media recently, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Mompati Merafhe, said "As government, our standpoint currently is that we are not in a position to send troops to be part of the African Union contingent." He added that Botswana will do that only when the Sudanese government has agreeds to allow UN troops to replace the African Union peacekeeping forces.

AU mission in Darfur

Photo: Kenyan, Zambian and Rwandan soldiers working in Darfur for AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) take turns practicing marksman skills on a 50-calibre heavy machine gun in the Kabkabyia area of North Darfur, Saturday, June 24, 2006. The A.U. has 7,000 men and women in Darfur, a region of 150,000 square miles (388,500 square kilometers), roughly the size of France, where punishing heat and frequent sandstorms take their toll on troops and equipment. (AP Photo)

EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

European Union (EU) foreign policy and security chief Javier Solana said Tuesday that the Sudanese government might be closer to a change of position on a UN mission in Darfur, People's Daily Online reported July 19, 2006. Excerpt:
"Has the government of Sudan changed their position as taken by (Sudanese) President Bashir? No," Solana told a press conference.

"But it is no doubt today a lot of things have been clarified and we are closer probably to have a change of that position and get closer to the will of the majority of countries."

He said he, together with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, held talks with Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol for almost two hours on Monday and "a lot of things that were less clear before are clearer now."

The Sudanese side was not available for comment in Brussels.

A Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Monday that Akol was not traveLling to Brussels to give a nod to a UN mission.

Tuesday, July 18, 2006

EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

There's been a breakthrough in the deadlock between the international community and the Sudanese government over a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, according to the Dutch development minister: Agnes van Ardenne says the EU, together with the UN and the US, have succeeded in getting Khartoum to agree to the establishment of a UN force in Darfur, Radio Netherlands Vanessa Mock reported July 18, 2006. Excerpt:
Speaking at an international conference on Darfur in Brussels, van Ardenne said Khartoum had now bowed to international pressure, but only on condition that AU forces would form part of the UN mission. "[The Sudan government] will not accept a new force. They will only accept the same force under the umbrella of the UN. And now we've understood more clearly what was hampering them before. ... AU troops will remain on the ground, they will be strengthened, more equipped and will operate under the UN umbrella."

Ms Van Ardenne said she was hopeful that the new mission would be ready by the end of the year and said the Netherlands would help train AU troops for deployment under the UN.

The Netherlands also announced it would give an extra 20 million euros to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) so that it could continue operations until the end of the year. The EU has pledged 115 million euros.

However, the sum still falls short of the amount needed to keep AU operations going. The force says its needs over 30 million euros a month and says its coffers will run out by the end of August.

The US, for its part, has refused to give more cash to the AU, in the hope that its financial collapse would hasten the deployment of an UN mission.

Ms Van Ardenne says failure to give more financial backing would spell disaster: "I don't think that the AU mission can keep on going without finances and they cannot be transformed for the UN mission if there's not enough funding. So we must ask our colleagues not only for enough budget for the coming two months but also for the period beyond."

Ms Van Ardenne admits the [Darfur peace] deal got off to a bad start but argues that it is still the right instrument to bring about a lasting peace:

"There was maybe a failure on the part of all of us. But if you read the DPA, there's enough there to implement the peace process. So I don't want to mourn the peace process, it's more important to get more people involved. "It can be salvaged, if we bring in everybody," she insisted.
Annan and Konare

Photo: U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, left, welcomes African Union President Alpha Oumar Konare during a Darfur donors conference at the European Council headquarters in Brussels, Tuesday July 18, 2006. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed confidence that an international conference Tuesday on Darfur will lead to a stronger African peacekeeping force able to better protect civilians in the Sudanese region from rebels and pro-government militias. (AP Photo/Yves Logghe)

European Union Council conclusions on Sudan/Darfur

Council conclusions on Sudan/Darfur
(2744th EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting - Brussels, 17 July 2006) via ReliefWeb. Excerpt from the conclusions adopted by the Council:
3. The Council emphasized the vital role of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for the peace process in Darfur, and for DPA implementation in particular. The Council stressed the need to continue to enhance the operational capabilities of AMIS, emphasizing especially the need to ensure protection of the civilian population and humanitarian access. In this respect, the Council welcomed the new Concept of Operations for AMIS, and in particular the AU PSC decision of 27 June to approve the additional tasks and the new mandate of AMIS already within its existing strength and capacity. The Council recalled the need to swiftly implement the recommendations of the AU-led evaluation mission of December 2005 in order to enhance the mission's overall efficiency.

4. The Council urged the Government of Sudan to accept the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council, reaffirmed at its meeting of 27 June, to end the mandate of AMIS within the context of a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation.

5. The Council underlined that a UN operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term.

6. The Council reaffirmed the EU's commitment to support the efforts of the AU and AMIS in Sudan and Darfur politically and financially as well as through military and police means.
Children in Darfur

Photo: Children look on at a school in Greida camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) at Darfur, Sudan June 12, 2006. Sudan, Uganda and Congo are the world's three most dangerous places for children due to wars that have brought death, disease and displacement to millions, a Reuters poll of humanitarian experts showed on July 18, 2006. (Zohra Bensemra/Reuters)

Sudan: European Union response to the Darfur crisis

EUROPEAN UNION FACTSHEET
Source: European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 17 July, 2006 (via ReliefWeb)

Responding to the Darfur conflict that has been raging since 2003, the European Union has been at the forefront of international assistance backing up efforts led by the African Union (AU). The EU's support has included the following major components:

Mobilisation of funds of around EUR 1 billion. Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food aid and aid to Darfur refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission alone has allocated EUR 282 million in humanitarian support. EU Member States have provided around EUR 12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) amount to approximately EUR 325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of EUR 212 million.

Support for human rights inquiries and calls for an end to impunity in Darfur. On 26 July 2004, the EU supported calls for the creation of an international commission of inquiry into human rights violations, which was duly established. It welcomed the international commission's findings, submitted to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 25 January 2005 and condemned the crimes described in the report. The EU stresses the importance of terminating impunity in Darfur and was the prime mover behind UN Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Similarly, the EU fully supports the ongoing investigations by the ICC of human rights abuses in Darfur.

Support for the efforts of UN Special Representative, Jan Pronk, to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions (1556, 1564, 1574, 1590, 1591, 1593, 1651, 1665, 1672 and 1679(1) ). EU Heads of Mission in Khartoum participate in the Joint Implementation Mechanisms established by the Government of Sudan and the Special Representative to supervise compliance with the Resolutions.

Active support for the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). From its early involvement, when it helped broker the N'djamena ceasefire, the EU has steadily increased its diplomatic activity in relation to Sudan, as well as its operational support to AMIS (see details below). The EU, which has been assigned a specific role in the agreement, will continue to play a crucial part in its implementation - notably in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and in the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and by providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.

Continuing support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). This is provided through diplomatic efforts - notably by the EU Special Representative, through political dialogue with the Government of National Unity of Sudan, and through EU assistance programmes that particularly focus on war-affected areas in Southern and Central Sudan. The EU is thus contributing to the overall stabilisation of Sudan, a country that has suffered from civil strife throughout most of its modern history.

EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur - AMIS

The EU and its Member States have been providing a wide range of support to the African Union's (AU) efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004. This support has included financial, personnel and political support to the Abuja talks process and the Ceasefire Commission. It also includes support to AMIS through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers and strategic transportation.

- Almost 100 personnel from the EU and its Member States have been deployed to Sudan in support of the military component of AMIS and a further 50 in support of the civilian police component.(2)

- In the same period, EU Member States have provided coordinated strategic airlift for well over 2000 African Union personnel.

- The EU has committed a total of EUR 212 million from the African Peace Facility in support of AMIS since June 2004. This has provided the funds necessary to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs.

- Additionally, EU Member States have made substantial bilateral contributions - financial as well as the provision of expertise, equipment, food rations, airlift, etc. The estimated amount of Member States' support to AMIS is approximately EUR 115 million.

- The EU Special Representative for Sudan, Mr Pekka Haavisto, who was appointed in July 2005, ensures coordination and coherence of the EU'S contributions to AMIS. He is assisted by a team of EU military and police advisers in Addis Ababa.

Footnotes

(1) For more details: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc

(2) EU personnel currently deployed to AMIS II includes 29 police officers, 17 military experts, and 10 military observers. In addition, 3 military staff, one police officer and one political advisor have been deployed to Addis Ababa to support the EUSR in his contacts and cooperation with the AU. Finally, 3 officers will be deployed to the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (Al Fasher).

Monday, July 17, 2006

Darfur Peace Must Address Water Crisis: Economist

Here is an excellent, important report via DefenseNews.com.

Darfur Peace Must Address Water Crisis: Economist (by Megan Rowling, Reuters July 17, 2006)
There is no chance of peace in Darfur unless the region's dire water shortages are tackled as part of a settlement between rebels and the Sudanese government, a top international economist said on July 17.

The conflict in Sudan's arid west is often attributed to political and ethnic grievances, Jeffrey Sachs, director of Columbia University's Earth Institute, told a climate change conference.

But he said its origins can be traced to severe drought and population growth in the 1980s that sparked a struggle between settled farmers and pastoralists.

"(In Darfur) we need to understand that, at the core, there is a massive ecological and demographic challenge exacerbated by climate change," Sachs said.

"I would say there's not a chance in the world for Darfur to be peaceful unless a solution is found to water stress."

Three years of fighting has killed tens of thousands of people and forced 2.5 million to flee their homes. A peace deal was signed between the government and one rebel faction in May, but violence continues.

International efforts to solve the conflict have been too focused on peacekeeping and not enough on development, Sachs told Reuters on the sidelines of the conference on the outskirts of Helsinki.

"In general, crises like these are viewed through the optic of geopolitics and the military. ... But when you are dealing with very hungry people and desperately poor people, unless you also put forward a realistic and viable development option, you can't make peace," he said.

Sachs called for greater international recognition of the role of climate in sparking violence and a deeper understanding of the affect of climate change on vulnerable communities.

Policymakers need to integrate knowledge about climate change into their planning, he said.

VICIOUS CIRCLE

Sachs also criticized the time it took the international community to respond to disasters, saying delays in addressing food shortages increased the risk of violence.

"The world is overloaded with crises. ... We need to buffer agencies so that (when a disaster happens) they don't have to beg rich governments for money," he said.

Droughts that cause food shortages and hunger can often be predicted using climate modeling and seasonal forecasting, but the current international system for raising funds only kicks in once a crisis is under way -- meaning that relief may not start arriving until months after its onset.

"By then, there may be violence, and then people say they can't respond because the situation is too violent," Sachs said. "Where rains fail in Africa, violence increases. We know that, but we don't seem to be able to do anything about it."

Sachs also said the international community needed to come up with a framework for dealing with growing migration caused by droughts, floods and other disasters linked to climate change.

Population growth -- which is expected to increase the number of people in Africa by 1 billion by the middle of the century -- is likely to make the problem worse by fuelling competition for scarce resources, Sachs said.

Dry, landlocked African nations were likely to become a major source of environmental refugees and richer countries should be prepared, he warned.

"The world needs a better response than locked gates, barbed wire and shooting people. The political challenge is enormous," Sachs said. The conference, organized by several agencies including the World Meteorological Organization, continues until July 21.
Water pump in Darfur

Photo: Women use a water pump to fill their containers at the Galap camp for Internally Displaced Persons in the town of Fasher, Darfur, Sudan, June 14, 2006. (Zohra Bensemra/Reuters)

Saturday, July 15, 2006

Sudanese First VP due in Eritrea for talks with Darfur's holdout rebel groups

14 July 2006 Sudan Tribune report - Eritrea says Darfur peace deal approach not correct - excerpt:
Sudanese First Vice President is expected to visit Asmara on Saturday 15 July to hold talks with the holdout rebel groups to discuss their demands and see how to establish a common ground with them and the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Eritrea who is sponsoring eastern Sudan peace talks seems more and more interested by the Darfur crisis. The rapid rapprochement between Eritrea and Sudan could encourage Asmara to bring Darfur rebels to the table of negotiations with Khartoum.

Friday, July 14, 2006

Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia (Alex de Waal)

Here are links to an amazing series of excellent articles authored by Dr Alex de Waal, an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations. The articles, published at AllAfrica.com July 14, 2006, concern the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explain how different parts were negotiated by the Sudanese Government and Movement delegations, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. Dr de Waal states that "one of the reasons for this is that it is important for the Sudanese people as a whole--and the people of Darfur especially--to understand the spirit and letter of the DPA, so that it can be implemented so as best to serve the interests of the people and bring lasting peace to Darfur."

[Tip: Re links here below, click on "Print this page" at AllAfrica for easier view]

(1) Sudan: Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia - This first article asks, how are the Janjaweed and other armed militia to be disarmed? One of the toughest questions in the negotiations in Abuja that led to the DPA was how to control and disarm the Janjaweed and other armed militia in Darfur. Excerpt:
The Movements' negotiators raised this issue time and time again, and went line by line over every relevant paragraph over many long weeks. Each of the Movements' negotiators--Ali Tirayo (SLM-Minawi), Mohamed Adam (SLM-Abdel Wahid) and Tajudeen Niam (JEM)--was closely involved in this issue, and the GoS security team led by General Ismat al Zain was extremely professional and examined every detail. Everyone in the peace talks knew from the beginning that long-term peace and security in Darfur requires the control of all the militia and paramilitary forces, some of which have terrorized Darfurians since the 1980s, and some of which were only recently established.

Security experts agree that the DPA articles concerning the Janjaweed are some of the toughest parts of the whole Agreement. For the first time there is a practical plan for controlling and disarming the Janjaweed. This is a credit to the GoS and Movements negotiating teams in Abuja and the hard work they put in.
(2) Sudan: Security For IDPs and Refugees - This article asks, how is security to be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees?

(3) Sudan: Compensation and Assistance to Victims - This article asks, what provisions are there for victims of the conflict to receive compensation and assistance?

(4) Sudan: The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority - This article asks, what is the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and why was it proposed by the African Union Mediation?

(5) Sudan: How to Include the Different Darfur Movements - This article is concerned with the question of representation of different Movements and fractions of Movements.

(6) Sudan: Guarantees for the DPA - This article deals with the question: how do we know it can work? What are the mechanisms and guarantees?

(7) DDDC - see previous entry here at Sudan Watch 14 July 2006 - Darfur Community Peace and Reconciliation.

(8) Sudan: The Comprehensive Ceasefire - This article is concerned with one of the first and most important aspects of the Agreement, namely the ceasefire.

(9) Sudan: The Future of the Movements' Combatants - This article focuses on the controversial question of the future of the armed forces of the Movements: how many should be integrated into the national army and other security services, and in what way, and what should happen to the remainder.

(10) Sudan: The Question of Land - This article focuses on central question of land tenure. Conflict over land is one of the major reasons for the war in Darfur.

(11) Sudan: Darfurians in the Civil Service and Education - This article focuses on the question of Darfurian representation in the national civil service and educational institutions. It presents the arguments put forward by both the Movements' negotiators and their Government counterparts and the rationale for why the African Union presented its proposals.

(12) Sudan: Human Rights - This article focuses on human rights and how they are respected and promoted in the Agreement.

(13) Sudan: Rebuilding Darfur - This article focuses on the question of rebuilding Darfur.

(14) [Sudan Watch Ed: Article to be inserted here later, if and when I find it - not sure it exists]

(15) Sudan: Leadership for Implementing the DPA - This is fifteenth and last in a series of articles explaining the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining what lies behind the long and complicated text of the Agreement. As these articles have tried to explain, the text of the DPA is strong and reflects the hard work put in by the negotiators on both sides. This final article asks, what kind of leadership will be needed to implement the Agreement?

Alex de Waal

Alex de Waal is a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University and the co-director of Justice Africa. He has been an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations. After receiving his D.Phil. from Oxford University, he became an activist and author of several books on famine, human rights and conflict in Africa especially in north-east Africa including Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (1998). He was editor of the 'African Issues' series with James Currey Publishers, and served as Associate Director of Africa Watch before resigning in 1992 in protest over the U.S. military intervention in Somalia. He was a founder and director of African Rights and the Chairman of Mines Advisory Group 1993-98 (co-laureate of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize), and director of programmes for the International African Institute. He also served as the director of the United Nations' Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance. - [via COC]

Alex de Waal's books include Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-5 (Oxford University Press, 1989; revised edition, 2005), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004), and (with Julie Flint) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (Zed Books, 2006).

Alex de Waal's recent articles at Open Democracy: "Darfur's fragile peace" - The collapse of the Darfur peace agreement designed to resolve the conflict in western Sudan; "The African state and global governance" - The scale of Africa's political and social crises, exacerbated by the HIV/Aids pandemic.

DDDC: Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (Alex de Waal)

At long last, some food for thought and commentary on the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). Here is a link to an excellent analysis Community Peace and Reconciliation (via allAfrica.com July 14, 2006) by Alex de Waal, an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations in Abuja. Excerpt:
This is the seventh in a series of articles concerning the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were negotiated -- including which negotiators insisted on which articles -- what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This article deals with the question of what is next: how the DPA can serve as the foundation for a process of peace and reconciliation among Darfur's fractured and divided communities. It is important that the letter and spirit of the DPA are properly understood by all Darfurians and other Sudanese, so that the Agreement can be implemented and peace can return to Darfur.

As the Darfur peace talks entered their fifth round a year ago, it was clear to all involved that any peace agreement signed between the GoS and the two Movements represented there -- the SLM/A and the JEM -- could only be the first step in a longer process of community peacebuilding and reconciliation. Many groups were not represented in Abuja, and many issues could not be adequately discussed. For example, all the complicated issues of land ownership could only be discussed at the level of general principles -- the specific problems of who owned which piece of land could not be resolved.

This, incidentally, is one reason why the AU Mediation and the international partners were keen for the peace talks in Abuja to come to a rapid conclusion. Only when the DPA had been agreed there by the political leaders, would it be possible to begin the equally important process of creating peace, locality by locality, across Darfur. Only with the leaders' signatures on the DPA would it be possible to bring other groups to the table.

There are two main elements to the ongoing community peace and reconciliation efforts. One is Chapter 4, which concerns the "Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation" and the other is the Peace and Reconciliation Council, a subsidiary body of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which will be set up by the DDDC. [edit]

The DPA does not give a specific timetable for convening the DDDC. This is wise, because the preparatory consultations may take some months to complete. It is more important for the process of dialogue and consultation to be thorough, exhaustive and inclusive, than for it to be quick. The divisions caused by the war in Darfur will take a long time to heal. The people of Darfur will need the opportunity to sit together and discuss their many issues at length, to have the confidence to examine their problems honestly and to find ways of achieving solutions that can be accepted by all.
- - -

July 14 2006 Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia (Alex de Waal) - links to a series of articles by Dr Alex de Waal.

EU: A UN operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term

July 14, 2006 Reuters report excerpt:
A conference in Brussels on Tuesday attended by the European Union, the United States and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will urge Sudan to allow a U.N. mission to replace an ill-equipped and over-extended African Union force in an attempt to stop the violence.

"A U.N. operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term," the European Union will say on the eve of the meeting according to a draft declaration obtained by Reuters.

Tuesday's conference will urge Sudanese rebels to sign a peace deal reached in May between the Khartoum government and one of the main rebel factions.

The meeting will also seek ways to help finance the African Union's 7,000-strong mission until it is replaced by U.N. troops, EU officials said.
UPDATE: July 14 2006 AFP report (via CFD): "The international community's goal is to ensure that AMIS can function at its current level until the end of the year," said an EU diplomat.

On Thursday, EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Louis Michel said AMIS, which is likely to be replaced by a United Nations mission, could continue to operate until mid-August or early September.

"After that, we just don't have enough money," he said.