At long last, in his latest opinion piece, warmongering American academic Eric Reeves (pictured above) admits that if people really understood what they are calling for to protect Darfuris, they'd desist in their demands. No wonder he and other Western activists do not spell things out to their readers: they would not receive the same amount of attention or have many followers to donate to their cause, read their columns, visit their websites, buy their books, promote their awards, subscribe to their writings, watch their plays. I'd be right behind them, promoting their writings if what they wrote was accurate, sensible and not looking to set the tinder box of Africa alight. Their calls for international troops in Darfur does not make any sense to me because what they are proposing is military intervention (an act of war) in Sudan without a UN resolution - China and Russia would never approve such a resolution. The time and effort they've spent on backing the rebels and publishing what they want to hear, could have been better spent on pulling people together to support the fledgling African Union Mission in Darfur.
Excerpt from the opinion piece July 21, 2006:
Perhaps in understanding what is really militarily at stake in protecting Dafuris, those who have so often and loudly demanded such protection---including UN and government officials, humanitarian and human rights organizations, and advocacy groups---will desist in their demands. But they cannot have it both ways: they cannot demand that civilians and humanitarians be protected and then fail to accept the extraordinary military requirements and difficulties entailed in providing that protection.Also, in the following edited excerpt, Reeves outlines what (It seems to me) he appears to believe: that a U.S. led coalition force with Chapter 7 mandate will be required in Darfur to militarily defeat the rebels and militias. Note how he chose to use a sub-title that misleads readers into believing it is the view of the U.S. and not just one American official:
THE REAL U.S. VIEW FROM KHARTOUM- - -
Cable written by U.S. Foreign Service Officer Ron Capps, Deputy Chief of the Political/Economic Section in Embassy Khartoum. Capps' analysis was distributed confidentially on April 28, 2006 (a week before the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja):"An Abuja peace accord is unlikely to stop the violence in Darfur. There are several reasons why:Three months ago, Capps drew inescapable conclusions from the violence he predicted, and which is now all too evident:
[1] Rebel field commanders have lost faith in the leadership of the movements. Nineteen SLA/[Abdel] Wahid [el-Nur] commanders have publicly broken with Wahid. SLA/[Minni] Minawi has splintered, with breaks by Sulieman Jamooz, Sharif Harir, Sulieman Marajan, Khamis Abdullah and seventeen other commanders. Other commanders have defected to Wahid. At least one has joined the government in fighting the SLA; [ ]
[2] Government of Sudan negotiators do not represent the Arab tribal militias of the Janjaweit leaders, nor does the Government have a sufficient level of control over those militias to guarantee their compliance;
[3] fighting between SLA factions will continue and could degrade into a tribal war which would eventually draw in the Arab tribals.""A weak international force with a limited mandate will be powerless to stop the violence. In this scenario, Internally Displaced Persons and refugees will be unable to return home, rebels and militias will continue to kill with impunity, and all our work in Abuja will have been futile."Capps here characterizes the force necessary in Darfur:
"Regardless of whether Abuja produces an enhanced cease-fire agreement or a complete peace accord --- or even if the talks completely collapse --- in order to stop the violence, rebel forces and militias will have to be mapped, counted, cantoned and disarmed. Given the lack of cohesion among the rebels and the lack of Government control over the militias, it seems likely that the groups will resist these steps, particularly disarmament. In this event, the international peace and security force will be required to militarily defeat them. This is not a Chapter VI mission. The force will require the combat power and prowess to enforce a peace accord if it is to provide a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees. It will require the right mandate. Seven UN Security Council Resolutions have been issued under Chapter VII. This must be the starting point for the follow-on force.""Stopping the violence in Darfur will require a military force with first-world leadership, first-world assets, and first-world experience. US and coalition experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq is relevant here. Putting together such a coalition and getting it into place to do its work will require that the United States government and our military take a lead role, at least initially. Our NATO and other first-world military partners will not be keen to step forward without our participation, and many of the traditional UN troop contributing countries lack the military capability to successfully complete the mission."
Signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement implementing the deal is seen by Eric Reeves as an "ominous collaboration"
Excerpt from Eric Reeves's July 21 2006 opinion piece (see above)
"There is an increasing body of evidence, including from eyewitnesses, which makes overwhelmingly clear that an ominous collaboration between SLA/Minawi and Khartoum's regular forces defined recent fighting in Bir Mazza and Um Sidir, North Darfur."What is ominous about parties to a peace agreeement implementing what they had agreed? I guess it can be viewed as "ominous" if you are anti the Darfur Peace Agreement/GoS/SLA-Minnawi but pro SLM-Nur and all the others who are against Darfur's peace deal.
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July 22 2006 When did Sudanese VP Ali Taha say Sudan would allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur?
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