Wednesday, July 03, 2019

Sudan Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal interview in Darfur 2004 and Khartoum 2005

FURTHER to a report on alleged Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal posted at Sudan Watch today, here is a copy of transcript from the 2004 archive of Human Rights Watch.org.

Musa Hilal in His Own Words
Interview, Khartoum, Sudan, September 27, 2004
This is the exact English translation of Musa Hilal speaking on tape to Human Rights Watch. For a full transcript of the video, with the voice over included, 

Clip 1
MH: Regarding the problem of Tawila, I already told you about the issue of the commanders. All of the people in the field are led by top army commanders. The highest rank is major, and officers, and some sergeants, and some captains, and so on. These people get their orders from the Western command center, and from Khartoum.

Clip 2
MH: I’ve never thought of becoming a soldier, or a military commander, and of leading troops and attacking the rebels’ command areas in Tawila, or anywhere else. That’s not true.

Clip 3
MH: As a coordinator and mobilizer, as I said before, yes, it’s true, I mobilize people, I coordinate with recruiters. I’ve been with the PDF commanders, but I was never a commander of troops in a war zone.

Clip 4
MH: Listen, Doctor, they have to get this idea out of their heads. These troops in the west of Kebkabiya, in the north of Kebkabiya, in the south of Kebkabiya, inside the mountains of Jebel Marra -- these troops have commanders leading them, in accordance with military rules.

I’m from Kebkabiya. I come and go with groups there, and I travel with the nomads; I visit their families. 
This much is true. I attended a small conference on reconciliation, and I’m very involved in establishing relationships of mutual coexistence, specifically west of Kebkabiya. It’s very peaceful from the Mea area up to Wadi Bare, especially my area, which is called Seref Umra, there are about 86 villages made up of different tribes -- Arabs, Fur, so many tribes, Tama, Gimir. I’m involved in encouraging good relationships and establishing local defense forces, made up of Arabs and Fur, to defend Arab and Fur villages. We have to make sure that the Arabs patrol Fur villages, and Fur patrol Arab villages, to defend them from attack.

There are some people in this war that are not part of the joint patrols, and they’re not rebels – they’re criminals; they want to profit off the situation. We build the joint defense forces from different tribes to defend these villages. We’ve secured the area very well, especially west of Kebkabiya. This area is not affected by the war: there’s no displacement, no one is fleeing, the markets are open, the roads are open – it’s a very secure area right now. It’s my area, I’m not denying that I’m involved in this, and I’ll continue to be involved: it’s a good thing that I’m doing.

But as for the military units, with guns, that move around to attack rebel areas or that are attacked by rebels – they’re under the orders of field commanders.

Clip 5
MH: It’s the government’s concern. They’re the ones that gave the PDF the guns; they’re the ones that recruited the PDF; they’re the ones that pay their salaries; they give them their ID cards. They can disarm them or they can leave them alone; that’s the government’s concern.

Clip 6
MH: Our job is to mobilize the people – the government has told us to mobilize people. We’ve gone to the people to tell them to join the PDF and defend your country, defend the land, defend the country’s most important things, and that you have to fight for your survival and the country’s stability. If the government comes back to us and tells us that they want to demobilize the people that we brought to them, that’s the government’s concern.

Clip 7
MH: I don’t have a relation or link by which they can talk to me personally. If they want to talk they can talk to the tribal leaders’ conference and issue the orders, like previous orders to disarm the rebels or the Janjaweed. I think the PDF is a military organization. There’s no link by which they can come talk to me.

Clip 8
MH: Is this question specifically directed to me and my people: are you saying that we attacked the rebels without the presence of the military? That’s not true. I just want to tell you something there’s criminals on all sides, from all tribes in the area, whether my people or other people. There are people who aren’t part of the PDF or the rebels. These people are greedy and selfish. I’ll give you an example: when a cow dies, all the vultures come from the sky to feed off the carcass. The problem between the government and the rebels -- sometimes criminals take advantage of the situation and they commit crimes. And these crimes exist and you can’t say who’s responsible for them. There’s a lot of propaganda made up about this. You can’t tell who did them, where they went; everything is hazy.

Clip 9
MH: First, I am not a criminal. Thank God I’m not afraid. I’ve never had any fear. If there’s a concrete complaint and an investigation is opened against me, I can go to court -- nobody is above the law -- but not because of allegations made by Ali al Haj and Khalil Ibrahim, who are rebel leaders, who make up dark information and give to the UN, and they put my name on the list. That’s not right.

- - -

From the archive of Human Rights Watch:
Video Transcript: Exclusive Video Interview with Alleged Janjaweed Leader
March 2, 2005 7:00PM EST

In late September 2004, a Human Rights Watch delegation interviewed Musa Hilal, a tribal leader from North Darfur who has allegedly organized Janjaweed militia to attack non-Arab tribes.
* * *

VO: Human Rights Watch confronted Musa Hilal with reports that he had personally commanded the Janjaweed militia that attacked and killed civilians in Tawila in February 2004. He denied leading his tribesmen into battle, stating that they were organized into official militia, known as PDF, led by Sudanese military commanders.

MH: Regarding the problem of Tawila, I already told you about the issue of the commanders, and as for newspaper reports, actually, I’ve said enough already. All of the people in the field are led by top army commanders. The highest rank is major, and officers, and some sergeants, and some captains, and so on. 
These people get their orders from the western command center, and from Khartoum.

I’ve never thought of becoming a soldier, or a military commander, and of leading troops and attacking the rebels’ command areas in Tawila, or anywhere else. That’s not true.

As a coordinator and mobilizer, as I said before, yes, it’s true, I mobilize people, I coordinate with recruiters. I’ve been with the PDF commanders, but I was never a commander of troops in a war zone, here or there.

VO: Hilal’s denial of leadership is contradicted by eyewitness testimony. Several men interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Kebkabiya, North Darfur, said that they had twice seen Musa Hilal dressed in a military uniform, leading his troops in celebrating military victories. Both instances occurred in January 2004, when Musa Hilal gathered townspeople in the market in Kebkabiya and announced he had rid fifty villages north of town of the “opposition.” He also accused Kebkabiya residents of supporting the opposition. After he spoke, the witnesses said, Janjaweed militiamen on horses and camels looted the marketplace.

Human Rights Watch challenged Musa Hilal’s claim that he had never participated in attacks, citing evidence that he had led groups that committed attacks in the Kebkabiya area.

MH: Listen, Doctor, they have to get this idea out of their heads. These troops in the west of Kebkabiya, in the north of Kebkabiya, in the south of Kebkabiya, inside the mountains of Jebel Marra -- these troops have commanders leading them, in accordance with military rules.

I’m from Kebkabiya. I come and go with groups there, and I travel with the nomads; I visit their families. This much is true. I attended a small conference on reconciliation, and I’m very involved in establishing relationships of mutual coexistence, specifically west of Kebkabiya. It’s very peaceful from the Mea area up to Wadi Bare, especially my area, which is called Serif Umra, there are about 86 villages made up of different tribes -- Arabs, Fur, so many tribes, Tama, Gimir. I’m involved in encouraging good relationships and establishing local defense forces, made up of Arabs and Fur, to defend Arab and Fur villages. We have to make sure that the Arabs patrol Fur villages, and Fur patrol Arab villages, to defend them from attack.

There are some people in this war that are not part of the joint patrols, and they’re not rebels – they’re criminals; they want to profit off the situation. We build the joint defense forces from different tribes to defend these villages. We’ve secured the area very well, especially west of Kebkabiya. This area is not affected by the war: there’s no displacement, no one is fleeing, the markets are open, the roads are open – it’s a very secure area right now. It’s my area, I’m not denying that I’m involved in this, and I’ll continue to be involved: it’s a good thing that I’m doing.

But as for the military units, with guns, that move around to attack rebel areas or that are attacked by rebels – they’re under the orders of field commanders.

VO: The government of Sudan maintains that the Janjaweed militia is not under army supervision but rather is independent of government control or influence. But Musa Hilal claims that his tribesmen are organized into government-sponsored militia, and that he does not have the power to demobilize or disarm them. He says that this responsibility rests with the Sudanese government.

MH: It’s the government’s concern. They’re the ones that gave the PDF the guns; they’re the ones that recruited the PDF; they’re the ones that pay their salaries; they give them their ID cards. They can disarm them or they can leave them alone; that’s the government’s concern.

Our job is to mobilize the people – the government has told us to mobilize people. We’ve gone to the people to tell them to join the PDF and defend your country, defend the land, defend the country’s most important things, and that you have to fight for your survival and the country’s stability. If the government comes back to us and tells us that they want to demobilize the people that we brought to them, that’s the government’s concern.

VO: On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that gave the government of Sudan thirty days to disarm the Janjaweed. But Musa Hilal claims that the government of Sudan has never asked him to tell his tribesmen to disarm.

MH: I don’t have a relation or link by which they can talk to me personally. If they want to talk they can talk to the tribal leaders’ conference and issue the orders, like previous orders to disarm the rebels or the Janjaweed. I think the PDF is a military organization. There’s no link by which they can come talk to me.

VO: Musa Hilal specifically denies that his tribesmen have committed attacks independently, outside of government control. He blames unidentified criminals for such attacks.

MH: Is this question specifically directed to me and my people: are you saying that we attacked the rebels without the presence of the military? That’s not true. I just want to tell you something there’s criminals on all sides, from all tribes in the area, whether my people or other people. There are people who aren’t part of the PDF or the rebels. These people are greedy and selfish. I’ll give you an example: when the bull or the cow dies, all the vultures come from the sky to feed off the carcass. The problem between the government and the rebels -- sometimes criminals take advantage of the situation and they commit crimes. And these crimes exist and you can’t say who’s responsible for them. There’s a lot of propaganda made up about this. You can’t tell who did them, where they went; everything is hazy.

VO: But as a tribal leader in the Kebkabiya area of North Darfur, Musa Hilal is in an excellent position to know exactly who is committing major, large-scale crimes such as massacres and the destruction of villages. All the witnesses Human Rights Watch interviewed in Musa Hilal’s region reported that the military attacks were coming from his people. There is nothing hazy about it: Musa Hilal is covering up his major role in the destruction of Darfur.

Human Rights Watch has obtained Sudanese government documents that show Musa Hilal’s responsibility for leading Janjaweed militia. A memo dated February 13, 2004 from a local government office in North Darfur orders “security units in the locality” to “allow the activities of the mujahedeen and the volunteers under the command of Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed in the areas of [North Darfur] and to secure their vital needs.” The memo specifically tells security units not to interfere in the activities of Hilal’s volunteers.

Despite the evidence against him, Musa Hilal shows little concern about the possibility that he might someday be found criminally responsible. Asked if he feared prosecution, he said:

MH: With common criminals? First, I am not a criminal. Thank God I’m not afraid. I’ve never had any fear. If there’s a concrete complaint and an investigation is opened against me, I can go to court -- nobody is above the law -- but not because of allegations made by Ali al Haj and Khalil Ibrahim, who are rebel leaders, who make up dark information and give to the UN, and they put my name on the list. That’s not right.

VO: On January 25, a U.N.-sponsored Commission of Inquiry presented a report on the gross violations of human rights committed in Darfur, based on extensive fact-finding and evidence collection conducted in the region. The report stated that the government and Janjaweed militia “conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.”

The Commission of Inquiry strongly recommended that the Darfur situation be referred to the International Criminal Court. It said that the prosecution of those likely responsible for the most serious crimes in Darfur would contribute to peace in the region. The report identified individuals possibly guilty of these abuses, but withheld their names from the public. It is likely that the Commission of Inquiry included Musa Hilal on this list of individuals alleged to be guilty of crimes against humanity.

Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of Darfur, Sudan: Lynchpin of Arab Janjaweed Militia Recruitment

Sudanese Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur
NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is a photo of an influential Sudanese warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal plus a copy of a fascinating report by Human Rights Watch. The old report was reprinted on 7 June 2019 by the Editor of Gurtong at www.Gurtong.net who introduced it by saying "This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan".

I have not had time to look into the meaning of the reference numbers used in the report. The yellow highlighting is mine for my own reference and to help me recall reports logged here at Sudan Watch during the Darfur war when the internet was still wild, before the existence of Twitter and Instagram, when there were no maps of Darfur to be found anywhere online.

Note to self. Here is a reminder of what it was like blogging in those days, 16 years ago. This blog was hosted by Blogger.com, it was taken over by Google. In those days, Bloggers were in their thousands not millions, we accessed the internet using a dial-up modem. Here is the sound each of us heard while we sat in front of our computer screens waiting in anticipation of getting online: https://youtu.be/gsNaR6FRuO0 - and here: https://youtu.be/qfPMAoXEJ4Q
This photo and caption "The rebels started the war - Musa Hilal" is from a BBC News online report dated 14 November 2004 entitled "Janjweed 'leader' denies genocide". To read the BBC report click here:

HERE is the report from the Editor of Gurtong.net.

Useful Background To Crisis In Khartoum, Sudan.
This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan (Ed, Gurtong).

"He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces".

Entrenching Impunity
Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur
[In Darfur] there are scattered tribes battling over meager resources. There is no organization, except for the rebels…. [The militias] have no hierarchy. The leadership of the tribe can be disputed and people are acting on their own at times, without the knowledge of the tribe.
--Dr. Abdul-Moniem Osman Mohammed Taha, head of the Sudan Human Rights Advisory Council7

Despite persistent Sudanese government characterization of the Darfur conflict as a “tribal conflict,” and repeated denials of state coordination of abusive militia groups, there is irrefutable evidence of a Sudanese government policy of systematic support for coordination of and impunity from prosecution granted to the “Janjaweed militias,” a policy that continues to this day.

The logic behind this policy is clear. Distrusting the armed forces, many of who were originally from Darfur, the Sudanese government recruited the “Janjaweed” militias as the main ground forces for the government’s counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur.8 

Although the government issued a general call to arms, recruitment was selective and based on ethnicity. Certain ethnic groups with historical grievances against those ethnic groups constituting the rebel movements or with strong interests in gaining access to land and other resources became the mainstay of the government’s militia force.9

To successfully recruit these groups, the Sudanese government provided incentives in the form of payment and access to loot, as well as promises of access to land and administrative power. Sudanese officials also identified key tribal leaders from the northern Riziegat to coordinate the recruitment: Sheikh Musa Hilal, a leader of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid, became the lynchpin for recruitment of militias in northern Darfur. Since June 2003, he has become emblematic of the role of the militia forces in the attacks on civilians and the impunity conferred upon them by the Sudanese government.

A. Musa Hilal: Lynchpin of Militia Recruitment
The worst atrocities are committed by the Um Jalul of Musa Hilal because historically they have tensions with the Fur and Zaghawa. They’re all camel herders, not cattle herders, and they have no respect for farmers, they have a superiority complex and they need their camels. When the war started, the Sudanese government asked Musa Hilal to be the leader of the Janjaweed.
--Neutral Arab nomadic leader from West Darfur10

Sheikh Musa Hilal has become internationally synonymous with the Janjaweed, the government-backed militias who have earned notoriety for their brutal attacks in Darfur over the past few years.11

His role in the crimes committed in Darfur and his current freedom within Sudan—flying in Sudanese military transport between his homes and wives in Khartoum and his base in Misteriya, North Darfur—illustrate the broader role and impunity of the militias throughout Darfur.

The Sudanese government has repeatedly stated that it cannot pursue individuals responsible for crimes in Darfur if the victims and witnesses are unable or unwilling to name them. Dr. Abdul Moniem Osman Taha, head of the government’s Advisory Council on Human Rights (and brother to Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha) told Human Rights Watch in October 2004, that “Even Pronk [Jan Pronk, Head of the U.N. Mission in Sudan] tells us it’s important to try the leaders. If the name of the leaders is mentioned by defendants or witnesses, we could do that. Until now, no one mentioned any names.”12 

This statement came months after six alleged militia leaders, including Musa Hilal, were named by the U.S. State Department in July 2004.13 

Scores of victims, witnesses of attacks, and even members of the Sudanese armed forces have named Hilal as the top commander for Janjaweed militias in North Darfur and elsewhere in Darfur. His Um Jalul tribesmen have played a prominent role among the attackers responsible for many atrocities across Darfur.14 

As of December 2005, Musa Hilal remains at liberty, free from any investigation or prosecution for his role in numerous attacks in Darfur.

Since 2003, Hilal has operated from his base in Misteriya, southwest of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, under the direction of the Sudanese army; his immediate superior is a Sudanese army officer named Lt. Col. Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said. Misteriya is now one of the largest militia training bases in the region, although initially it was merely a satellite settlement of the nomadic Um Jalul. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Wahid functions as one of the main liaisons between the Janjaweed militias recruited and trained in Misteriya and the Sudanese army.15 

He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces.17 

According to a former legal advisor to the brigade, Lt Col Abdul Wahid’s orders for the brigade come directly from the Sudanese army headquarters in Fashir.18

In a Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Hilal, he denied that he commanded any “military group.” He stated that his men are always under the command of the military and that he was merely a “coordinator.” 

Hilal told Human Rights Watch, “The training, the uniforms, the guns, they are the responsibility of the government.” Hilal said that he and his men were involved in what he called “joint patrols” in the area from Zalingei to Abata to Kutum (an area that extends from southwest of Jebel Marra north around Jebel Marra and includes much of central North Darfur), and that the Sudanese government had provided them with weapons for these patrols.19

The responsible army officials confirm that all of Hilal’s operations have been under the control of the army.20

Numerous community leaders from different parts of Darfur, interviewed independently by Human Rights Watch, said that Musa Hilal held a leadership role in the Tajamu al Arabi or Arab Gathering (or Coalition or Alliance) since the 1990s. 

He had close ties to Maj. Gen. Abdallah Safi el Nour, an Ireqat from Darfur and former air force pilot, who was the governor of North Darfur from 2000 to January 2002, and a federal minister in Khartoum in 2003-2004.21 

During Safi el Nour’s tenure as governor of North Darfur, tribal tensions increased dramatically due to perceptions that the Sudanese government was aligning itself with and arming the Arab militias.22

“Wali Safi al Nour, an army officer, is the one who gave Arabs the authority to devastate the farms,” a group of Fur and Tunjur community leaders from North Darfur told Human Rights Watch.23

The governor who followed Safi el Nour in North Darfur in 2002, Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan, an ethnic Berti from North Darfur and ruling party member, was concerned about the increasing tensions in Darfur. It was during Governor Ibrahim Suleiman’s tenure as chair of the North Darfur state security committee that Hilal was detained and sent to prison in Port Sudan.24 

At the time, local community leaders named Hilal in many complaints of clashes and incitement, and he was said to have been levying excessive fines and imposing corporal punishment on members of his own tribe.
On account of the complaints of his tribes people, he was removed as nazir or tribal leader by Ibrahim Suleiman and another person was put in his place.25 

During Hilal’s time in detention, attacks by Arab militias on other ethnic groups decreased. A Zaghawa tribal leader told Human Rights Watch, “While Musa Hilal was away from Darfur, the Janjaweed had fewer activities. They were still attacking, but not that much. When he returned, the burning of houses and villages started.”26

Hilal was released from detention after the SLA’s April 24, 2003 attack on Fashir; a few days after this attack, Governor Ibrahim Suleiman was removed from his post by President El Bashir. Upon returning to Darfur in June 2003, Hilal based himself in the Kebkabiya area and organized a meeting of the leaders of all the local Arab tribesmen, including the Awlad Rashid, Ireqat and Um Jalul.27

According to a person present at the Kebkabiya meeting, Musa Hilal ordered tribesmen to attack and burn non-Arab villages and loot livestock. He reportedly said, “The government is with us, so you have no accusations to fear.”28 

Some of the tribes refused; even some of his own Um Jalul tribesmen apparently refused to obey the orders. A community leader from Kebkabiya who knew Hilal in previous years said, “Musa Hilal compelled every Arab tribe member to participate, even those who refused. He acts as king of the Arabs, the guide of all. How does he force them to fight? He beats those who refuse and takes their animals, killing some of them.”29

The Kebkabiya meetings were a turning point in the government’s involvement with Musa Hilal—and with the Janajweed militias. “Guns flowed to them after that” said one local community leader.30

B. Musa Hilal’s Role in the Attacks in North Darfur
By July 2003, Musa Hilal’s militia base in Misteriya was established. Misteriya was not an army base—that was located in Kebkabiya. With the first Janjaweed forces mobilized, the Sudanese government launched a major ground offensive in North Darfur in mid-2003. A former soldier in the army who participated in these attacks noted the close coordination between Musa Hilal, other tribal militia leaders and the military prior to and during the attacks:

In Kebkabiya, at the Sudanese army camp, there were Janjaweed. It was actually a small group of thirteen leaders under the command of “Abu Ashreen.”31 

The Janjaweed troops used to stay in the vicinity of Kebkabiya, in Misteriya. Misteriya is a training camp for Janjaweed. Musa Hilal came more than twenty times to our camp in Kebkabiya while I was there. I saw him myself, with my own eyes, more than ten times. He always came with two cars, one for him and one for his guards. He had meetings with officers. Three or four days after each of his visits, we were attacking a place.

I don’t know how they were organizing and coordinating the troops, by phone or not, but on the day of an attack, hundreds of Janjaweed were coming to our camp in Kebkabiya, on horses and camels. We were asked to prepare our stuff too, to get ready and at some point we were ordered to get into our vehicles. 

We were never told that we were about to attack a village. We were always told that there were groups of Zaghawa or Fur militiamen operating where we were going and that we had to “finish them.” That is the expression that was used.32

Villages around Kebkabiya were among the first to be attacked by Musa Hilal’s men and government troops in the government’s first major campaign in July 2003. The same former soldier participated in the attacks. He said:

We were asked to clear the way and the area [the Eid en Nabak area east of Kebkabiya] for the Janjaweed to attack, burn, and loot the village. It was on July 5, 2003. That day, too, Antonovs came during the attack and dropped three bombs on the mountains near the village. People were running away. I saw seven villagers being killed. I saw three old guys captured by the Janjaweed and handed over to the commander of our army. They were later taken to Kebkabiya and put in jail. Some soldiers burned huts and buildings in the village along with the Janjaweed. Three hundred fifty soldiers participated in this attack. Only five of us refused to shoot or shot in the air. Three of the five were later arrested, court-martialed and sentenced to three years in jail. In Eid En Nabak that day, there were no SLA, only civilians.33

After destroying their villages and displacing the population around Kebkabiya, the forces moved north, towards the Zaghawa areas that were home to the SLA. In July and August 2003, large swathes of North Darfur, including villages in the Abu Gamra area between Kebkabiya and Karnoi and the Beré area north of Kutum, were attacked and burned in what was to be the start of a two-year campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed militia.

It is unclear whether Musa Hilal himself led the forces in the Abu Gamra attacks, but several local leaders interviewed independently, some of whom knew him personally, named him as one of the overall leaders of the militia forces in the area, and he is known to have operated in the area in later attacks. Sudanese forces attacked the town of Abu Gamra and its fifteen surrounding villages repeatedly during 2003-2004.
Human Rights Watch documented four major attacks on the area, and a number of smaller attacks. These major attacks took place in July-August 2003, December 2003 and January 2004, February-March 2004, and July-August 2004. More than three hundred people were killed in the attacks between May 2003 and August 2004.34 Witnesses noted that each large attack involved Antonov aircraft, helicopters, Janjaweed militias on horses and camels, and the Sudanese military in vehicles.

Some civilians living in Dar Zaghawa learned how to predict the bombing attacks and take refuge in caves or hand-dug shelters before the aircraft arrived. They listened to radio exchanges between the pilots on simple FM radios which picked up the radio frequencies used by the planes:

We heard the names of the [government army] pilots and conversations.… That is how we know some of the pilots. One was Egyptian, because of the way he spoke in clear Egyptian Arabic. One officer is Gadal in the army, because we heard him on the radio organizing the attacks. They called him Janabo Gadal or Officer Gadal. Also, Afaf Segel, who is a woman pilot from Sudan. She said things like “Nas Kornoi na dikim fatuur” which means “I am going to give breakfast to the peasant from Karnoi,” before Karnoi was bombed. Captain Khalid was another pilot. In their conversations on the radio they called us “Nuba, abid,” and said things like, “I am going to give those slaves a lesson they will not forget.”35

On February 9, 2004, after a massive government offensive forced almost one million people from their homes, including one hundred thousand Sudanese citizens into neighboring Chad, President El Bashir announced that the government had won the war.36 

The next day the Sudanese government agreed, in theory, to allow international organizations to have access to Darfur.37 

In order to rebut the government announcement of its defeat, the SLA moved its forces to West and South Darfur to open a new front.

The Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias moved into the areas of North Darfur that the SLA had partially vacated. According to government memoranda obtained by Human Rights Watch, this movement of government and Janjaweed forces into North Darfur appears to have been ordered to occupy the area and prevent an SLA return.38

Another government document from the same period specifically names Musa Hilal, and orders all security units to “allow the activities of the mujaheedin and the volunteers under the command of Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed.…”39 

Setting up several new Janjaweed militia camps in North Darfur was done to deter return of the rebel movements and also of civilians expelled from their homes by Janjaweed and government forces’ attacks.
Musa Hilal was seen at various attacks in North Darfur in February and March 2004; he and his forces were apparently responsible for a large part of North Darfur. 

He himself was frequently transported by Sudanese government helicopters. Several witnesses identified him as a commander of the forces who attacked Tawila on February 27, 2004, and noted that he was brought there by helicopter. A man from Kebkabiya who overheard one of Hilal’s conversations prior to the Tawila attack said, “I heard them on Thurayas [satellite phone] with someone in Khartoum, to arrange the point where the plane should land to bring the required ammunition.”40

Another witness placed Musa Hilal at the scene of crimes in the Abu Leha area in March 2004.41 Refugee women from villages near Furawiya, in the far north of North Darfur, named Hilal as leader of the forces attacking their village, Omda Dabo, in early 2004.42 A forty-two-year-old Zaghawa man who was arrested and then tortured by Janjaweed militia members after a joint army-Janjaweed attack on Abu Leha in March 2004, told Human Rights Watch:

They hung me with hooks piercing my chest. They also burned me. I was arrested with thirty other men. They tied us together and interrogated us about animals. We said we did not know so they called us liars and shot and slaughtered some of [the men] in front of my eyes.… The biggest boss of the Janjaweed is Musa Hilal. I saw him before the events, but also when I was tortured. He came by helicopter with soldiers. He gives orders to both soldiers and Janjaweed.43

When Hilal was interviewed by Human Rights Watch in September 2004, he deferred responsibility for the attacks to the Sudanese armed forces, denying that he had any official military rank or responsibility beyond “mobilization” or recruitment of militias. He said, “I have not led military groups, I only asked our people to join. I am only a coordinator for the PDF, training, uniforms, guns are the responsibility of the military people.”44

C. Government-Militia Coordination
The pattern of joint army-militia attacks supported by intensive aerial bombardment demonstrated in North Darfur became standard as the conflict spread to other areas of Darfur. In many cases, villages were first heavily bombed, then the Janjaweed and army ground forces moved in, again with aerial support, to ensure the “cleaning up” of any remaining civilian presence.

In contrast to the Sudanese government’s depictions of the militia activity in Darfur as unorganized and lacking hierarchy, many of the tribal militias used in the government’s campaign were highly structured. Many of the nomadic fighters were led by the agid or war leader. Agids and tribal leaders were in regular contact with military officials or civilian administrators at the local level, either provincial commissioners or state governors. 

In South Darfur, for example, the governor reportedly met with tribal leaders and agids on an almost daily or weekly basis. Witnesses and observers from different ethnic groups told Human Rights Watch that the agid traditionally plays an important role in mobilizing and leading the fighters in battle, often carrying a red flag.45 

The agid and tribal leaders were also used for distribution of arms, and as liaisons between the militiamen and the government. A well-informed observer from a neutral Arab tribe told Human Rights Watch:
Every Arab tribe has an agid. The government contacted the agid and other leaders…. They get salaries and ammunition from the PDF office near the market. The agid are the real power to mobilize the Arabs. The hakama [women singers] are one of the dangerous tools…but the word is with the agid, he can mobilize the men.46

As described by an A.U. monitor who investigated numerous attacks in Darfur and spoke to militia leaders, the militia attacks were highly organized, with “echelons” of militia attacking in waves. Militia members on horses were often the first to attack, because of their speed and the fact that they presented a smaller target. Militiamen on camels followed in a second echelon.47

Joint government-militia offensives were well-coordinated. In North Darfur, for instance, Musa Hilal and other militia leaders met, discussed and planned offensives together with the Sudanese military prior to implementing the offensives. In the South Darfur “road clearing” offensive of December 2004 (see Section VI below), the Sudanese armed forces coordinated with the militias not only in carrying out the attacks but in the systematic sealing off of villages and the methodical looting and destruction that followed.

The looting was not random; it was clearly organized and premeditated. In many cases, it appears to have been organized by the military commander and conducted in a methodical way. The troops and Janjaweed used in attacks south of and around Kutum were told that they could keep their looted goods if they “fight well.”48 

Prior to attacking Anka, a town northeast of Kutum, the army commander ordered the militia men to enter the village first and burn everything, after taking “what you like.” The army followed and “collected chairs and beds.” Numerous witnesses, in North Darfur and other states, described seeing army troops and Janjaweed militiamen collecting furniture, other goods and livestock, and loading the items into trucks and on camels.49

A twenty-five-year-old former government soldier described the looting policy to Human Rights Watch, “You keep what you have taken. It applies to the officers too. One exception: the animals. The animals are given to Janjaweed nomads who keep them. Then they are sold.”50 

After the government soldiers and Janjaweed militia conducted fighting and looting operations, large army trucks would transport the looted livestock back to the Janjaweed camp, according to this former government soldier who was stationed in Kutum, North Darfur. He told Human Rights Watch that after destroying villages around Enciro, North Darfur, in June 2003, the Sudanese government commander ordered the militia to take the looted cattle and cows to Damrat Sheikh Abdel Bagi, a Janjaweed camp located less than twenty kilometers northeast of Kutum, and from there some of the livestock were distributed onward in trucks: one interviewee told us, “Big lorries from Omdurman arrived.… They loaded up with sheep from the base and took them away. Three times these lorries came… and transported camels and cows.”51

Several witnesses of attacks who hid in the vicinity also noted that in some cases, the army left after any initial fighting between the attackers and the SLA or self-defense groups was over, and the militia men were left to loot, plunder and then destroy the villages alone. In one such attack in South Darfur described to Human Rights Watch, the militia leaders “wore a red cloth over the left shoulder, no flag. Afterwards they showed a white flag and the fighting stopped.… After they showed the white flag and the army vehicles had left, the Janjaweed looted.”52

Tuesday, July 02, 2019

UN job vacancies in Sudan, South Sudan, UN, Intergovernmental Organisations

THE following links are now listed in the sidebar of this site Sudan Watch.

UN job vacancies in Sudan (enter Sudan in search box)
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UN job vacancies in South Sudan (enter South Sudan in search box)
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UN job vacancies and other international organisations 
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UN Duty Stations: cities

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UN and Intergovernmental organisations
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Monday, July 01, 2019

Sudan militia chief Hemeti hires Canadian lobbying group for $6m to influence US, Russia, Saudia Arabia, UN, AU, Libya in favour of TMC

Article from The Financial Times.com
By TOM WILSON in London 
Published at FT.com on Sunday 20 June 2019

Sudan militia chief hires Canadian lobbying group for $6m
US filings show boom in such contracts between N American outfits and African governments
Photo: Soldiers wait for the arrival of Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo before a meeting in Aprag village, 60 km from Khartoum, Sudan © Reuters

A feared militia commander in Sudan has hired a Canadian lobbying group he hopes will secure a public meeting with US president Donald Trump, support from Libya’s military leader and free wheat from Russia in return for an upfront fee of $6m

The consultancy agreement, signed in May by Montreal-based Dickens & Madson and Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of Sudan’s ruling military council, was published on June 17 by the US Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It is the latest in a series of eye-catching lobbying contracts between North American companies and authoritarian African governments.s military leader and free wheat from Russia in return for an upfront fee of $6m.

For decades, lobbying outfits have served the interests of US businesses and foreign governments willing to pay for introductions and influence. Those companies are expanding their services, promising not only access in Washington but also mediation and dealmaking with third-party governments all over the world.

Matthew Page, a former Department of State official, said lobbying contracts between Washington groups and African states were proliferating because there was a belief that the Trump White House was more susceptible to external influence than previous administrations.

“This is a reflection of the changed political realities in Washington where the dynamics within the Trump administration are fundamentally different in terms of influence peddling,” Mr Page, who is now an associate fellow at Chatham House, a UK think-tank, said. “African governments have always had these types of lobbying firms helping them out but in the Trump era these firms can be more effective.”

Foreign governments, individuals and companies spent almost $1bn on US lobbyists in 2017, according to figures compiled by the Washington-based website OpenSecrets.org, a non-profit organisation which tracks money in US politics.

Services rendered have included securing press coverage for Cameroon’s 82-year-old autocrat Paul Biya, defending officials in the Democratic Republic of Congo from targeted sanctions or blocking the investigation of war crimes in South Sudan.

In Sudan, Dickens & Madson said they would attempt to influence US policy in favour of the transitional military council and help secure funding and equipment for the Sudanese army.

Lt Gen Hamdan and his fellow military officers seized power in April, toppling Omar al-Bashir, a long-term US enemy, following months of government protests. After promising to hand power to civilian rulers, the generals have demurred and in June turned their guns on the people, killing more than 100 civilians in a night-time raid on a pro-democracy sit-in.

The lobbying contract was signed on May 7, before the raid. But even then, Dickens & Madson faced an uphill battle to build US confidence in Lt-Gen Hamdan. Better known as Hemeti, the soldier who is second-in-command in the transitional military council and Sudan’s de facto leader, rose to national prominence as the head of a feared paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces.

Members of the RSF have been accused of widespread human rights abuses in Darfur, western Sudan.

The lobbying group’s contract extends further than Washington. It will also push the interests of the Sudanese transitional military council in Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the African Union and “any other mutually agreed upon country or countries,” according to the filings.

In Russia, the company aims to arrange “private meetings...with senior Russian and other political figures” and to secure aid shipments of wheat, diesel and animal feed.

In Libya, the goal is to win funding for the transitional council from military leader General Khalifa Haftar - another Dickens & Madson client - in return for Sudanese military support for the Libyan National Army.

Other objectives include meetings with Middle Eastern heads of state, US investment in Sudan’s oil industry and even the negotiation of an economic union between Sudan and neighbouring South Sudan, which seceded in 2011.

When contacted by the Financial Times, a spokesperson for Dickens & Madson said the company’s president who signed the agreement, former Israeli intelligence officer Ari Ben-Menashe, was travelling and could not be immediately reached for comment.