The women of Sudan's protests - Sudan needs women at its negotiating table

Opinion Piece from ISS Today

By LIEZELLE KUMALO and CASSIE RODDY-MULLINEAUX 

Dated Tuesday, 06 August 2019 

Sudan needs women at its negotiating table

Having played a leading role in Bashir’s ousting, women can improve prospects for mediation and long-term peace. 

Sudanese women played a leading role in the pro-democracy movement that started in April and set their country on the long road to transition. Since the popular uprisings though, women’s participation in shaping Sudan’s political landscape has been limited. Their notable absence from negotiations to date is a missed opportunity to achieve lasting positive change.

Restoring power to civilian rule is proving difficult in Sudan. As the military continues to exert power over the population, civilians continue to protest. Non-violent resistance has been met with the butt of a rifle and women, in particular, have been targeted. Between April and June, 70 cases of rape and gang rape of protesters, female medical personnel and human rights defenders were reported, with over a dozen minors injured or killed.

By July, Sudan’s Transitional Military Council and the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change agreed on a preliminary power-sharing agreement aimed at transferring control to civilian rule. On 4 August the two groups agreed on a constitutional declaration that will ensure the formation of a transitional government. The formal signing will take place on 17 August. A three-year transitional period will be set up with a ruling body that comprises six civilians and five generals.

Political arrangements – like the one currently struggling for survival in Sudan – are not the end of a process but rather the beginning of building more accountable and transparent governance. They don’t guarantee stability or security on their own but are indicative of the type of society that will follow.

Including women in peace processes not only bridges divides between conflicting parties, but leads to better long-term outcomes. When women are involved, peace agreements are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years, and 64% less likely to fail. Women’s level of influence over a peace process is also associated with the likelihood that an agreement will be reached and that it will include gender-specific provisions.

Women aren’t considered key actors in peace processes because the focus tends to be short-term – ending the bloodshed – rather than the type of society and peace the negotiations will deliver.

Peace processes typically involve powerful men forgiving each other for the wrongs – including wrongs against women – they, or those they command, have committed, says Professor Cheryl Hendricks from the Africa Institute of South Africa. These men distribute power and access to resources among themselves, which serves to consolidate existing power structures.

Women bring a different voice to peace deals. Research shows that agreements with female signatories have more provisions for political, economic and social reform. When women are absent, peace deals tend to be more military-focused.

Considering the difficult transition Sudan will have to navigate to create a government based on human rights, it is essential that political, economic and social reforms are prioritised. And this is where women have a key role.

While the number of women represented during negotiations does not guarantee gender equality, including them gives their rights and interests a fighting chance. If gender priorities are not spelt out at the beginning, and strategically planned and budgeted for, they are unlikely to be recognised over time.

In the same vein, women’s inclusion during the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases paves the way for their inclusion in new institutions and during the implementation phase of the peace agreement. If women are not involved early on, chances are they will not be included in the later stages.

Mali is a case in point. The Algiers Agreement signed in 2015 offered little in terms of inclusivity. The peace process and its related bodies and mechanisms fall short of meeting the 30% quota for Malian women. 

Four years later, the highest committee overseeing implementation, the Agreement Monitoring Committee, which is made up of 39 members from the government and signatory movements, is still composed entirely of men.

Sudan’s peace process provides an opportunity for its women to strengthen and consolidate women’s networks and help forge effective implementation strategies. In Liberia, such networks were instrumental in reviving political will for the disarmament process when it stalled.

Sudanese women should undertake mass action campaigns to push their way into official processes that currently exclude them. The push for inclusivity of women will have to come from civil society and political groups.

Three possible routes could be explored. One would allow an independent delegation of women to participate in the process. A second could involve formal consultative forums to identify key issues from women’s groups which are then communicated to negotiators. Finally, the 11 members of the new transitional government should at a minimum make provision for a quota for women’s representation which ensures women constitute at least 30%, as per international norms.

The collective role of Sudanese women’s organisations thus far has kept the international spotlight on human rights violations. They should continue to play a crucial role, especially in ensuring that the final agreement represents women and marginalised groups.

Monitoring the implementation of the political settlement – including of gender-specific provisions where they exist – is a key activity that local and international communities tend to overlook. In Sudan, women need to be closely involved in monitoring progress on the country’s peace deal.

Regional and international institutions must together exert pressure to ensure women play a meaningful and sustained role in Sudan’s negotiations once they resume. This requires procedures that explicitly allow women to influence decision making, rather than focusing on the numbers of women involved.

There are already woman champions who are the faces of positive transition in Sudan. In the interest of lasting stability, they need a place in the transitional government. DM

Liezelle Kumalo is a researcher and Cassie Roddy-Mullineaux, intern, Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, ISS Pretoria

The women of Sudan's protests 

(Provided by Deutsche Welle) 

The Returnee

The Activist

The Adviser

The silent fighter

The self-determined student

The Optimist

SOURCES: https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/africa/sudan-needs-women-at-its-negotiating-table/ar-AAFq5DE and https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sudan-needs-women-at-its-negotiating-table

Film: MEET THE JANJAWEED - Hemedti is positioning himself as paramilitary ruler of Darfur (Alex de Waal)

Note from Sudan Watch Editor:  Here is another great essay by Africa and Sudan expert Dr Alex de Waal.  It is a profile of Mohamed Hamdam Dagolo 'Hemedti' who is positioning himself as paramilitary ruler of Darfur. Yellow highlighting is mine for future reference.  At the end I have posted a link to a film entitled "MEET THE JANJAWEED" referred to by Alex in his essay as a 'television documentary'.  It is a must-see.

Article by Dr Alex de Waal

Dated 03 July 2019

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo ‘Hemedti’

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemedti” is the face of Sudan’s violent, political marketplace. 

Hemedti’s career is an object lesson in political entrepreneurship by a specialist in violence; his conduct and (as of now) impunity are the surest indicator that mercenarised politics that have long defined the Sudanese periphery, have been brought home to the capital city. Hemedti’s Rapid Support Force (RSF), a paramilitary led by Darfurian Arabs—and commonly decried as “Janjaweed”—are today the dominant power in Khartoum.

During the peaceful democracy protests in Khartoum, demonstrators chanted “we are all Darfur” as a rebuttal to regime propaganda, trying to portray them as rebels from the far periphery. During the crackdown of June 3, in which well over 100 protesters were killed, armed men wearing RSF uniforms chanted “You used to chant the whole country is Darfur. Now we brought Darfur to you, to Khartoum.”

“Hemedti” is the diminutive, endearing name for ‘little Mohamed’, which Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo has ironically kept because of his fresh-faced, youthful looks. For a moment, in the days after the April 11 overthrow of President Omar al Bashir, some of the young democracy protesters camped in the streets around the Ministry of Defense embraced him as the army’s new look.

Hemedti’s grandfather, Dagolo, was the head of a subclan of the Mahariya Rizeigat Arab tribe that roamed across the pastures of Chad and Darfur. 

Young men from the camel-herding Mahariya—landless and marginalised in both countries—became a core element of the Arab militia that fought in the vanguard of Khartoum’s counterinsurgency in Darfur. 

Hemedti is from the farthest of Sudan’s far peripheries, an outsider to the Khartoum political establishment.

Hemedti is a school dropout turned trader, without formal education or military staff college—the title ‘General’ was awarded on account of his proficiency in fighting and bargaining. He was a commander in the Janjaweed brigade in Southern Darfur at the height of the 2003-05 war, proving his mettle on the battlefield.

In 2007-08—the year of a widespread but inchoate rebellion by many of the Janjaweed against their patrons, Hemedti was a prominent mutineer. 

He led his forces into the bush, promising to fight Khartoum “until Judgment Day,” shot down an army helicopter, negotiated for an alliance with the Darfurian rebels, and threatened to storm the city of Nyala. 

Hemedti then cut a deal with the government, settling for a price that included payment of his troops’ unpaid salaries, compensation to the wounded and to the families of those killed, promotion to general, and a handsome cash payment. A television documentary captures his parallel negotiations with the Darfur rebels and his own government, his charm and concern for his troops—and the fact that he enlisted Arabs and non-Arabs alike in his ranks.

After returning to the Khartoum payroll, Hemedti proved his loyalty. Pres. al-Bashir became fond of him, sometimes appearing to treat him like the son he had never had. Al-Bashir reportedly called him “Hamayti”—my protector.

Hemedti has ably used his commercial acumen, military prowess—and the fact that the Sudanese establishment consistently underestimates him—to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning Sudanese state.

On returning to the government fold, Hemedti’s troops constituted a brigade of the “Border Guards” headed by Musa Hilal, the leader of the Janjaweed. But he soon became a rival to his commander, and al-Bashir constituted his forces as a separate force in 2013, initially to fight the rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains. The new Rapid Support Forces (RSF) came off second best. 

But, with a fleet of new pickup trucks with heavy machine guns, the RSF became a force to be reckoned with, fighting a key battle against Darfurian rebels in April 2015.

Following the March 2015 Saudi-Emirati military intervention in Yemen, the director of al-Bashir’s office, Taha Hussein, cut a deal with Riyadh to deploy Sudanese troops in Yemen. One of the commanders of the operation as Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (current chair of the TMC). But most of the fighters were Hemedti’s RSF. This brought hard cash direct into Hemedti’s pocket.

And in November 2017, when his arch-rival Hilal rebelled and was captured, Hemedti’s forces took control of the artisanal gold mines in Jebel Amer in Darfur—Sudan’s single largest source of export revenues. Suddenly, Hemedti had his hands on the country’s two most lucrative sources of hard currency.

Hemedti is adopting a model of state mercenarism familiar to those who follow the politics of the Sahara. 

President Idriss Déby of Chad rents out his special forces for counter-insurgencies on the French or U.S. payroll in much the same manner. Hemedti has recently hired the services of the Canadian lobbying firm Dickens & Madson, which has previous contracts with Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and Libyan militia commander Khalifa Haftar, with the explicit aim, among other things, of obtaining U.S. recognition and Russian funding. Expect to see RSF troops deployed to Libya any day soon.

Meanwhile, with the routine deployment of paramilitaries to do the actual fighting in Sudan’s wars at home and abroad, the Sudanese army has become akin to a vanity project: the proud owner of extravagant real estate in Khartoum, with impressive tanks, artillery and aircraft, but few battle-hardened infantry units. 

Other forces have stepped into this security arena, including the operational units of the National Intelligence and Security Services, and paramilitaries such as special police units—and the RSF. When the democracy demonstrators surrounded the Ministry of Defense on April 6, demanding that al-Bashir must go, Hemedti was one of the security cabal whom al-Bashir convened to decide how best to break this unarmed siege. Hemedti was caught on video arguing for the use of force, though he later claimed it was his brother speaking, not him. But on the morning of April 11, he joined the army generals in deposing al-Bashir, rather than massacring the protesters. For that he won a moment of celebrity.

Unnoticed by the eyes of the media, which are focused on Khartoum, the RSF has been taking over the camps of the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as that peacekeeping operation scales down. Hemedti is positioning himself as the de facto paramilitary ruler of Darfur. (That takeover was ordered to be halted after UN protests.) [ http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67678 ]

Since revolution day, unlike the army generals who have been cautious, even timid, and the leaders of the democracy protests, who have been painstakingly consultative, Hemedti has acted boldly and decisively. He saw that state power was lying in the streets of Khartoum to be seized by whoever had the audacity to take it. Hemedti took it: he realised that after decades of eviscerating political institutions, power in the capital functioned no differently to in lawless Darfur.

As negotiations between the generals and the democracy protesters dragged on, Hemedti repeatedly threatened to clear the streets by force—and several times, his soldiers opened fire, killing or wounding one or two.

Then, after al-Burhan and Hemedti visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, the TMC appears to have decided that it could impose military rule without facing anything more than empty protests from the international community. On June 3, Hemedti’s RSF brought his Janjaweed methods to Khartoum. His forces rampaged through the city, beginning with the camps of the protesters, burning the tents, often with people inside. More than 100 were killed. Many were raped. Many were chased through the streets, hunted down in their neighborhoods. They rampaged through the university campus. The RSF fighters terrorised Khartoum.

Hemedti denies this, and avers that an independent investigation will exonerate him. And indeed, most close observers think that it is possible that he intended a limited attack, and that elements from the ousted intelligence services of the former regime took the opportunity to escalate the violence, tarnish Hemedti’s reputation and divide him from the generals in the Transitional Military Council.

Whatever the true story, Hemedti is a specialist in violence and should have seen it coming; he can’t complain if his own methods are used against him.

On 29 June, the TMC accepted to negotiate on the basis of a power-sharing formula proposed by the Ethiopian mediation. But the same day, the RSF broke up a press conference by the AFC, and the following day—30 June, the African Union deadline for a handover of power to a civilian authority—broke up the democracy forces “millions march” with tear gas and live bullets, killing seven.

But there’s also a twist to the story. Every ruler in Sudan, with one notable exception, has hailed from the “Awlad al Balad”—the heartlands of Khartoum and the neighboring towns on the Nile. The exception is deputy and successor to the Mahdi, the Khalifa Abdullahi “al-Ta’aishi” who was a Darfurian Arab, whose armies provided the majority of the force that conquered Khartoum in 1885. The riverian elites remember the Khalifa’s rule (1885-98) as a tyranny. They are terrified it may return. Hemedti is the face of that nightmare, the first non-establishment ruler in Sudan for 120 years.

The other side of this coin is that Hemedti has opened negotiations with the armed rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, and he may have the clout and the credibility to cut a deal with them. Despite the grievances against Hemedti’s paramilitaries, the Darfur rebels still recognise that he is a Darfurian, and they have something in common with this outsider to the Sudanese establishment.

When the Sudanese regime sowed the wind of the Janjaweed in Darfur in 2003, they did not expect to reap the whirlwind in their own capital city. In fact the seeds had been sown much earlier, when previous governments adopted the war strategy in southern Sudan and southern Kordofan of setting local people against one another, rather than sending units of the regular army—manned by the sons of the riverain establishment—into peril. Hemedti is that whirlwind. Immediately, he is the boomerang of Janjaweedism that has returned to strike Khartoum. But his ascendancy is also, indirectly, the revenge of the historically marginalised. The slogan “we are all Darfur” must be more than an expression of solidarity with the victims of the Janjaweed, but also a far-reaching restructuring of Sudan to address the causes of the recurrent wars in the peripheries.

The tragedy of the Sudanese marginalised is that the man who is posing as their champion is the ruthless leader of a band of vagabonds, who has been supremely skillful in playing the transnational military marketplace.

“Hemedti” is employee of the month as the representative of that inhuman logic of paramilitary mercenary politics.

Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the Conflict Research Programme, the London School of Economics and Political Science, or the UK Government.

This blog post was originally published by the World Peace Foundation; our partners on the Conflict Research Programme.

About the author

Alex de Waal is the Research Programme Director for the Conflict Research Programme and Director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University.

VIDEO 

Title: Sudan: Meet the Janjaweed

7 years ago 7.3K views

sudanewsmedia

This report comes from Darfur, where the team secured unprecedented access to a key Arab armed group accused of being part of the infamous Janjaweed militia  

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE - Tue 13 Aug 2019 11:09:  This film report made at least seven years ago comes from Darfur where the UK TV Channel 4 News team secured unprecedented access to a key Arab armed group accused of being part of the infamous Janjaweed militia.

Title: Sudan: Meet the Janjaweed 

Producer: Channel 4, Unreported World, Andrew Carter, Nima Elbagir – reporter Nima Elbagir meets an Arab militia accused of being an important element of the Janjaweed, blamed for the atrocities in Darfur. Note, Nima Elbagir is a sister of Yousra Elbagir @YousraElbagir, another great journalist. An amazing pair.

Verified account@YousraElbagir

To visit the film click here: https://dai.ly/xtxd8n

SOURCE: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/07/03/general-mohamed-hamdan-dagolo-hemedti/

Further Reading

1,000 of Sudan RSF fighters deployed to warlord Haftar's Libya offensive

REPORTEDLY, four thousand members of Sudan’s notorious RSF militia are thought to be deployed to protect Haftar’s oil resources during the offensive on Libya's capital Tripoli.

Sudan Watch - Thursday, August 01, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/08/1000-of-sudan-rsf-fighters-deployed-to.html

Sudan militia chief Hemeti hires Canadian lobbying group for $6m to influence US, Russia, Saudia Arabia, UN, AU, Libya in favour of TMC

Article from The Financial Times.com

Sudan Watch - Tuesday, July 02, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/07/sudan-militia-chief-hemeti-hires.html

US David Hale meets TMC al-Burhan, FFC and other groups - US keeps Sudan on terrorism sponsor list

Article written by Reuters

Dated 08 August 2019

Sudan stays on terrorism sponsor list

The United States still needs to resolve longstanding issues with Sudan before removing it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a senior State Department official said.

Earlier this week, Sudan’s military rulers and the main opposition coalition initialled a constitutional declaration paving the way for a transitional government, leading to calls from international mediators for the country to be removed from the US list.

The designation as a state sponsor of terrorism makes Sudan ineligible for debt relief and financing from lenders like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Removal from the list potentially opens the door for foreign investment.

“There’s a number of things we’re looking forward to engaging with a civilian-led government,” Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale said when asked about the issue in Khartoum.

These included human rights, religious freedom and counter-terrorism efforts, as well as “promoting internal peace, political stability and economic recovery in Sudan”, he said.

The US government suspended discussions on normalising relations with Sudan in April after the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir. Hale said the suspension remained.

The US government added Sudan to its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993 over allegations that then-President Bashir’s Islamist government was supporting terrorism.

Hale met General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council, as well as members of the Forces for Freedom and Change, the main opposition coalition, and other civil society groups.

“We discussed the importance of a thorough and independent investigation into the violence that has claimed numerous lives, according to credible reports, since the former regime was deposed,” Hale said.

Dozens of demonstrators were killed in crackdowns on protests in Khartoum and other cities following Bashir’s overthrow.

Hale paid tribute to the role of women in the revolution and hoped they would play a meaningful part in the transition to a civilian government.

“America is fully committed to helping Sudan transition to a civilian-led government that reflects the will of the people,” Hale said.

SOURCE: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/sudan-stays-on-terrorism-sponsor-list/

Sudan Hemeti hires lobbying firm to increase his sway in US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, hosts ex US congressman

Article from Foreign Policy

BY JUSTIN LYNCH, ROBBIE GRAMER 

Dated 28 June 2019, 7:17 PM

Seeking to Secure Power, Sudan’s Military Ruler Hires Lobbying Help

Top general brokers a multimillion-dollar deal with a Canadian firm and hosts a former U.S. congressman.

Sudan’s military leaders are increasingly reaching beyond their own borders for help from lobbyists, wealthy Persian Gulf states, and even a former U.S. congressman to shore up their legitimacy and control in the aftermath of a coup.

The de facto military ruler of Sudan, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, brokered a multimillion-dollar lobbying deal to increase his sway in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and multilateral institutions and welcomed a former member of the U.S. Congress to Khartoum for meetings amid a growing power struggle in the east African country. 

The posturing comes ahead of a massive pro-democracy rally in Khartoum on Sunday, which some experts and U.S. officials fear could turn violent, after forces under Hemeti killed at least 100 protesters and wounded hundreds more in a bloody crackdown at the beginning of June. 

Sudan’s Transitional Military Council, which has led the country since the ouster of longtime leader Omar al-Bashir in the wake of widespread protests, signed a $6 million deal with a Canadian lobbying firm in May to curry favor in the United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

The lobbying contract, which was signed by Hemeti, according to public disclosures filed last week with the U.S. Justice Department, sheds new light on the general’s shadowy behind-the-scenes push with foreign interlocutors to consolidate control and illustrates how many foreign governments have worked to stake claims in Sudan. The Canadian lobbying firm working with the military council, Dickens & Madson, seeks to secure a meeting between Hemeti and U.S. President Donald Trump and the heads of Middle Eastern governments and will work to ensure that it “attain[s] recognition as the legitimate transitionary leadership of the Republic of Sudan,” according to the contract. 

The contract also outlines other priorities, including the lobbying firm working to “provide military training and security equipment”; obtain “infrastructural and food security support” from the Russian government; and even obtain funds from a Libyan general vying for power in that country in exchange for military help. 

The lobbying firm is led by a former Israeli intelligence operative, Ari Ben-Menashe, and has worked in the past for the Zimbabwean and Libyan governments.

Hemeti took de facto control after Bashir was toppled in April following months of anti-government demonstrations. Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, remains under arrest in Sudan, but the powerful security forces and military junta that propped up his rule for three decades are still in place. Hemeti, the head of the notorious paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), implicated in war crimes in Darfur, has tried to portray himself as the one man who can bring stability to Sudan.

Main opposition groups and pro-democracy protesters have challenged the military council, insisting that it should cede power to a civilian-led democratic government, calls that are backed by the United States. Hemeti has sought support from wealthy Gulf states and other countries to shore up his legitimacy in the ensuing power struggle. 

In addition to backing from a Western lobbying firm, Hemeti also received a public relations boost from a former U.S. congressman, James Moran, who visited Sudan last week and met with the Sudanese leader. Moran, now a senior legislative advisor and lobbyist at the law firm McDermott Will & Emery, spoke at what appeared to be a rally in Khartoum after meeting with Hemeti, praising his time with the general and saying he was “impressed” with everyone he met, including the Sudanese leader. 

Moran’s visit gave Hemeti a potential public relations win, reinforcing the perception—at least in state media—that he is backed by the international community. During the rally, Moran was incorrectly introduced as a U.S. senator. Hemeti and the junta have shut down regular internet access in Sudan, and Moran’s visit was displayed on state television, making his speech the only information that many Sudanese have regarding the international community’s stance toward the general. 

Moran and his office did not respond to multiple requests for comment from Foreign Policy, including questions on the purpose of his visit with Hemeti and who funded his trip. 

Moran, according to Sudanese opposition figures and former U.S. officials familiar with internal deliberations, also met with the opposition Sudanese Professionals Association and the top U.S. diplomat in Sudan, Steven Koutsis, the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy. The State Department did not answer questions regarding Moran’s apparent meeting with Koutsis, other than to say he is a private citizen and doesn’t represent the U.S. government.

An official trip by current members of Congress, including Democratic Rep. Karen Bass on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was canceled due to the unstable political situation in Sudan. 

Powerful lawmakers in Washington are already raising alarm bells about Hemeti’s rise to power, however. On Friday, Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the Trump administration to slap sanctions on Hemeti and the RSF for their role in violence against protesters

As recently as September 2018, Moran was a lobbyist for Qatar, according to public disclosure filings. The Gulf state paid at least $40,000 per month for Moran and his law firm to speak with journalists, engage with Congress members and their staff, and send letters regarding Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Qatar.

Qatar is a rival to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, which have given substantial support to Hemeti.

Moran’s visit, and Hemeti’s new lobbying contract, comes during a potential flash point in Sudan’s revolution.

Hemeti and the military council face a June 30 deadline set by the African Union to hand over power to civilians. The Sudanese Professionals Association and other civilian groups, called the Forces for Freedom and Change, eventually accepted the proposal from the Ethiopian government to share power with the military, a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy.

The agreement calls for the junta to chair a body of seven civilians, seven military officials, and one civilian agreed to by both sides for the first 18 months of the country’s transitional period. In the following 18 months, a civilian would lead the council, followed by national elections. The military has not yet responded to the proposal. 

Two civilian negotiators told Foreign Policy that they did not expect the military to agree to the power-sharing agreement and said even if the junta signed it, it would not follow it. A million-strong march organized by civilian groups is planned for the June 30 deadline, which has experts concerned. 

“There are a number of warning signs that show violence is imminent for the protest on Sunday,” said Cameron Hudson, a former White House official under George W. Bush and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “The wheels are coming off. The military council is both losing patience and feeling emboldened by the lack of strong international response. They want to prevent a second wave of protests that could reinvigorate the whole movement.”

Central to the negotiations between the civilians and the junta is the role of Hemeti.

Some in the Sudanese Professionals Association say they will not accept a government that includes Hemeti. They demand an investigation into crimes in Darfur and responsibility for the June 3 massacre of protesters. (The general has denied responsibility for the massacre and said he launched an investigation to find the perpetrators.)

But other civilian groups, and even some inside the Sudanese Professionals Association, say they must be practical and include Hemeti in the transitional government. Still, Hudson warned that the military’s involvement in Sudan’s political future may be a formula for disaster.

“The idea that the Transitional Military Council or the Rapid Support Forces can bring stability is insane.”

Justin Lynch is a journalist covering Eastern Europe, Africa, and cybersecurity. Twitter: @just1nlynch

Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @RobbieGramer

SOURCE: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/28/seeking-to-secure-power-sudans-military-rulers-hire-lobbying-help-hemeti-lobbying-influence-dagolo-hemeti-rsf/

Further Reading

The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’s Supposed Transition

The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.

‘The Possibility of Violence Is Very Real’

Sudan’s transition hangs in the balance, says Zachariah Mampilly, an expert on protest movements and African politics.

Document of The Week: Sudan’s Paramilitaries Are Seizing Abandoned U.N. Outposts in Darfur

The United Nations halts withdrawal of peacekeepers amid fear that Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces are filling the security vacuum.

Sudan: Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan to be appointed 1st President of Sovereign Council, Hemedti Deputy

Article from Aawsat.com

By Sawsan Abu Hussein and Ahmed Younes - Cairo, Khartoum

Dated Saturday, 10 August, 2019 - 08:00

Sudan: Burhan to Be Appointed 1st President of Sovereign Council, Hemedti Deputy

A senior Sudanese military commander announced on Friday that Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan, who currently presides over Sudan’s Transitional Military Council (TMC), would be appointed the head of the future Sovereign Council.

“The Sovereign Council will chair the first transitional period under the leadership of Abdel Fattah Burhan, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo will be his deputy,” Gen. Salah Abdelkhalig, a TMC member, told Sputnik news agency.

The TMC and the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change agreed on Saturday on a constitutional declaration to govern the transitional period following months of political instability.

The declaration stipulated that the presidency of the Transitional Sovereign Council shall be assumed by the military for the first period of 21 months. It shall be composed of five representatives of the military and five representatives of the civil community, in addition to one other member who will be appointed by a collective vote.

The civilian-picked prime minister will appoint a cabinet where the defense and home ministry seats have been reserved by the military.

Abdelkhalig stressed that the constitutional agreement was “one of the most important strategic achievements, as it has saved the country from the civil war disaster.”

Meanwhile, Cairo is expected to witness important talks between representatives of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the coalition of Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, to negotiate controversial issues between the two parties related to achieving peace and ending war with the armed movements.

The armed movements - operating under the Revolutionary Front – expressed reservations over the constitutional document signed with the TMC, noting that it failed to include the “peace paper” that was approved in Addis Ababa.

SOURCE: https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1851861/sudan-burhan-be-appointed-1st-president-sovereign-council-hemedti-deputy

A day registered in the history of Sudan by #tears and emotions 🇸🇩 💙 #Sudan #SudanUprising #standwithsudan #blueforsudan

A day registered in the history of Sudan by #tears and emotions 🇸🇩 💙 #Sudan #SudanUprising #standwithsudan #blueforsudan #السودان_الحكم_المدني #السودان #تجمع_المهنيين_السودانيين #مدن_السودان_تنتفض #السودان_الاتفاق_الدستوري #IStillCantBelieve pic.twitter.com/Df9EtkhhIw

— Ali Saad Ali (@ali_saad_ali) 5 August 2019

 To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/ali_saad_ali/status/1158300963893067776

Analysis: Sudan's Constitutional Charter (Eric Reeves)

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Sudan researcher Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves entitled "The Constitutional Charter and the Future of Sudan” (a preliminary assessment of what has and has not been achieved, and the challenges ahead) dated Wednesday 07 August 2019. The analysis was published in full on the same date by Radio Dabanga online at https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan 

"The Constitutional Charter and the Future of Sudan,” Eric Reeves in Radio Dabanga, August 7, 2019 (a preliminary assessment of what has and has not been achieved, and the challenges ahead)https://t.co/C28otGjD55 pic.twitter.com/jziUlGVrvw

— Eric Reeves (@sudanreeves) 7 August 2019

To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1159206392940650501