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Showing posts sorted by date for query slaves. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Sunday, June 25, 2023

Sudan UN OHCHR: El-Geneina uninhabitable, infrastructure destroyed, aid continues to be blocked

Report at Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights - ohchr.org
Published Saturday 24 June 2023 - here is a full copy:


Comment by UN Human Rights Spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani, raising alarm on killings of people fleeing El Geneina in West Darfur, Sudan


Interviews with people who have fled El-Geneina, West Darfur, into Adre in Chad have revealed horrifying accounts of armed “Arab” militia backed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) killing people fleeing El Geneina on foot. Our UN Human Rights officers have heard multiple, corroborating accounts that “Arab” militia are primarily targeting male adults from the Masalit community. All those interviewed also spoke of seeing dead bodies scattered along the road – and the stench of decomposition. Several people spoke off seeing dozens of  bodies in an area referred to as Shukri, around 10km from the border, where one or more of the Arab militias reportedly has a base.


We are gravely concerned that such wanton killings are ongoing and urge immediate action to halt them. People fleeing El-Geneina must be guaranteed safe passage and humanitarian agencies allowed to access to the area to collect the remains of those killed.


Out of 16 people we have so far been able to interview, 14 testified that they witnessed  summary executions and the targeting of groups of civilians on the road between El-Geneina and the border – either the shooting at close range of people ordered to lie on the ground or the opening of fire into crowds. The testimonies recounted killings that took place on 15 and 16 June, but also in the past week. We understand the killings and other violence are continuing and being accompanied by persistent hate speech against the Masalit community, including calls to kill and expel them from Sudan.


One 37-year-old man said that from his group of 30 people fleeing to the Chad border, only 17 made it across. Some were killed after coming under fire from vehicles belonging to the RSF and “Arab” militia near the Chad border, while others were summarily executed, he said. Those who survived had their phones and money looted from them by armed men shouting: “You are slaves, you are Nuba”.


A 22-year-old woman gave similar accounts of killings. She told how one badly wounded young man had to be left on the ground, as they had no way of carrying him to safety across the border. “We had to leave him because we had only one donkey with us,” she said. It is difficult to estimate how many injured people may have been left to die in such circumstances.


Two interviewees testified separately that they, along with a group of people, were ordered by the RSF to leave El-Geneina. One said she was hit with sticks while being told to “get up and go to Chad – this is not your country.”


The High Commissioner for Human Rights calls on the RSF leadership to immediately, unequivocally condemn and stop the killing of people fleeing El-Geneina, and other violence and hate speech against them on the basis of their ethnicity. Those responsible for the killings and other violence must be held accountable.


El-Geneina has become uninhabitable. Essential infrastructure has been destroyed and movement of humanitarian aid to El-Geneina continues to be blocked. We urge the immediate establishment of a humanitarian corridor between Chad and El-Geneina, and safe passage for civilians out of areas affected by the hostilities. ENDS


For more information and media requests, please contact:

In Geneva
Ravina Shamdasani - + 41 22 917 9169 / ravina.shamdasani@un.org or
Liz Throssell + 41 22 917 9296 / elizabeth.throssell@un.org or
Jeremy Laurence +  +41 22 917 9383 / jeremy.laurence@un.org or
Marta Hurtado - + 41 22 917 9466 / marta.hurtadogomez@un.org

In Nairobi
Seif Magango - +254 788 343 897 / seif.magango@un.org


Tag and share

Twitter @UNHumanRights
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View original: https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/06/comment-un-human-rights-spokesperson-ravina-shamdasani-raising


[Ends]

Saturday, June 24, 2023

Sudan: Army outnumbered on Khartoum's streets

Report at BBC News World Africa

Published Saturday 24 June 2023 - here is a full copy:


Sudan conflict: Army outnumbered on Khartoum's streets


IMAGE SOURCE, 

GETTY IMAGES


The Sudanese army's infantry battalions have hardly been present on the streets of Khartoum during the two months-long conflict that has raged in the country, leaving much of the capital under the control of the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).


This is despite the fact that the army is made up of about 200,000 soldiers, roughly twice the size of the RSF.


Yet the army is heavily outnumbered on the streets of Khartoum, as well as the two cities across the River Nile - Bahri and Omdurman.


RSF fighters were initially moving the three cities in their armed pick-up vehicles, but they now mostly do so in ordinary cars. 


Huge numbers of people have complained on social media about the RSF stealing their cars from their homes. The suspicion is that the RSF is using them to avoid being hit by air strikes.


With its airpower being its greatest strength, the military has been constantly carrying out strikes to weaken the RSF. Although they are believed to have killed hundreds of civilians, they have not prevented the paramilitaries from advancing in Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman.


In a serious blow to the army, RSF fighters carried out an assault earlier this month on al-Yarmouk, one of Sudan's biggest military complexes, where arms were manufactured and stored.


While a fire raged at the complex for days, the RSF declared that it had seized control of it, which was confirmed by local residents. The military, however, has not confirmed the loss of the complex. 


It launched a counter-offensive, but could only manage in briefly wresting control of a vitally important bridge that linked RSF fighters in Omdurman to those in Khartoum and Bahri.


The RSF is also in control of other key sites in and around the three cities, including:

  • the main oil terminal, which the paramilitaries have turned into their base
  • the state media's headquarters, giving the RSF control of its radio airwaves, although the army has managed to retain control of the TV station by broadcasting from elsewhere
  • a large part of the presidential complex
  • much of the international airport, which has been shut since the conflict started.

The headquarters of the spy agency was also said to have been occupied by the RSF early in the conflict, but it is unclear who is currently in control of it. 


The military is known to have held on to a few key places - the most important of which are its headquarters and the airbase in Wadi Saeedna, from where its fighter jets fly to hit the RSF.


Troops have dug long and deep trenches to prevent the paramilitaries from overrunning the two locations.


"Their attempt to attack us does not have any effect now. The shells they fire fall on trees, or are cold by the time they land on our side," an officer said.


History of racism


About two million residents, out of around 10 million, have fled the once-peaceful cities, abandoning their homes, shops and offices. Some of them have been shelled and bombed, others have been occupied and ransacked, with air-conditioners and furniture among the items carted away by the RSF.


For some, the failure of the infantry battalions to make significant battlefield gains is not surprising, as Sudan is not a democratic state with a well-trained professional army.


The army - like many other sectors of society - is still bedevilled by Sudan's history of racism, slavery and colonialism.


It dates back more than two centuries when Ottoman and Egyptian conquerors established an army of slaves.


Recruitment from mostly poor black African communities continued under British rule, and has remained so throughout the post-independence era. Some of the soldiers are, in fact, descendants of slaves.


Under the three decades-long rule of ex-President Omar al-Bashir, black Africans were rarely accepted in Sudan's military college, with applicants required to mention their ethnic groups.


As a result, only a few have risen to senior ranks, with the army largely under the control of generals from the Arab and Nubian elites bordering Egypt.

IMAGE SOURCE, 

GETTY IMAGES

Image caption, 

Both residential and commercial areas have been devastated by the fighting


Soldiers earn a mere $11 (£8.5) to $16 a month, in contrast with the generals who have enriched themselves by setting up companies and factories that have given them control of 80% of the economy, according to Sudan's short-lived civilian Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok.


Because of their low pay, some soldiers even joined the RSF to fight - at one point, as part of the Saudi-Emirati coalition in Yemen, in exchange for vast sums of cash.


RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo became a big gold trader when his forces took over Sudan's most lucrative gold mines in 2017, and control of the border with Chad and Libya.


Sudan's army chief of staff did not like it - he wanted the money from the gold trade to go to strengthening the regular forces, but Bashir had confidence in the RSF, giving Hemedti the nickname "Himayti", meaning "My Protector".


Training camps were set up near Khartoum. Hundreds of Land Cruiser pick-up trucks were imported and fitted with machine guns.


With an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 men and more than 10,000 armed pick-up trucks, the RSF became Sudan's de facto infantry.


Arabs from Darfur form the backbone of the RSF. They appear to believe that it is now their turn to rule - especially after their pivotal role in helping the military fight the Darfuri rebels in the 2000s. 


One of the RSF's greatest strength lies in the fact that many of its "battalions" are made up of members of the same family or ethnic group, so they fight ferociously to protect each other.


In contrast, the defence minister has been forced to call for the mobilisation of retired officers and soldiers to beat back the RSF.


His appeal was met with derision by many Sudanese, who saw it as further proof of the army's weaknesses.


The reality is that Sudan's army, rather than fighting wars on its own, has long relied on militias. This is something it did in the decades-long civil war, which ended with South Sudan gaining independence in 2011, and more recently in Darfur, where Arab militias were accused of committing a genocide.


Now those militias - heavily armed by the military - have come back to haunt it, plunging Sudan into its latest crisis. 

Related Topics

Sudan


More on this story

Why an accountant has taken up arms in Darfur
Published 17 May 2023


What is going on in Sudan? A simple guide
Published 24 April 2023


How unsung heroes are keeping Sudanese alive
Published 21 April 2023


The two generals fighting over Sudan's future
Published 17 April 2023



[Ends]

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Sudan's Gold: Hemedti's untold power - Hilal’s militia made up to $54m pa controlling Jebel Amer goldmine

Article from Zimfocus.net - African Business Magazine
Written by TOM COLLINS
Dated 08 JULY 2019
SUDAN’S GOLD: HEMEDTI’S UNTOLD POWER

The power of Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagolo, who has led the violent suppression of demonstrators in Sudan, is based not only on leadership of a militia but also his control of valuable gold resources. Tom Collins reports

After weeks of peaceful sit-ins outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, the uneasy truce between Sudan’s security forces and thousands of protestors demanding change was finally ruptured at dawn on 3 June. Members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a militia widely condemned for human rights violations in its suppression of rebels in the western province of Darfur – fanned out across the city and proceeded to kill over 100 demonstrators.

A grim warning had been given just days before by Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagolo, the leader of the RSF and vice-president of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the body that has controlled the country since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April. “My patience has limits,” he said.

Hemedti, along with the head of the army, Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, has emerged as a key figure within the TMC. With a violent past and control of a paramilitary force estimated to number as many as 40,000, many fear that he has set his ambitions on more than simply preventing Sudan’s transition to democracy.

His reported vast personal wealth – accrued from the gold trade, along with outsourcing his militia to the former regime and Saudi Arabia to fight the war in Yemen – under­pins his power.

In 2017, Sudan produced 107 tonnes of gold, making it the third-largest producer on the continent after Ghana and South Africa. Some 70% of output is estimated to be smuggled abroad, although the true size of the illicit trade is hard to quantify. Through his militia, Hemedti controls one of the country’s most lucrative gold mines – Jebel Amer in North Darfur.

By origin a member of the Rezeigat tribe in the Darfur region, Hemedti rose from humble origins as a trader of cloth and camels. In 2003, he joined the Janjaweed, a local militia that was waging a brutal campaign against Darfuri rebels on behalf of the government under the leadership of tribal chief Musa Hilal. The conflict has left 300,000 dead, according to UN estimates.

Through his role in the war, he gained favour with President Bashir, who in 2014 put him in charge of the RSF, which had been formed as an offshoot of the Janjaweed. The group was given the status of a regular force but retained its violent modus operandi, and Bashir began to use it as a bulwark against the strength of Sudan’s military.

“That’s when Hemedti became quite strong,” says Omer Ismail, senior advisor at the Washington-based NGO Enough Project. “Bashir was not confident in the army because the economy was deteriorating rapidly and there were many problems.”

Yet along with a position of almost unparalleled power, Hemedti’s ascendance was accompanied by access to riches. In 2015, a report drawn up for the UN Security Council found that Hilal’s militia was making up to $54m a year from control of the Jebel Amer goldmine. The following year, Hemedti moved against Hilal, who had come into conflict with the government, and seized control of the lucrative mine. Ismail estimates that his earnings may now outstrip those of his former boss.

With this money, the militia kingpin has been able to recruit jobless youths from the across the Sahel to the RSF, resulting in an ever-growing force which Ismail claims is presently “occupying” Sudan: “I would say that Sudan is occupied now because the troops that he is using to control and monopolise power, most of them are not even Sudanese. They are recruited from Chad, Mali and Niger. They are from the Sahel.”

As the RSF continues to sow terror, much of the gold coming from the Jebel Amer mine, which supports a surrounding settlement of around 70,000 people, is exported clandestinely to various international buyers via a shady and complicated web of smuggling activities.

“Almost everything makes its way east to Khartoum,” says Ismail. “From there it is almost exclusively sold to traders in the UAE.”

With very little capacity for smelting and refining gold in Sudan, the metal travels onwards in rough kilogram bricks to countries including Dubai, which act as a gateway for much of Africa’s illicit gold trade.

Comtrade data shows that the UAE imported $15.1bn worth of gold from Africa in 2016, more than any other country and up from $1.3bn in 2006. The share of African gold in the UAE’S gold imports increased from 18% to nearly 50% over the same period and the industry accounts for approximately one fifth of the country’s total GDP.

The substantial offtake of Sudanese gold in Dubai’s markets suggests that economic considerations are part of the UAE’s chequebook diplomacy, which saw a joint $3bn aid package pumped into Khartoum alongside Saudi Arabia.

Hemedti has close links with both Gulf countries as the agent who recruited around 15,000 of his troops to fight the war in Yemen against Houthi-led militia. Ismail speculates that he may receive anywhere between $2,000 to $3,000 a month per person as payment for outsourcing his troops.

Other gold routes, according to Ismail, include the “40-day route” through the desert, historically used to smuggle slaves and ivory to either Tripoli in Libya or Cairo in Egypt. Ismail estimates that the country has around 440 remote airstrips used in the clandestine trade.

“They put the gold in a Land Cruiser and smuggle the gold outside the city of Khartoum,” he explains. “Then one of the smaller companies who have licences to fly out of Sudan will set up a local flight. They will put the gold in the belly of the plane. The gold will then come back through Khartoum airport and onwards to its final destination.”

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT
One of these destinations is Russia. Ramping up its presence across Central Africa and the Horn, Moscow has begun gold mining operations in Sudan over the last two years – predominantly in the northeastern region away from Darfur.

Sim Tack, global security analyst for Stratfor, says that the Wagner Group, a Russian private-military outfit with close links to the Kremlin, has been providing security to Russian companies working in the region.

“Russia has become very involved in mineral extraction in Sudan,” he says. “We have seen big accounts of Russia doing this in the Central African Republic (CAR) but at the same time they are doing it in Sudan. Sudan is the entry point into Africa which Russia is using to support its presence in CAR.” 

Data from the Russian central bank cited by Bloomberg show that its gold reserves have nearly quadrupled over the past 10 years, and that 2018 marked the most “ambitious year yet” for Russian gold-buying.

Much of Russia’s activities across Sudan and the CAR are shrouded in secrecy, and the Enough Project’s Ismail believes there is “no way of knowing” how large the trade is.

As for Hemedti, it’s clear that the vast amount of money earned from his gold-mining activities is a key enabler of the fearsome power he continues to wield in Khartoum and beyond.

Friday, August 16, 2019

Flooring Hemeti Dagalo the monster from Darfur Sudan may require more than unarmed protesters

  • The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum
  • By creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control
  • In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time
  • When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent
  • Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes
  • Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now
Full story below.

From Foreign Policy
Dated 14 May 2019, 2:34 PM
The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’s Supposed Transition
The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.
Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, the deputy head of Sudan’s military council, speaks at a news conference in Khartoum on April 30. ASSOCIATED PRESS

After Omar al-Bashir was deposed on April 11, Western diplomats made no mistake about who was in charge. Ambassadors from the United States, Britain, and the European Union did not shake hands with the transitional military council’s president, the little known army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; they met with his younger deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known by the nickname “Hemeti.” 

The story of how an uneducated 40-something chief of the janjaweed—the Arab militias that brought death and destruction to Darfur 16 years ago—became more powerful than his seasoned mentors in the Sudanese junta is, to many, a mystery. 

In fact, Hemeti is the main legacy of Bashir’s 30-year rule. Bashir himself was a product of an alliance of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, unseen elsewhere in the Arab world, but the army grew tired of the wars it had to fight in Sudan’s south, and the Islamists fragmented. When a new war began in Darfur in 2003, Bashir was convinced by Darfuri Arab hard-liners that turning their youths to militias would allow him to win. But by creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control and who represents a security threat not only for Sudan but also for its neighbors.

It seems that for a few days after Bashir’s ousting Khartoum’s civilian opposition trusted that it could negotiate a civilian transition with Burhan and Hemeti. Darfuris were more skeptical, given that they were more intimately familiar with the new men in charge. Burhan was a military intelligence colonel coordinating army and militia attacks against civilians in West Darfur state from 2003 to 2005, at a time when Hemeti was already a known warlord, who would gradually become the janjaweed’s primary leader. 

During its first, most intense years, the war in Darfur led to the deaths of several hundred thousand non-Arab civilians and displaced about 2 million people, earning Bashir an arrest warrant for genocide from the International Criminal Court. 

I met Hemeti a couple of times in 2009, first in a vaguely Orientalist furniture shop he owned in South Darfur’s state capital of Nyala (one of his early business efforts), from which I was driven to a more private office setting. He was a tall man with the sarcastic smile of a naughty child—yet he was then the newly appointed security advisor to South Darfur’s governor, his first official government position, obtained through blackmail and threats of rebellion.

Hemeti hails from a small Chadian Arab clan that fled wars and drought in Chad to take refuge in Darfur in the 1980s. As he told me, his uncle Juma Dagalo failed to be recognized as a tribal leader in North Darfur state, but South Darfur authorities welcomed the newcomers and allowed them to settle on land belonging to the Fur tribe, Darfur’s main indigenous non-Arab group. The place, called Dogi in the Fur language, was rebranded Um-el-Gura, “the mother of the villages” in Arabic, an old name for Mecca. The authorities also armed Dagalo’s followers, who, as early as the 1990s, began attacking their Fur neighbors.

Hemeti was then a teenager who, as he told me, dropped out of primary school in the third grade to trade camels across the borders in Libya and Egypt. When the Darfur rebellion began in 2003, he became a janjaweed amir (war chief) in his area, leading attacks against neighboring Fur villages. To justify joining the government-backed militias, he said the rebels had attacked a caravan of fellow camel traders on their way to Libya, allegedly killing 75 men and looting 3,000 camels. That fell short of his own brutal record as a militia leader. 

In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time.  His violent methods even created tensions with accompanying army officers. 

At the same time, Chad and Sudan began a proxy war through their respective rebel groups. The Chadian government used its own Arab officials to push the janjaweed to betray Khartoum. Bichara Issa Jadallah, a cousin to Hemeti, was then the defense minister in Chad. In 2006, he invited the janjaweed leader to the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, and had him sign a secret nonaggression pact with the Darfur rebel Justice and Equality Movement, behind the back of Khartoum. 

Shortly afterward, Hemeti announced that he had become a rebel. He then received a visit from a TV crew working for Britain’s Channel 4, which shot a documentary in his camp—his first exposure to TV—a medium to which he has become addicted since. But the journalists reportedly came late, and, as they were filming, government negotiators were also in the camp, bargaining over the price to bring Hemeti back into the government fold.

He remained a rebel for only six months before going back to Khartoum’s side. “We didn’t really become rebels,” he told me in 2009, sitting in his governor advisor’s chair. “We just wanted to attract the government’s attention, tell them we’re here, in order to get our rights: military ranks, political positions, and development in our area.” 

Other janjaweed leaders were increasingly critical of the government, including the most powerful among them, Musa Hilal, who in 2013 quit his post as presidential advisor in Khartoum and began forming his own movement. At the same time, some janjaweed were openly fighting the Sudanese intelligence service in downtown Nyala. Hemeti was one of the few janjaweed leaders to remain loyal to Bashir’s government. 

Consequently, Hemeti was picked to lead the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an enhanced paramilitary force—initially in an effort to retake control of the janjaweed, but it didn’t work out as planned. The RSF became uncontrollable and engaged in looting, killing, and rape in Darfur, as well as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The RSF also began exporting Darfur’s violence to central Sudan, ransoming civilians at highway roadblocks north of Khartoum and taking part in repressing demonstrations in the capital in September 2013, when at least 200 protesters were killed. First under the intelligence service, then under the direct control of the presidency, the force became Bashir’s praetorian guard, whose role was to protect the president from protests or from any coup attempt by the army—it turned into a third pole of power within Sudan’s security apparatus, rival to both army and intelligence. Hemeti was appointed brigadier general.

Then, in 2016, as Europe began cooperating with Sudan to curb migration flows, Hemeti’s men began to intercept migrants, from Sudan itself as well as other parts of the Horn of Africa, on their way to Libya, exhibiting them on local and foreign TV stations to demonstrate to the European Union that they were the right people for the job. In fact, the RSF played a double game and filled their cars with migrants whom they sold to Libyan traffickers, who would then often jail them in torture houses. Since Muammar al-Qaddafi’s fall in 2011, migrants in Libya are commonly tortured until they call relatives and convince them to pay a ransom to set them free; those who cannot pay are turned into slaves. But on Sudanese national TV, Hemeti claimed to be acting on behalf of the EU, which he also threatened with reopening the border if he was not paid a ransom for his “hard work.”

When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent led by Burhan, then the ground forces chief of staff. The two men got along well. They reportedly had meetings with Emirati and Saudi officials, discussing the post-Bashir era and telling them that they were the men the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian regimes were looking for: Arab military leaders who were not Islamists friendly with Qatar, Iran, or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

The RSF reportedly received Saudi and Emirati support, including money and weapons. Recently, at a press conference, Hemeti claimed to have set aside some $350 million to save Sudan’s finances and explained that he obtained this money for his role in Yemen and mining gold in Sudan. (He had competed with Hilal for gold concessions and eventually managed to have his rival arrested in 2017.)

In another recent TV appearance, Hemeti described how, in April, Bashir asked him and other military leaders to open fire on protesters, quoting an Islamic law supposedly allowing a ruler to kill 30-50 percent of a population in order to save the rest. He said he then decided “not to resist the change” and not oppose the protesters. 

The first head of the transitional military council, Gen. Awad Ibn Auf, resigned after 24 hours, reportedly disagreeing with Hemeti, who preferred Burhan. In the following days, Hemeti continued his public relations campaign, visiting a wounded protester in the hospital. But at a press conference on April 30, he made clear who he was, accusing the protesters of being drug addicts and stating he could not tolerate them continuously “blocking the streets.” Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes. 

Indeed Hemeti positioned his troops—reportedly 9,000 soldiers who were already in Khartoum and 4,000 who came recently from Darfur—at strategic locations all over the city, ready to fight protesters, the army, or anyone else. (On Monday, protest leaders blamed the RSF when five demonstrators and an army major were shot.) 

Hemeti is reportedly backed by some of the same Darfuri Arab politicians who created the janjaweed 16 years ago. If they rise to power, it would threaten to “steal the revolution from the people,” as one protest slogan put it, transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism. 

While the West seems passive, other countries are more worried, especially Chad. In recent years, in spite of his cousin still being a close advisor to Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, Hemeti has appeared more hostile to the Chadian regime and may be supportive of an Arab takeover in N’Djamena. Chad’s president took power a year after Bashir in Sudan, and Bashir’s fall might legitimately worry him. While relying largely on his own non-Arab Zaghawa tribe, Déby also accommodated other groups, not least Arab politicians who held key positions such as the defense and foreign ministries. 

Even so, ambitious Chadian Arab politicians might not refuse Hemeti’s armed support. The RSF’s ranks include hundreds of Chadian Arab youths and ex-rebels against Déby who took refuge in Sudan. Such combatants may well be more interested in regime change in Chad than in Sudan, risking an unprecedented exportation to Chad of Darfur’s racist violence. 

Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now.

Even in the most optimistic scenario—whereby a new civilian government in Sudan tries to disarm the janjaweed—at least some of them will inevitably get involved in armed activities across Sudan’s borders, in countries where they have already been active, including Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. There are also reports that janjaweed were among Sudanese who joined jihadi groups in Mali. 

The janjaweed’s strength is now comparable to that of the Sudanese regular forces or other armies in the region. Opposing them by force could trigger bloodshed, making the stakes of the ongoing negotiations higher than ever before. 

Flooring the monster may require more than unarmed protesters.

Jérôme Tubiana is a researcher and journalist who has covered conflicts in Chad and Sudan for more than 20 years and the author of Guantánamo Kid: The True Story of Mohammed El-Gharani.

Wednesday, July 03, 2019

Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of Darfur, Sudan: Lynchpin of Arab Janjaweed Militia Recruitment

Sudanese Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur
NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is a photo of an influential Sudanese warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal plus a copy of a fascinating report by Human Rights Watch. The old report was reprinted on 7 June 2019 by the Editor of Gurtong at www.Gurtong.net who introduced it by saying "This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan".

I have not had time to look into the meaning of the reference numbers used in the report. The yellow highlighting is mine for my own reference and to help me recall reports logged here at Sudan Watch during the Darfur war when the internet was still wild, before the existence of Twitter and Instagram, when there were no maps of Darfur to be found anywhere online.

Note to self. Here is a reminder of what it was like blogging in those days, 16 years ago. This blog was hosted by Blogger.com, it was taken over by Google. In those days, Bloggers were in their thousands not millions, we accessed the internet using a dial-up modem. Here is the sound each of us heard while we sat in front of our computer screens waiting in anticipation of getting online: https://youtu.be/gsNaR6FRuO0 - and here: https://youtu.be/qfPMAoXEJ4Q
This photo and caption "The rebels started the war - Musa Hilal" is from a BBC News online report dated 14 November 2004 entitled "Janjweed 'leader' denies genocide". To read the BBC report click here:

HERE is the report from the Editor of Gurtong.net.

Useful Background To Crisis In Khartoum, Sudan.
This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan (Ed, Gurtong).

"He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces".

Entrenching Impunity
Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur
[In Darfur] there are scattered tribes battling over meager resources. There is no organization, except for the rebels…. [The militias] have no hierarchy. The leadership of the tribe can be disputed and people are acting on their own at times, without the knowledge of the tribe.
--Dr. Abdul-Moniem Osman Mohammed Taha, head of the Sudan Human Rights Advisory Council7

Despite persistent Sudanese government characterization of the Darfur conflict as a “tribal conflict,” and repeated denials of state coordination of abusive militia groups, there is irrefutable evidence of a Sudanese government policy of systematic support for coordination of and impunity from prosecution granted to the “Janjaweed militias,” a policy that continues to this day.

The logic behind this policy is clear. Distrusting the armed forces, many of who were originally from Darfur, the Sudanese government recruited the “Janjaweed” militias as the main ground forces for the government’s counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur.8 

Although the government issued a general call to arms, recruitment was selective and based on ethnicity. Certain ethnic groups with historical grievances against those ethnic groups constituting the rebel movements or with strong interests in gaining access to land and other resources became the mainstay of the government’s militia force.9

To successfully recruit these groups, the Sudanese government provided incentives in the form of payment and access to loot, as well as promises of access to land and administrative power. Sudanese officials also identified key tribal leaders from the northern Riziegat to coordinate the recruitment: Sheikh Musa Hilal, a leader of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid, became the lynchpin for recruitment of militias in northern Darfur. Since June 2003, he has become emblematic of the role of the militia forces in the attacks on civilians and the impunity conferred upon them by the Sudanese government.

A. Musa Hilal: Lynchpin of Militia Recruitment
The worst atrocities are committed by the Um Jalul of Musa Hilal because historically they have tensions with the Fur and Zaghawa. They’re all camel herders, not cattle herders, and they have no respect for farmers, they have a superiority complex and they need their camels. When the war started, the Sudanese government asked Musa Hilal to be the leader of the Janjaweed.
--Neutral Arab nomadic leader from West Darfur10

Sheikh Musa Hilal has become internationally synonymous with the Janjaweed, the government-backed militias who have earned notoriety for their brutal attacks in Darfur over the past few years.11

His role in the crimes committed in Darfur and his current freedom within Sudan—flying in Sudanese military transport between his homes and wives in Khartoum and his base in Misteriya, North Darfur—illustrate the broader role and impunity of the militias throughout Darfur.

The Sudanese government has repeatedly stated that it cannot pursue individuals responsible for crimes in Darfur if the victims and witnesses are unable or unwilling to name them. Dr. Abdul Moniem Osman Taha, head of the government’s Advisory Council on Human Rights (and brother to Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha) told Human Rights Watch in October 2004, that “Even Pronk [Jan Pronk, Head of the U.N. Mission in Sudan] tells us it’s important to try the leaders. If the name of the leaders is mentioned by defendants or witnesses, we could do that. Until now, no one mentioned any names.”12 

This statement came months after six alleged militia leaders, including Musa Hilal, were named by the U.S. State Department in July 2004.13 

Scores of victims, witnesses of attacks, and even members of the Sudanese armed forces have named Hilal as the top commander for Janjaweed militias in North Darfur and elsewhere in Darfur. His Um Jalul tribesmen have played a prominent role among the attackers responsible for many atrocities across Darfur.14 

As of December 2005, Musa Hilal remains at liberty, free from any investigation or prosecution for his role in numerous attacks in Darfur.

Since 2003, Hilal has operated from his base in Misteriya, southwest of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, under the direction of the Sudanese army; his immediate superior is a Sudanese army officer named Lt. Col. Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said. Misteriya is now one of the largest militia training bases in the region, although initially it was merely a satellite settlement of the nomadic Um Jalul. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Wahid functions as one of the main liaisons between the Janjaweed militias recruited and trained in Misteriya and the Sudanese army.15 

He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces.17 

According to a former legal advisor to the brigade, Lt Col Abdul Wahid’s orders for the brigade come directly from the Sudanese army headquarters in Fashir.18

In a Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Hilal, he denied that he commanded any “military group.” He stated that his men are always under the command of the military and that he was merely a “coordinator.” 

Hilal told Human Rights Watch, “The training, the uniforms, the guns, they are the responsibility of the government.” Hilal said that he and his men were involved in what he called “joint patrols” in the area from Zalingei to Abata to Kutum (an area that extends from southwest of Jebel Marra north around Jebel Marra and includes much of central North Darfur), and that the Sudanese government had provided them with weapons for these patrols.19

The responsible army officials confirm that all of Hilal’s operations have been under the control of the army.20

Numerous community leaders from different parts of Darfur, interviewed independently by Human Rights Watch, said that Musa Hilal held a leadership role in the Tajamu al Arabi or Arab Gathering (or Coalition or Alliance) since the 1990s. 

He had close ties to Maj. Gen. Abdallah Safi el Nour, an Ireqat from Darfur and former air force pilot, who was the governor of North Darfur from 2000 to January 2002, and a federal minister in Khartoum in 2003-2004.21 

During Safi el Nour’s tenure as governor of North Darfur, tribal tensions increased dramatically due to perceptions that the Sudanese government was aligning itself with and arming the Arab militias.22

“Wali Safi al Nour, an army officer, is the one who gave Arabs the authority to devastate the farms,” a group of Fur and Tunjur community leaders from North Darfur told Human Rights Watch.23

The governor who followed Safi el Nour in North Darfur in 2002, Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan, an ethnic Berti from North Darfur and ruling party member, was concerned about the increasing tensions in Darfur. It was during Governor Ibrahim Suleiman’s tenure as chair of the North Darfur state security committee that Hilal was detained and sent to prison in Port Sudan.24 

At the time, local community leaders named Hilal in many complaints of clashes and incitement, and he was said to have been levying excessive fines and imposing corporal punishment on members of his own tribe.
On account of the complaints of his tribes people, he was removed as nazir or tribal leader by Ibrahim Suleiman and another person was put in his place.25 

During Hilal’s time in detention, attacks by Arab militias on other ethnic groups decreased. A Zaghawa tribal leader told Human Rights Watch, “While Musa Hilal was away from Darfur, the Janjaweed had fewer activities. They were still attacking, but not that much. When he returned, the burning of houses and villages started.”26

Hilal was released from detention after the SLA’s April 24, 2003 attack on Fashir; a few days after this attack, Governor Ibrahim Suleiman was removed from his post by President El Bashir. Upon returning to Darfur in June 2003, Hilal based himself in the Kebkabiya area and organized a meeting of the leaders of all the local Arab tribesmen, including the Awlad Rashid, Ireqat and Um Jalul.27

According to a person present at the Kebkabiya meeting, Musa Hilal ordered tribesmen to attack and burn non-Arab villages and loot livestock. He reportedly said, “The government is with us, so you have no accusations to fear.”28 

Some of the tribes refused; even some of his own Um Jalul tribesmen apparently refused to obey the orders. A community leader from Kebkabiya who knew Hilal in previous years said, “Musa Hilal compelled every Arab tribe member to participate, even those who refused. He acts as king of the Arabs, the guide of all. How does he force them to fight? He beats those who refuse and takes their animals, killing some of them.”29

The Kebkabiya meetings were a turning point in the government’s involvement with Musa Hilal—and with the Janajweed militias. “Guns flowed to them after that” said one local community leader.30

B. Musa Hilal’s Role in the Attacks in North Darfur
By July 2003, Musa Hilal’s militia base in Misteriya was established. Misteriya was not an army base—that was located in Kebkabiya. With the first Janjaweed forces mobilized, the Sudanese government launched a major ground offensive in North Darfur in mid-2003. A former soldier in the army who participated in these attacks noted the close coordination between Musa Hilal, other tribal militia leaders and the military prior to and during the attacks:

In Kebkabiya, at the Sudanese army camp, there were Janjaweed. It was actually a small group of thirteen leaders under the command of “Abu Ashreen.”31 

The Janjaweed troops used to stay in the vicinity of Kebkabiya, in Misteriya. Misteriya is a training camp for Janjaweed. Musa Hilal came more than twenty times to our camp in Kebkabiya while I was there. I saw him myself, with my own eyes, more than ten times. He always came with two cars, one for him and one for his guards. He had meetings with officers. Three or four days after each of his visits, we were attacking a place.

I don’t know how they were organizing and coordinating the troops, by phone or not, but on the day of an attack, hundreds of Janjaweed were coming to our camp in Kebkabiya, on horses and camels. We were asked to prepare our stuff too, to get ready and at some point we were ordered to get into our vehicles. 

We were never told that we were about to attack a village. We were always told that there were groups of Zaghawa or Fur militiamen operating where we were going and that we had to “finish them.” That is the expression that was used.32

Villages around Kebkabiya were among the first to be attacked by Musa Hilal’s men and government troops in the government’s first major campaign in July 2003. The same former soldier participated in the attacks. He said:

We were asked to clear the way and the area [the Eid en Nabak area east of Kebkabiya] for the Janjaweed to attack, burn, and loot the village. It was on July 5, 2003. That day, too, Antonovs came during the attack and dropped three bombs on the mountains near the village. People were running away. I saw seven villagers being killed. I saw three old guys captured by the Janjaweed and handed over to the commander of our army. They were later taken to Kebkabiya and put in jail. Some soldiers burned huts and buildings in the village along with the Janjaweed. Three hundred fifty soldiers participated in this attack. Only five of us refused to shoot or shot in the air. Three of the five were later arrested, court-martialed and sentenced to three years in jail. In Eid En Nabak that day, there were no SLA, only civilians.33

After destroying their villages and displacing the population around Kebkabiya, the forces moved north, towards the Zaghawa areas that were home to the SLA. In July and August 2003, large swathes of North Darfur, including villages in the Abu Gamra area between Kebkabiya and Karnoi and the Beré area north of Kutum, were attacked and burned in what was to be the start of a two-year campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed militia.

It is unclear whether Musa Hilal himself led the forces in the Abu Gamra attacks, but several local leaders interviewed independently, some of whom knew him personally, named him as one of the overall leaders of the militia forces in the area, and he is known to have operated in the area in later attacks. Sudanese forces attacked the town of Abu Gamra and its fifteen surrounding villages repeatedly during 2003-2004.
Human Rights Watch documented four major attacks on the area, and a number of smaller attacks. These major attacks took place in July-August 2003, December 2003 and January 2004, February-March 2004, and July-August 2004. More than three hundred people were killed in the attacks between May 2003 and August 2004.34 Witnesses noted that each large attack involved Antonov aircraft, helicopters, Janjaweed militias on horses and camels, and the Sudanese military in vehicles.

Some civilians living in Dar Zaghawa learned how to predict the bombing attacks and take refuge in caves or hand-dug shelters before the aircraft arrived. They listened to radio exchanges between the pilots on simple FM radios which picked up the radio frequencies used by the planes:

We heard the names of the [government army] pilots and conversations.… That is how we know some of the pilots. One was Egyptian, because of the way he spoke in clear Egyptian Arabic. One officer is Gadal in the army, because we heard him on the radio organizing the attacks. They called him Janabo Gadal or Officer Gadal. Also, Afaf Segel, who is a woman pilot from Sudan. She said things like “Nas Kornoi na dikim fatuur” which means “I am going to give breakfast to the peasant from Karnoi,” before Karnoi was bombed. Captain Khalid was another pilot. In their conversations on the radio they called us “Nuba, abid,” and said things like, “I am going to give those slaves a lesson they will not forget.”35

On February 9, 2004, after a massive government offensive forced almost one million people from their homes, including one hundred thousand Sudanese citizens into neighboring Chad, President El Bashir announced that the government had won the war.36 

The next day the Sudanese government agreed, in theory, to allow international organizations to have access to Darfur.37 

In order to rebut the government announcement of its defeat, the SLA moved its forces to West and South Darfur to open a new front.

The Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias moved into the areas of North Darfur that the SLA had partially vacated. According to government memoranda obtained by Human Rights Watch, this movement of government and Janjaweed forces into North Darfur appears to have been ordered to occupy the area and prevent an SLA return.38

Another government document from the same period specifically names Musa Hilal, and orders all security units to “allow the activities of the mujaheedin and the volunteers under the command of Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed.…”39 

Setting up several new Janjaweed militia camps in North Darfur was done to deter return of the rebel movements and also of civilians expelled from their homes by Janjaweed and government forces’ attacks.
Musa Hilal was seen at various attacks in North Darfur in February and March 2004; he and his forces were apparently responsible for a large part of North Darfur. 

He himself was frequently transported by Sudanese government helicopters. Several witnesses identified him as a commander of the forces who attacked Tawila on February 27, 2004, and noted that he was brought there by helicopter. A man from Kebkabiya who overheard one of Hilal’s conversations prior to the Tawila attack said, “I heard them on Thurayas [satellite phone] with someone in Khartoum, to arrange the point where the plane should land to bring the required ammunition.”40

Another witness placed Musa Hilal at the scene of crimes in the Abu Leha area in March 2004.41 Refugee women from villages near Furawiya, in the far north of North Darfur, named Hilal as leader of the forces attacking their village, Omda Dabo, in early 2004.42 A forty-two-year-old Zaghawa man who was arrested and then tortured by Janjaweed militia members after a joint army-Janjaweed attack on Abu Leha in March 2004, told Human Rights Watch:

They hung me with hooks piercing my chest. They also burned me. I was arrested with thirty other men. They tied us together and interrogated us about animals. We said we did not know so they called us liars and shot and slaughtered some of [the men] in front of my eyes.… The biggest boss of the Janjaweed is Musa Hilal. I saw him before the events, but also when I was tortured. He came by helicopter with soldiers. He gives orders to both soldiers and Janjaweed.43

When Hilal was interviewed by Human Rights Watch in September 2004, he deferred responsibility for the attacks to the Sudanese armed forces, denying that he had any official military rank or responsibility beyond “mobilization” or recruitment of militias. He said, “I have not led military groups, I only asked our people to join. I am only a coordinator for the PDF, training, uniforms, guns are the responsibility of the military people.”44

C. Government-Militia Coordination
The pattern of joint army-militia attacks supported by intensive aerial bombardment demonstrated in North Darfur became standard as the conflict spread to other areas of Darfur. In many cases, villages were first heavily bombed, then the Janjaweed and army ground forces moved in, again with aerial support, to ensure the “cleaning up” of any remaining civilian presence.

In contrast to the Sudanese government’s depictions of the militia activity in Darfur as unorganized and lacking hierarchy, many of the tribal militias used in the government’s campaign were highly structured. Many of the nomadic fighters were led by the agid or war leader. Agids and tribal leaders were in regular contact with military officials or civilian administrators at the local level, either provincial commissioners or state governors. 

In South Darfur, for example, the governor reportedly met with tribal leaders and agids on an almost daily or weekly basis. Witnesses and observers from different ethnic groups told Human Rights Watch that the agid traditionally plays an important role in mobilizing and leading the fighters in battle, often carrying a red flag.45 

The agid and tribal leaders were also used for distribution of arms, and as liaisons between the militiamen and the government. A well-informed observer from a neutral Arab tribe told Human Rights Watch:
Every Arab tribe has an agid. The government contacted the agid and other leaders…. They get salaries and ammunition from the PDF office near the market. The agid are the real power to mobilize the Arabs. The hakama [women singers] are one of the dangerous tools…but the word is with the agid, he can mobilize the men.46

As described by an A.U. monitor who investigated numerous attacks in Darfur and spoke to militia leaders, the militia attacks were highly organized, with “echelons” of militia attacking in waves. Militia members on horses were often the first to attack, because of their speed and the fact that they presented a smaller target. Militiamen on camels followed in a second echelon.47

Joint government-militia offensives were well-coordinated. In North Darfur, for instance, Musa Hilal and other militia leaders met, discussed and planned offensives together with the Sudanese military prior to implementing the offensives. In the South Darfur “road clearing” offensive of December 2004 (see Section VI below), the Sudanese armed forces coordinated with the militias not only in carrying out the attacks but in the systematic sealing off of villages and the methodical looting and destruction that followed.

The looting was not random; it was clearly organized and premeditated. In many cases, it appears to have been organized by the military commander and conducted in a methodical way. The troops and Janjaweed used in attacks south of and around Kutum were told that they could keep their looted goods if they “fight well.”48 

Prior to attacking Anka, a town northeast of Kutum, the army commander ordered the militia men to enter the village first and burn everything, after taking “what you like.” The army followed and “collected chairs and beds.” Numerous witnesses, in North Darfur and other states, described seeing army troops and Janjaweed militiamen collecting furniture, other goods and livestock, and loading the items into trucks and on camels.49

A twenty-five-year-old former government soldier described the looting policy to Human Rights Watch, “You keep what you have taken. It applies to the officers too. One exception: the animals. The animals are given to Janjaweed nomads who keep them. Then they are sold.”50 

After the government soldiers and Janjaweed militia conducted fighting and looting operations, large army trucks would transport the looted livestock back to the Janjaweed camp, according to this former government soldier who was stationed in Kutum, North Darfur. He told Human Rights Watch that after destroying villages around Enciro, North Darfur, in June 2003, the Sudanese government commander ordered the militia to take the looted cattle and cows to Damrat Sheikh Abdel Bagi, a Janjaweed camp located less than twenty kilometers northeast of Kutum, and from there some of the livestock were distributed onward in trucks: one interviewee told us, “Big lorries from Omdurman arrived.… They loaded up with sheep from the base and took them away. Three times these lorries came… and transported camels and cows.”51

Several witnesses of attacks who hid in the vicinity also noted that in some cases, the army left after any initial fighting between the attackers and the SLA or self-defense groups was over, and the militia men were left to loot, plunder and then destroy the villages alone. In one such attack in South Darfur described to Human Rights Watch, the militia leaders “wore a red cloth over the left shoulder, no flag. Afterwards they showed a white flag and the fighting stopped.… After they showed the white flag and the army vehicles had left, the Janjaweed looted.”52