Sudan: Humanitarian Update. 53 healthcare attacks, 11 dead. Aid workers attacked or detained, 18 killed

HERE is a full copy of a Press Release from OCHA

(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)

Dated Monday 07 August 2023

SUDAN: Humanitarian Update (7 August 2023) 

HIGHLIGHTS • More than 3 million people have been internally displaced across all of Sudan’s 18 states due to the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as of 1 August. • About 2.2 million of all people internally displaced have fled from Khartoum State. • About 880,000 people have fled the conflict across Sudan’s borders into neighbouring countries, including Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Sudan, as of 3 August. • About 20.3 million people across Sudan – over 42 per cent of the population – are now facing high levels of acute food insecurity between July and September 2023. More than 6.2 million people are just one step away from famine. • On 3 August, the first humanitarian convoy to reach East Darfur since the start of the conflict arrived in the state, after a nine-day road trip. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) facilitated the first cross-border delivery of food items by the World Food Programme (WFP) from Chad into West Darfur, one of the most food-insecure states in the country. Those supplies arrived in West Darfur on 3 August.

SITUATION OVERVIEW As the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues across the country, more people are being displaced and humanitarian needs are increasing daily. To date, about 3.9 million people have been displaced inside and outside the country due to the conflict that erupted on 15 April. More than 3 million people have been displaced internally as of 1 August, according to the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM). People have been displaced across all 18 states, the majority of whom are in River Nile, Northern, North Darfur and White Nile states. About 71 per cent of those displaced are originally from Khartoum. The most severe clashes have taken place in the capital city of Khartoum and the state capital of West Darfur, Ag Geneina town. Additionally, ­fighting between SAF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) has been reported in several locations across South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, resulting in civilian displacement. In addition, about 880,000 refugees, asylum seekers and returnees have crossed the border into neighbouring countries, including Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Sudan as of 3 August, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Humanitarian needs across the country continue to rise. The conflict and economic crisis have driven about 20.3 million people across Sudan (over 42 per cent of the population) into high levels of acute food insecurity between July and September 2023, according to the latest report from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for Sudan. This is nearly double the number of food-insecure people compared to the last IPC analysis conducted in May 2022. Of these food-insecure people, 14 million (29 per cent of the population) are in crisis levels, IPC Phase 3. This means that people have less food to eat and are forced to adopt crisis-coping strategies, such as eating fewer meals a day. More than 6.2 million people (13 per cent of the population) are at emergency levels, IPC 4, just one step away from famine (IPC 5). They mainly reside in states with active conflict and are selling off assets to buy food.   On 30 July, Sudan's Civil Aviation Authority extended the closure of Sudanese airspace until 15 August 2023 to all air traffic, except for humanitarian aid and evacuation flights. Sudanese airspace has been closed to regular air traffic since mid-April, when the conflict between the SAF and RSF erupted. In addition, state authorities in North Kordofan imposed a curfew from 1900 to 0500 across the entire state, effective from 2 August until further notice.

STATE UPDATES The majority of people internally displaced due to the conflict are from Khartoum State. IOM estimates that 2.2 million people have fled the state capital Khartoum, with 2.16 million people going to other states, while about 38,400 people have been displaced in seven locations within the state, mainly in Bahri (Khartoum North), Jebel Awlia, Karrari, Khartoum, Sharg An Neel, Um Bada and Um Durman localities. Most of these displaced people are living with relatives, while the rest have rented accommodations. More than 420,100 people, mostly displaced from Khartoum, have taken refuge in 73 locations across six localities in Blue Nile State, mainly Ed Damazine, Ar Rusayirs, Al Kurmuk, At Tadamon, Geisan, and Wad Al Mahi localities. About 66 per cent of displaced households are seeking shelter with relatives, while the remaining 34 per cent have rented accommodations. On 9 July, an inter-agency assessment mission was carried out in Ed Damazine and Rusayris localities. The World Food Programme (WFP) plans to start a verification exercise for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Khartoum in these two localities to provide them with food assistance. UNICEF plans to rehabilitate two water yards in Abu Hashim, Ed Damazine locality. On 25 July, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a measles outbreak in Wad Al Mahi locality, with 211 suspected cases and nine related deaths reported between 1 May and 24 July. Most of the cases were reported in Dam Town 7/ Umdarfa, while other cases were reported in Dam Town 1, 2 and 3. One suspected case each was reported in Ed Damazine and Geisan localities. A measles vaccination of 2,989 children under five years of age was carried out in Dam Town 7/ Umdarfa between 31 May and 2 June 2023. WHO and the State Ministry of Health (SMoH) are planning to vaccinate children under five years of age in Wad Al Mahi locality and catchment areas. About 297,000 people have arrived in North Darfur State after fleeing the conflict between SAF and RSF forces, according to IOM. Those displaced are taking refuge in 72 locations across Al Fasher, Al Koma, Al Lait, Al Malha, As Serief, At Tawisha, Dar As Salam, Kebkabiya, Kelemando, Kernoi, Kutum, Melit, Saraf Omra, Tawila, and Um Kadadah localities. Most (93 per cent) have been displaced from within the state, while the remaining displaced people have arrived from West Darfur, Khartoum, South Darfur and Central Darfur states. More than 43 per cent of those displaced are living with the host community, 17.5 per cent are living in IDP camps, and 6.5 per cent have taken refuge in schools or other public buildings. Northern State is hosting about 361,000 displaced people from Khartoum across 232 locations, according to IOM. All IDPs within Northern State have reportedly arrived from Khartoum. Displaced populations have been reported in Dabbah, Al Burgaig, Al Golid, Delgo, Dongola, Halfa and Merowe localities. Most of those displaced (80.96 per cent) are living with relatives, 8.7 per cent have rented accommodations, and 10.3 per cent have taken refuge in school premises or other public buildings. Many of the displaced people in Northern State are either waiting for the situation to improve in Khartoum or for their visas to Egypt to be processed, as it is close to both Argeen and Ashkeet border crossings. As people continue to move to Northern State, basic services are becoming stretched. On 27 July, the Medical Director of the Halfa Hospital indicated that remaining medicines and medical supplies in the hospital were only sufficient for one more week. Furthermore, the laboratory in Halfa Hospital lacks the supplies needed for different medical tests. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services are also affected. Access to safe drinking water is one of the main needs for displaced people at gathering points or shelters, as are sanitation facilities. More than 15 per cent of those displaced by the conflict between the SAF and RSF have taken refuge in River Nile State, which hosts about 467,700 displaced people across 244 locations, according to IOM. All IDPs have reportedly arrived from Khartoum and have taken refuge in Hamad, Ad Damar, Al Buhaira, Al Matama, Atbara, Barbar and Shendi localities. About 78 per cent of the displaced population are living with relatives and 15 per cent have rented accommodations, while the remaining displaced people are either sheltering in schools and public buildings or out in the open in gathering sites.   West Darfur currently hosts about 119,500 displaced people in nine locations across the state, according to IOM. IDPs have been reported in Ag Geneina, Foro Baranga, Jebel Moon, Kulbus and Sirba localities. The vast majority of those displaced have reportedly come from within the state (99 per cent) while others came from Central Darfur, Khartoum and South Darfur. About 73 per cent of the displaced population have taken refuge in shelters, while 27 per cent are living with relatives. On 2 July 2023, inter-communal conflict between Arab and Masalit tribesmen spread to Murnie Town in Kereneik locality. An estimated 87,500 people (17,535 households) were reportedly displaced by this conflict within the state and into neighbouring South Darfur and West Darfur states. Due to insecurity and targeted killings, people from Ag Geneina, Habila, Beida, Forobaranga, Kreneik, Mornei and Sisi localities continue to cross the border into neighbouring Chad.   On 29 July, RSF – supported by Arab militias in more than 100 vehicles and on motorbikes – reportedly attacked Sirba Town (50 kilometres north of Ag Geneina Town), according to the head of the Government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), Adam Abdelnabi Al-Sheikh. The Commissioner reported that the entire town has been looted and burned, and an unspecified number of civilians have reportedly been killed. He also reported that about three-quarters of the town’s inhabitants have fled to Kondobei and Bir Dageeg villages in Sirba locality, while others crossed the border to Birak in neighbouring Chad. The remaining residents did not leave the town, as many were children, women and older or disabled people. After the attack on Sirba, the perpetrators went to Kondobei and Bir Dageeg villages, where they intimidated and looted residents’ homes, according to the HAC Commissioner. The de facto Wali (governor) of West Darfur formed a peace committee with representatives of the different tribes in Sirba locality to address the conflict and sign a reconciliation agreement between the tribes. More than 272,300 people have been displaced in 498 locations across White Nile State since the start of the conflict in mid-April, IOM reports. All of those displaced have reportedly arrived from Khartoum State and have taken refuge in Ad Diwaim, Aj Jabalain, Al Gitaina, As Salam/Ar Rawat, Guli, Kosti, Rabak, Tendalti and Um Rimta localities. More than half of the displaced population are living with relatives, 30 per cent are living in camp-like settlements, 9.8 per cent have rented accommodations, and the rest are staying in schools, public buildings or in open areas.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND CHALLENGES Since the start of the conflict in mid-April, humanitarians have worked to ensure the continued delivery of life-saving assistance to people in need, wherever and whenever possible. On 3 August, the first humanitarian convoy to reach East Darfur since the fighting began on 15 April arrived in the state, after a nine-day road trip. OCHA negotiated with the SAF, RSF, state governor, HAC, and community leaders in North and West Kordofan and East Darfur states for the movement of these trucks from White Nile to East Darfur. The SAF and RSF secured the roads in their areas of control, and community leaders supported the movement of the relief items between Tandulti and Um Rawaba in North Kordofan, and from El Fula in West Kordofan to the border of East Darfur state. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also facilitated the first cross-border delivery of food items by the World Food Programme (WFP) from Chad into West Darfur, one of the most food-insecure states in the country. Those supplies arrived in West Darfur on 3 August. Insecurity, bureaucratic access impediments, and looting of humanitarian premises and warehouses across the country continue to negatively impact the delivery of assistance. At least 18 aid workers have been killed, with many others injured or detained, since the start of the conflict in mid-April. Between 15 April and 3 August 2023, there have been 53 attacks on health care, resulting in 11 deaths and 38 injuries, according to the WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). These figures only represent attacks that WHO has been able to verify through its verification system. Attacks on health care include incidents involving hospitals, ambulances, laboratories, warehouses, health workers and patients. Some humanitarian organizations have also been forced to shutter offices or suspend operations in areas they are unable to access due to security concerns, mainly in Khartoum and the Darfur region. Any remaining resources will be used to scale up operations in accessible areas. Funding shortfalls, the limited capacity of humanitarian personnel and government counterparts on the ground, lack of fuel needed for the transportation of humanitarian supplies and staff, lack of access to money in banks, and difficulties in delivering humanitarian supplies to areas outside state capitals due to insecurity have also affected the humanitarian response. These challenges are further compounded by power outages, as well as poor internet and telephone connectivity.

CLUSTER UPDATES Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster: The Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Cluster partners continue to support people affected by the conflict with life-saving food and livelihood assistance. Since mid-April, FSL partners reached 2.03 million people with life-saving food assistance and 45,000 people with life-saving livelihoods assistance. FSL partners also distributed 2,800 metric tons (MT) of seeds benefitting 280,000 people. FSL partners plan to distribute a total of 8,840 MT of cereal seeds to 1 million vulnerable farmers for the planting season. The conflict is undermining the current planting season, coupled with soaring prices of fertilizer and seeds, which is impacting the food security and livelihoods situation in Sudan. The main livestock vaccination laboratory in Khartoum has been closed due to the conflict, and the resulting unavailability of livestock vaccines will also impact people’s livelihoods. Refugee Consultation Forum (RCF): Following the start of the conflict between the SAF and RSF, refugees are facing acute protection risks, including heightened risks of detention, extortion and deportation, according to Refugee Consultation Forum (RCF) partners. There are reports of refugees being stopped by armed elements or prevented from moving from one place to another. Refugees in White Nile State are facing critical gaps in services. Refugee camps were already below SPHERE[1] standards before the conflict, due to chronic funding shortages and a lack of durable solutions, and the fighting that has continued since mid-April has only made conditions worse. As people started arriving in the state from Khartoum, there has been an increase in the number of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) cases, as well as a suspected measles outbreak. About 300 South Sudanese refugee children in the state have died due to suspected measles and malnutrition, according to RCF partners. Since the start of the conflict, an estimated 187,333 refugee movements to new locations in the country have been reported. Most of these movements have been from Khartoum to White Nile State, with South Sudanese refugees accounting for more than 144,000 of the total. RCF partners have verified that 71 per cent are internal secondary movements, of which 16 per cent are women, 14 per cent are men, 34 per cent are girls, and 36 per cent are boys. Between 26 July and 1 August, RCF partners continued to respond to the needs of refugees across the country. In East Darfur, 633 South Sudanese refugees were reached with general protection awareness-raising activities. In South Kordofan and Gedaref states, 1,310 outpatient consultations were provided, and 393 Ethiopian refugees received mental health and psycho-social support (PSS) services. Case management continues to be provided for survivors of gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection cases, ensuring access to specialized services.  Logistics Cluster: The Logistics Cluster is currently providing storage services to partners at four locations, including in Port Sudan (Red Sea State), Wad Madani (Aj Jazirah State), Kosti (White Nile State), and Gedaref Town (Gedaref State). In the past week, the Logistics Cluster has provided storage space of up to 2,542 cubic meters for four partners at warehouses in Port Sudan, Wad Madani and Kosti. The cluster is in the process of contracting 190 square meters of temperature-controlled storage space for WFP. [1] The SPHERE standards are a set of minimum standards in humanitarian response for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); food security and nutrition; shelter and settlement; and health assistance.

FUNDING Humanitarian partners urgently require additional resources to scale up relief efforts across Sudan. The revised Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) requires US$2.6 billion to provide life-saving multi-sectoral assistance and protection services to 18.1 million people through the end of this year. To date, the appeal is only 24.5 per cent is funded, with $628 million received as of 6 August, according to the Financial Tracking Service.

Download the Humanitarian Update here

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Sudan’s next stop: Regional proxy war? (Alex de Waal)

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: This analysis by Prof Dr Alex de Waal will take me all day to read, re-read, study and digest. As it is important and time is of the essence, I am posting it here now with a view to commenting at a later date. Meanwhile, at the end I've added a post script and two cartoons. 

ANALYSIS at Responsible Statecraft - responsiblestatecraft.org

Written by Alex de Waal
Dated Thursday 03 August 2023 - here is a full copy 

[SW updated 06 Aug 2023, 16:07 BST: added al-Burhan photo and caption]

Sudan’s next stop: Regional proxy war?

Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan walks with troops, in an unknown location, in this picture released on May 30, 2023. Sudanese Armed Forces/Handout via REUTERS

Outside powers are taking sides, supplying weapons, and hoping one general or the other will gain the battlefield advantage.

The next stage of the battle for Khartoum will, it seems, be decided in Cairo, Ankara and Abu Dhabi.

The middle powers of the Middle East are talking peace even while they are arming their favored clients. 

The theory is that when one side gains a clear battlefield advantage, the other will sue for peace. It’s a high-risk approach.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recip Tayyip Erdogan are lining up in support of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is increasingly backed by the old-guard Islamists who held power under the long reign of President Omar al-Bashir. In doing so, they are setting aside longstanding differences over the Muslim Brothers — Turkey supports them, Egypt suppresses them. 

Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nayhan, president of the United Arab Emirates and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, has made the opposite bet. He has supported General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and, according to some reports, is still supplying him with weapons. Hemedti impressed bin Zayed with his energetic leadership, especially of the paramilitaries he provided for the Saudi-Emirati ground war in Yemen, and his opposition to the Muslim Brothers — famously, the Emirati ruler’s bête noire. Hemedti also has a mutually profitable business trading gold to UAE. 

Starting a few days after the eruption of civil war in Khartoum in April, the United States and Saudi Arabia convened talks in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The immediate aims were to secure a ceasefire and access for humanitarian aid, but another goal was to prevent the emergence of a proxy conflict such as this. 

After a slack period in which two other peace initiatives surfaced — one led by Kenya, the other by Egypt — American and Saudi diplomats have pushed their talks with new vigor. But the chance of a ceasefire is slipping away, and with it comes the peril of a new, even more intense phase of the war.

At the outbreak of hostilities on April 15, Hemedti’s RSF surprised its adversary, the SAF, with its tactical acumen and its ability to hold ground in Khartoum. As RSF troops occupied strategic sites throughout the city, the SAF was reduced to enclaves and to air and artillery barrages. Unable to control the capital, its claim to represent the government was in question. 

But the RSF could not press home its early military gains, while it decisively lost any sympathies among the city dwellers through the appalling abuses perpetrated by its fighters—arbitrary killings, rapes and ransacking residential neighborhoods as well as occupying hospitals and terrorizing medical staff, and vandalizing universities and the national museum.

The army interprets the May 11 “Declaration of Principles for the Protection of Civilians,” signed by both parties in Jeddah, as stipulating that the RSF withdraws not just from homes and hospitals, but virtually all the positions it controls in Khartoum. The RSF rejects that.

What it gained on the battlefield, the RSF lost in the political arena. After the popular uprising that overthrew the longstanding military leader, President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, Hemedti was the most nimble and energetic politician in Sudan. Belying his horrific human rights record, Hemedti positioned himself as a champion of revolution and the main bulwark against the return of the old guard of the al-Bashir regime. For that reason, segments of the civilian resistance leaned towards him.

Populist politicians thrive in the limelight, but when the fighting broke out, Hemedti disappeared, fueling speculation that he had been seriously injured. Only last week did he release a short video clip. He looked stiff and pallid. Meanwhile, he has forfeited the political initiative.

In Darfur — the RSF’s home base — it and its Arab militia allies have been conducting brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing, targeting the Masalit people of Western Darfur and the Fur of Central Darfur. There is evidence of mass graves. Militiamen burned the palace of the sultan, customary leader of the Masalit and murdered the ethnic Masalit governor, Khamis Abbakar. The violence compares with the atrocities of twenty years ago, and makes the withdrawal two years ago of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) look irresponsible.

Whatever happens in Khartoum, Darfur faces another round of turmoil and bloodshed, this time without any serious international attention.

By default, SAF’s leader, General al-Burhan, has gained the political upper hand. He’s increasingly recognized as representing the government. But he has shown neither political profile nor leadership, and it’s unclear if he can manage his cabal of quarrelsome lieutenants, including the resurgent veteran Islamists who served under al-Bashir. 

The Forces for Freedom and Change, which spearheaded the 2019 uprising, are trying to regroup, but other civilian groups are disenchanted with them. Most of them refuse to entertain talks with the Islamists—a position that, during the civilian-led interlude that lasted until the October 2021 military coup, pushed the Islamists into the army’s embrace. 

Meanwhile, the deposed civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, has continued his cautious pattern of seeking consensus, disappointing those who wanted to see a more energetic stand against the generals. 

The Neighborhood Resistance Committees — which were the backbone of the protests—have repurposed themselves as humanitarian first responders. Depleted by the flight of many members, they have yet to generate a coordinated political strategy.

In June and July, a burst of diplomatic energy seemed to promise that the low-wattage U.S.-Saudi and African Union mediation processes might be overtaken by more vigorous efforts. It hasn’t worked out that way, as rival initiatives have cancelled each other out, turning the diplomatic arena into a field of tactical positioning.

In late June, the northeast African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), held a summit meeting and appointed Kenyan President William Ruto to head a “quartet” including Djibouti, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Ruto made no secret of his strong views. He condemned the war as “senseless” and the violence in Darfur as, possibly, “genocide.” He said that the Sudanese people had made it perfectly clear what they wanted—a democratic government. The IGAD leaders also spoke of activating the East African Standby Brigade to intervene.

Shortly afterwards, Egypt convened a “Summit of Sudan’s Neighboring States.” Strenuous diplomacy by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ensured a strong attendance. Paragraph 3 of the communiqué stressed “the importance of preserving the Sudanese State and its institutions, and preventing the fragmentation of the country, or descent into chaos.”

Egypt has a longstanding diplomatic rivalry with IGAD. Twenty-five years ago, the IGAD peace process for southern Sudan, led by a Kenyan general, resulted in a peace agreement that gave the southern Sudanese the opportunity to vote to secede. They took that option in 2011, creating the independent state of South Sudan. A parallel Egyptian-Libyan initiative, resolutely opposed to granting self-determination, was brushed aside.

Al-Sisi’s summit met his minimal aim of blocking IGAD, thus  reducing the diplomatic arena to tactical maneuvering without strategic direction.

The Egyptian plan was nurtured behind the scenes by Qatar and Turkey, both of which back Sudan’s Islamists. None are impressed with al-Burhan’s leadership, but they far prefer him to the alternative. This gave al-Burhan the green light to boycott the IGAD leaders’ follow-up meeting, and for SAF to voice strenuous objections to IGAD, on the pretext that Ruto has business dealings with Hemedti and is therefore biased. (They overlooked Ruto’s remarks about genocide, which targeted the RSF and its allies.)

After the Cairo summit, SAF generals have begun talking about how the war may be finished in a few months. Their hope is that Turkey, the region’s leading supplier of state-of-the-art drones—the Bayraktar TB2, deployed to devastating effect by Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Libya — will provide them with this game-changing technology. 

But an escalation in battlefield technology would not go unchallenged. The RSF already has some less capable drones of its own. It will be pressing the UAE to send it high-end versions — and bin Zayed is quite capable of resisting pressure from Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara, and overruling his own advisors to follow his own path. This would turn Sudan into a proxy war among Middle Eastern powers.

With Egypt canceling out IGAD, the diplomatic pass-the-buck goes back to the Americans and Saudis. After a six-week suspension, talks resumed in Jeddah in mid-July. The mediators insist they have a plan and may yet have the leverage to get the generals to agree to a ceasefire. But there’s no sign of a strategic vision for how to help Sudan escape from its crisis.

Written by Alex de Waal

More from Alex de Waal

View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/03/sudans-next-stop-regional-proxy-war/

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Post script from Sudan Watch Editor

Here are two cartoons. I wrote more but it became a rant about me feeling weary reading never-ending news of men attacking, raping, killing women and children. To help stop the violence I thought of starting a rumour. 

The rumour was this. Any man carrying a gun, knife or whatever to attack, kill, rape women and children has a tiny todger. Any man who cares about peace, women and children has a big todger. And any man who cares about peace, women and children and is a real peacemaker has a very big todger.  

Job done. Rumour started!

Hemedti is battering the Sudanese nation (independent since 1956), people are burying their dead and plundering the country, while El Burhan remains in his cellar below the Army Command in Khartoum (Cartoon by Omar Dafallah / RD)

Source: Radio Dabanga 28 July 2023 report: 

Army delegation in Jeddah returns to Sudan ‘for deliberations’

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Here is a copy of a tweet by John Godfrey @USAMBSudan 31 July 2023:

"Welcomed the opportunity to visit Egypt to consult with partners on efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan, and to meet in Cairo with a group of Embassy Khartoum locally-engaged staff.  Thank you to Egypt for its efforts, including on behalf of Sudanese fleeing the fighting in their country.

9:31 PM · Jul 31, 2023"

Here is a copy of one of the replies, posted in Arabic together with cartoon of chessboard (presumably being played by POTUS Donald Trump):

𓅃𝑨𝒛𝒐𝒖𝒛 𓀛ۦـــۦـزوز𓅋عـۦـــۦــ @oT9KUOpBLUloHHB

حكومتك هي سبب البلاوي اهتموا بامر روسيا والصين أفضل ليكم

Translated from Arabic by Google:

"Your government is the cause of the troubles. Take care of Russia and China. It is better for you."

https://twitter.com/USAMBSudan/status/1686112289726824448

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Chad's Deby met Sudan's Finance Minister JEM leader Ibrahim. JEM leaders secretly met RSF commander

Note, the leader of Darfur rebel group JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, is Sudan's Minister of Finance. He was appointed to the post by Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok in a cabinet reshuffle 8 February 2021. Read more.

Report from Sudan Tribune - sudantribune.com
Published Monday 17 July 2023 - here is a full copy:

JEM faces internal rift as leaders engage with RSF commander

July 17, 2023 (KHARTOUM) – The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is confronted with an internal crisis as three senior members are found to have secretly held a meeting with the Second Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Abdel Rahim Daglo.

JEM leader Gibril Ibrahim refuted claims in a statement last week, denying any meeting with Daglo in the Chadian capital during a recent trip to N’djamena. He affirmed that his sole meeting was with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby on July 8.

While JEM asserts its neutrality in the war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary forces, reports have resurfaced suggesting that Daglo had met with JEM leadership members in Chad. The purpose of the meeting was reportedly to discuss the RSF’s political future within the ongoing efforts to end the war, hold an inclusive dialogue, and explore possibilities for cooperation between the two armed groups.

In response to these reports, JEM indirectly acknowledged the meeting by issuing a second statement, on Sunday stating that the leadership members who met the RSF second-in-command in N’djamena acted in their personal capacity without any mandate from the group.

On Monday, a prominent JEM leader disclosed to the Sudan Tribune that the movement’s leader intends to take punitive measures against the senior officials who secretly met with Daglo in Chad.

“Gibril Ibrahim plans to impose severe penalties on the leaders who clandestinely met Daglo in N’Djamena,” said the senior official, who is not authorized to speak to the media.

The official revealed that Ibrahim personally spoke with JEM’s political secretary, Suleiman Sandal, and its chief negotiator and peace implementation secretary, Ahmed Tugud, to inquire about the reasons behind their meeting with the RSF second-in-command.

The source emphasized that the unauthorized meeting has angered the JEM leadership, particularly as it contradicts the movement’s stance of neutrality in the conflict between the army and the paramilitary forces.

“These leaders have chosen a path that contradicts the movement’s vision. Ongoing meetings are being held with them to clarify their positions, and strict sanctions are expected to be imposed against them in the coming days,” the source stated.

Last week, the leaders of the Darfur groups that signed the Juba peace agreement held discussions with the Chadian president to address the urgent need for protecting civilians in Darfur and stemming the flow of refugees to Chad.

In light of the reported killing of hundreds of civilians in West and Central Darfur states by the RSF and allied militiamen, the signatory groups also convened in N’djamena and agreed to strengthen the joint force.

Following the outbreak of war, the Darfur armed groups formed a joint force to safeguard civilians, but its role has remained limited to the North Darfur capital. The force is mainly escorting humanitarian and commercial convoys to or  in the western Sudan region.

(ST)

View original:  https://sudantribune.com/article275238/

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Related report

Darfur24 -Tuesday 18 July 2023

JEM chairman vows to punish senior movement officials

[...] On the 5th of July, several leading members of the struggle movements, including chairman of Sudan liberation Movements Minnawi, Altahir Hajar and Alhadi Idriss held talks with senior Chadian government officials on the situation in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular and the possibility of delivering humanitarian aid to Darfur region.

https://www.darfur24.com/en/2023/07/18/jem-chairman-vows-to-punish-senior-movement-officials/

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