Showing posts with label Mohamed bin Zayed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mohamed bin Zayed. Show all posts

Thursday, December 07, 2023

President Putin visits UAE & Saudi Arabia Dec 6 before meeting next day in Russia with Iran president

Report from BBC News

By George Wright

Dated Wednesday, 06 December 2023 - excerpts:


Russian President Putin lands in UAE

Image Source, Reuters. Image caption, 
Vladimir Putin was welcomed by the UAE's foreign minister


Mr Putin told UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan that "our relations have reached unprecedented levels".


Trade and oil will be on the agenda in the UAE, which a Kremlin statement said is "Russia's main economic partner in the Arab world".


The Russian president is scheduled to travel to Saudi Arabia later on Wednesday to meet with the kingdom's de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.


The two leaders will "consider ways to promote de-escalation" in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Kremlin said.


Conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Sudan will also be discussed in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Russian presidential assistant Yuri Ushakov stated.


Kremlin officials have also announced that Mr Putin will meet with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi on Thursday to discuss the war in Gaza.


Full story: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67636648

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Related report 


From Oil Price dot com

By RFE/RL staff 
Dated Wed, 05 Dec 2023, 10:00 AM CST - here is a copy in full:

Putin Makes Rare Trip Abroad With Visit To Saudi Arabia, UAE
  • In a rare trip abroad as an international arrest warrant hangs over him, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on December 6.
  • The Kremlin said on December 5 that bilateral relations and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will be discussed during the meetings.
  • Following the one-day trip, Putin will return home and meet Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, the Kremlin said.

In a rare trip abroad as an international arrest warrant hangs over him, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on December 6 before heading home for a meeting with Iran's president the next day.


The Kremlin said on December 5 that bilateral relations and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will be discussed during the meetings, while issues concerning the oil market, "are also always on the agenda."


The International Criminal Court (ICC) in March issued arrest warrants for Putin and his children's commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for being responsible for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia -- a war crime under international legislation.


While Putin did not make many foreign trips before the warrant was issued, he has curtailed his travel even more since.


He did not attend the G20 summit in India in September, and has limited his recent trips to countries such as China and states of the former Soviet Union.


With the warrant, Putin became the third serving head of state to be targeted in an arrest warrant from the ICC, the world's permanent war crimes tribunal, along with Sudan's Omar al-Bashir and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi.


The Kremlin did not give details of Putin's agenda, but the online news outlet Shot, which first reported the trip, quoted Kremlin foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov as saying the Russian leader would travel first to the U.A.E. before heading on to Saudi Arabia, where talks would include a meeting with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.


Putin and the prince have developed close ties over the years as they worked to form a group of leading oil producers, now known as OPEC+, in late 2016. The group has worked to support the price of oil, and last week announced voluntary supply cuts.


Following the one-day trip, Putin will return home and meet Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, the Kremlin said.


Putin visited Iran in July 2022, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tehran in October.


Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Iran has widely been accused of delivering cheap but effective kamikaze drones to Moscow.


While Iran denies the allegations, saying it only sold drones to Moscow before the war started, U.S. officials have repeatedly accused Tehran of supplying Shahed-136 Iranian drones that Russia has used to destroy civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. There has been evidence of Iranian drones rebranded as Russian Geran-2s being used on the battlefield.


And as the two countries have increased military-technical cooperation, Iran's Defense Ministry has routinely showcased its ballistic, cruise, anti-tank, and air-defense missile systems to Russian officials.


This has raised fears Moscow and Tehran could try to expand their existing arms dealing to include more advanced weaponry, know-how, and technology that could boost both Russia's war effort in Ukraine and Iran's ballistic-missile and drone programs.

By RF/ERL


View original:

https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Putin-Makes-Rare-Trip-Abroad-With-Visit-To-Saudi-Arabia-UAE.html


[End]

Saturday, August 05, 2023

Sudan’s next stop: Regional proxy war? (Alex de Waal)

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: This analysis by Prof Dr Alex de Waal will take me all day to read, re-read, study and digest. As it is important and time is of the essence, I am posting it here now with a view to commenting at a later date. Meanwhile, at the end I've added a post script and two cartoons. 

ANALYSIS at Responsible Statecraft - responsiblestatecraft.org
Written by Alex de Waal
Dated Thursday 03 August 2023 - here is a full copy 
[SW updated 06 Aug 2023, 16:07 BST: added al-Burhan photo and caption]

Sudan’s next stop: Regional proxy war?
Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan walks with troops, in an unknown location, in this picture released on May 30, 2023. Sudanese Armed Forces/Handout via REUTERS

Outside powers are taking sides, supplying weapons, and hoping one general or the other will gain the battlefield advantage.


The next stage of the battle for Khartoum will, it seems, be decided in Cairo, Ankara and Abu Dhabi.


The middle powers of the Middle East are talking peace even while they are arming their favored clients. 


The theory is that when one side gains a clear battlefield advantage, the other will sue for peace. It’s a high-risk approach.


Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recip Tayyip Erdogan are lining up in support of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is increasingly backed by the old-guard Islamists who held power under the long reign of President Omar al-Bashir. In doing so, they are setting aside longstanding differences over the Muslim Brothers — Turkey supports them, Egypt suppresses them. 


Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nayhan, president of the United Arab Emirates and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, has made the opposite bet. He has supported General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and, according to some reports, is still supplying him with weapons. Hemedti impressed bin Zayed with his energetic leadership, especially of the paramilitaries he provided for the Saudi-Emirati ground war in Yemen, and his opposition to the Muslim Brothers — famously, the Emirati ruler’s bête noire. Hemedti also has a mutually profitable business trading gold to UAE. 


Starting a few days after the eruption of civil war in Khartoum in April, the United States and Saudi Arabia convened talks in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The immediate aims were to secure a ceasefire and access for humanitarian aid, but another goal was to prevent the emergence of a proxy conflict such as this. 


After a slack period in which two other peace initiatives surfaced — one led by Kenya, the other by Egypt — American and Saudi diplomats have pushed their talks with new vigor. But the chance of a ceasefire is slipping away, and with it comes the peril of a new, even more intense phase of the war.


At the outbreak of hostilities on April 15, Hemedti’s RSF surprised its adversary, the SAF, with its tactical acumen and its ability to hold ground in Khartoum. As RSF troops occupied strategic sites throughout the city, the SAF was reduced to enclaves and to air and artillery barrages. Unable to control the capital, its claim to represent the government was in question. 


But the RSF could not press home its early military gains, while it decisively lost any sympathies among the city dwellers through the appalling abuses perpetrated by its fighters—arbitrary killings, rapes and ransacking residential neighborhoods as well as occupying hospitals and terrorizing medical staff, and vandalizing universities and the national museum.


The army interprets the May 11 “Declaration of Principles for the Protection of Civilians,” signed by both parties in Jeddah, as stipulating that the RSF withdraws not just from homes and hospitals, but virtually all the positions it controls in Khartoum. The RSF rejects that.


What it gained on the battlefield, the RSF lost in the political arena. After the popular uprising that overthrew the longstanding military leader, President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, Hemedti was the most nimble and energetic politician in Sudan. Belying his horrific human rights record, Hemedti positioned himself as a champion of revolution and the main bulwark against the return of the old guard of the al-Bashir regime. For that reason, segments of the civilian resistance leaned towards him.


Populist politicians thrive in the limelight, but when the fighting broke out, Hemedti disappeared, fueling speculation that he had been seriously injured. Only last week did he release a short video clip. He looked stiff and pallid. Meanwhile, he has forfeited the political initiative.


In Darfur — the RSF’s home base — it and its Arab militia allies have been conducting brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing, targeting the Masalit people of Western Darfur and the Fur of Central Darfur. There is evidence of mass graves. Militiamen burned the palace of the sultan, customary leader of the Masalit and murdered the ethnic Masalit governor, Khamis Abbakar. The violence compares with the atrocities of twenty years ago, and makes the withdrawal two years ago of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) look irresponsible.


Whatever happens in Khartoum, Darfur faces another round of turmoil and bloodshed, this time without any serious international attention.


By default, SAF’s leader, General al-Burhan, has gained the political upper hand. He’s increasingly recognized as representing the government. But he has shown neither political profile nor leadership, and it’s unclear if he can manage his cabal of quarrelsome lieutenants, including the resurgent veteran Islamists who served under al-Bashir. 


The Forces for Freedom and Change, which spearheaded the 2019 uprising, are trying to regroup, but other civilian groups are disenchanted with them. Most of them refuse to entertain talks with the Islamists—a position that, during the civilian-led interlude that lasted until the October 2021 military coup, pushed the Islamists into the army’s embrace. 


Meanwhile, the deposed civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, has continued his cautious pattern of seeking consensus, disappointing those who wanted to see a more energetic stand against the generals. 

The Neighborhood Resistance Committees — which were the backbone of the protests—have repurposed themselves as humanitarian first responders. Depleted by the flight of many members, they have yet to generate a coordinated political strategy.


In June and July, a burst of diplomatic energy seemed to promise that the low-wattage U.S.-Saudi and African Union mediation processes might be overtaken by more vigorous efforts. It hasn’t worked out that way, as rival initiatives have cancelled each other out, turning the diplomatic arena into a field of tactical positioning.


In late June, the northeast African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), held a summit meeting and appointed Kenyan President William Ruto to head a “quartet” including Djibouti, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Ruto made no secret of his strong views. He condemned the war as “senseless” and the violence in Darfur as, possibly, “genocide.” He said that the Sudanese people had made it perfectly clear what they wanted—a democratic government. The IGAD leaders also spoke of activating the East African Standby Brigade to intervene.


Shortly afterwards, Egypt convened a “Summit of Sudan’s Neighboring States.” Strenuous diplomacy by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ensured a strong attendance. Paragraph 3 of the communiqué stressed “the importance of preserving the Sudanese State and its institutions, and preventing the fragmentation of the country, or descent into chaos.”


Egypt has a longstanding diplomatic rivalry with IGAD. Twenty-five years ago, the IGAD peace process for southern Sudan, led by a Kenyan general, resulted in a peace agreement that gave the southern Sudanese the opportunity to vote to secede. They took that option in 2011, creating the independent state of South Sudan. A parallel Egyptian-Libyan initiative, resolutely opposed to granting self-determination, was brushed aside.


Al-Sisi’s summit met his minimal aim of blocking IGAD, thus  reducing the diplomatic arena to tactical maneuvering without strategic direction.


The Egyptian plan was nurtured behind the scenes by Qatar and Turkey, both of which back Sudan’s Islamists. None are impressed with al-Burhan’s leadership, but they far prefer him to the alternative. This gave al-Burhan the green light to boycott the IGAD leaders’ follow-up meeting, and for SAF to voice strenuous objections to IGAD, on the pretext that Ruto has business dealings with Hemedti and is therefore biased. (They overlooked Ruto’s remarks about genocide, which targeted the RSF and its allies.)

After the Cairo summit, SAF generals have begun talking about how the war may be finished in a few months. Their hope is that Turkey, the region’s leading supplier of state-of-the-art drones—the Bayraktar TB2, deployed to devastating effect by Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Libya — will provide them with this game-changing technology. 


But an escalation in battlefield technology would not go unchallenged. The RSF already has some less capable drones of its own. It will be pressing the UAE to send it high-end versions — and bin Zayed is quite capable of resisting pressure from Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara, and overruling his own advisors to follow his own path. This would turn Sudan into a proxy war among Middle Eastern powers.


With Egypt canceling out IGAD, the diplomatic pass-the-buck goes back to the Americans and Saudis. After a six-week suspension, talks resumed in Jeddah in mid-July. The mediators insist they have a plan and may yet have the leverage to get the generals to agree to a ceasefire. But there’s no sign of a strategic vision for how to help Sudan escape from its crisis.


Written by Alex de Waal


More from Alex de Waal


View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/03/sudans-next-stop-regional-proxy-war/


[Ends]

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Post script from Sudan Watch Editor

Here are two cartoons. I wrote more but it became a rant about me feeling weary reading never-ending news of men attacking, raping, killing women and children. To help stop the violence I thought of starting a rumour. 


The rumour was this. Any man carrying a gun, knife or whatever to attack, kill, rape women and children has a tiny todger. Any man who cares about peace, women and children has a big todger. And any man who cares about peace, women and children and is a real peacemaker has a very big todger.  


Job done. Rumour started!


Hemedti is battering the Sudanese nation (independent since 1956), people are burying their dead and plundering the country, while El Burhan remains in his cellar below the Army Command in Khartoum (Cartoon by Omar Dafallah / RD)

Source: Radio Dabanga 28 July 2023 report

Army delegation in Jeddah returns to Sudan ‘for deliberations’

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Here is a copy of a tweet by John Godfrey @USAMBSudan 31 July 2023:

"Welcomed the opportunity to visit Egypt to consult with partners on efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan, and to meet in Cairo with a group of Embassy Khartoum locally-engaged staff.  Thank you to Egypt for its efforts, including on behalf of Sudanese fleeing the fighting in their country.

9:31 PM · Jul 31, 2023"


Here is a copy of one of the replies, posted in Arabic together with cartoon of chessboard (presumably being played by POTUS Donald Trump):

𓅃𝑨𝒛𝒐𝒖𝒛 𓀛ۦـــۦـزوز𓅋عـۦـــۦــ @oT9KUOpBLUloHHB

حكومتك هي سبب البلاوي اهتموا بامر روسيا والصين أفضل ليكم

Translated from Arabic by Google:

"Your government is the cause of the troubles. Take care of Russia and China. It is better for you."


https://twitter.com/USAMBSudan/status/1686112289726824448

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[Ends]

Monday, March 02, 2020

In Sudan, Hemedti leads the fray (Gérard Prunier)

  • In reality, it is Hemedti, the brutal and cunning general who organised the harsh crackdown in Khartoum last June, who wields the real power in Sudan, writes Gerard Prunier
  • After arresting Bashir, Hemedti became vice-president of the Transitional Military Council and was effectively its real boss
  • The RSF's military and technical equipment in fact come from the United Arab Emirates
  • The overthrown regime seemed to embody all the mistakes of the past. Read full story:
In Sudan, General Hemedti leads the fray
Analysis from The New Arab - www.alaraby.co.uk
Dated 5 February 2020
By Gérard Prunier (Former chief of the Centre français des études éthiopiennes in Addis-Abeba, member of the Centre d’études des mondes africains of Paris and author of several articles and books on Sudan)

Since the overthrow and arrest of President Omar al-Bashir on 10 April last year, there has been a fragile cohabitation between civil society and the semi-privatised "armed forces". 

Indeed Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who represents the civilian side of the set-up, told a visiting US congressional delegation in Khartoum in January that "the civil-military partnership in Sudan could serve as a model for other countries." 

The idea, far from just being a piece of triumphalist braggadocio, raises the question of what has been going on in Sudan in recent months.

A return to civil society
After 25 years of dictatorship, the Islamist regime in Khartoum had nothing more to offer than further failures and mounting corruption. The economic crash was the last straw. In 2018, the price of a kilo of lentils went up by 225 percent, rice by 169 percent, bread 300 percent, and fuel 30 percent. 

There was no cooking gas, or even running water. At the same time, the 2018 budget of Sudanese pounds (SDG) 173 bn (about $27 bn) allocated nearly SDG 24 bn to the military and security sectors, but only just over SDG 5 bn to education and less than SDG 3 bn to health.

Civil society responded to this descent into hell with a spontaneous mobilisation whose roots went back to October 2012, and which now gathered momentum. Workers' groups began setting up professional organisations.

Today there are 17 of them, federated under the umbrella Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA). This clandestine unionism operated with an organisational rigour worthy of the pre-1917 Leninists, but without any particular ideology apart from an embryonic democratism and a rejection of violence.


The slogan "Silmiyya!" (Peaceful!) was to become the rallying cry of the protestors. Political parties which had become more or less forgotten under the 30 years of military-Islamic dictatorship regained at least a little strength, brought together in the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC).

Despite its extraordinary popularity, this democratic movement had three weak points: it was very urban in nature, it grouped essentially the Awlad al-Beled (the Arabs of the central provinces), and apart from the trade unionists of the SPA, it was very divided.

A general backed by the UAE
The situation at the beginning of 2019 was thus somewhat special. The Islamic-military regime was no longer Islamic, and the regular army had been set into competition with paramilitary forces which had become autonomous when then-President Bashir deployed them into overseas conflicts. The dispatch to Yemen of the "volunteers" of the Rapid Support Force (RSF) by their commander, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Daglo aka Hemedti, was crucial.

After arresting Bashir, Hemedti became vice-president of the Transitional Military Council and was effectively its real boss, rather than its official president, Gen. Abdel Fatah Abderrahman Burhan. Significantly, these volunteers are better armed than Burhan's regular army. The RSF's military and technical equipment in fact come from the United Arab Emirates.

Cunning, brutal and intelligent, if little educated, Hemedti became a millionaire through the "muscular" exploitation of the gold mines in western Sudan. He was the Janjaweed militia chief in Darfur, where he committed massive violence before overthrowing President Bashir, who saw him as his protector. 

Hence the ambiguity of the situation: was this a military coup d'état, or a democratic revolution? 

The popular uprising was a mixture of jamboree, open-ended political forum and social solidarity display. Everybody was looking after children - there are lots of them - women were everywhere, and the people came to the capital from afar. The basic slogans: "Silmiya!" (Peaceful!), "Hurriya!" (Freedom!), "Thawra!" (Revolution!), "Didd al-haramiyya!" (Down with the thieves!) and "Madaniyya!" (Civilian!). 

A camp, a festival, a space for joy and celebration, the sit-in was essentially revolutionary.

But while some soldiers were fraternising with the crowd, others, especially in the provinces, were killing or injuring the supporters of change. Those who opened fire on the demonstrators were not soldiers of the regular army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), which was doing its best to protect them. It was either mercenaries of the RSF who came from Darfur, or an operations unit of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) - the secret services, set up by Salah Gosh.

The uprising in Darfur had already destroyed the image of a "homogenous nation" led by a radical version of Islam, and had exposed the reality of a mafia regime which had deviated into illegal commerce during its dream petrol period between 1999 and 2011.

The "deep state" created by the Islamists had established itself as the ideological - and financial - flipside of a Sudan which had become phoney. For many in Sudan, the events of 2019 were an occasion to go back over developments since independence in 1956. Everything was brought out in the popular debates: the "civil war" with the disparate South, the coups, the empty rhetoric of a democracy lived in fits and starts, Islamism as the magic solution, the colonialism of the centre over all the outlying areas.

Even Arabism did not escape criticism. In this amazing thirst for demystification, the overthrown regime seemed to embody all the mistakes of the past.

Symptoms of the nostalgic revolution
This "nostalgic revolution" has been very ill understood by the international community. There are, of course, parallels with the various "Arab springs" - the same hostility to dictatorship, the same aspiration to democracy, but with no illusions about political Islam, which aroused obvious hostility among the protestors, no doubt because of Sudan's ethnic heterogeneity.

The killer General Hemedti hails from the outlying Darfur area and he has rallied to the RSF flag many soldiers straying from the wars of the Sahel-Chadians, Nigerians, Central Africans, and even some Boko Haram deserters.

He does not harbour hostility to Islam because it is too much part of Sudanese culture to be rejected. But the Islamists who prefer the Islamist "deep state" to their Sudanese homeland have lost control of the population. That is why the attempt by the Saudis and the UAE to preserve an Islamist regime without the Muslim Brotherhood has little chance of success.

Clean up at the NISS barracks
The UAE leader, Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed (MBZ), realised this more swiftly than his Saudi "allies", as indeed did General Hemedti. When on 14 January semi-demobilised elements of the NISS mutinied in two of the barracks where they were cooling their heels, Hemedti's reaction was immediate: his men attacked the barracks, and fighting went on late into the night. 

The mutineers had just learned that their operations unit, which was involved in racketeering, kidnapping and illegal taxation, had been disbanded.

The NISS groups got the worst of it, and their dead were written off. But the General had to make a trip to Abu Dhabi to explain to MBZ precisely what he was up to. He may be the UAE's ally in Sudan, but he is far from being a passive tool in the region, as MBZ realised when Hemedti declined to send reinforcements to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya, stalled outside Tripoli without being able to take the city. 

The Emiratis were reduced to recruiting "security guards" through small ads using Black Shield Security Services, a UAE front company.

Another example of the Darfur General's autonomy came on 11 January, when groups linked to the Islamist "deep state" tried to organise antigovernment demonstrations at Wad Madani, in central Sudan. Hemedti did nothing to help them, and they had to pay unemployed agricultural workers to swell their ranks.  

So was Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok justified in portraying civil-military relations in Sudan as a model to the Americans? Half. By "military" one means Hemedti, because the regular army no longer controls the situation, either politically or militarily. When there were negotiations in Juba with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (a guerrilla faction which still exists in Kordofan, in the south of Sudan), it was Hemedti who took charge of the talks and won SPLM-North agreement to a framework accord which may be ratified on 14 February.

PM accused of sluggishness
Under the power-sharing agreement signed in Khartoum on 5 July last year, there will be no elections until 2021, and those involved in the current transition will not be allowed to stand. 

PM Abdallah Hamdok is certainly doing what he can. But he is doing it at a pace which is irritatingly slow for a population which had struggled with astonishing determination until June 2019. He has only just dismissed the foreign minister, whose incompetence was a drag on Sudanese diplomacy, resurgent after 30 years of paralysis and corruption.

It remains for the World Bank to be begged for aid which the Americans continue to block on the basis of sanctions imposed earlier on the Islamist regime, and which are now obsolete.

Hemedti appears to maintain correct, but not warm, relations with the prime minister. He has talked to old political parties such as the Ummah of Sadeq al-Mahdi, and more discreetly with others. His men are involved in distributing free food and medicine. Nowadays he recruits his soldiers not just from his native Darfur, but also from among the Awlad al-Beled, the inhabitants of the country's central Nile Valley regions.

What about the people of Darfur, whose relatives he may have massacred? They are queueing up outside his offices in Khartoum. "At least he's someone we know, we know how to handle him. And it would be nice to have one of our own in the presidency, after having been colonised." 

How far will the camel trader turned militia chief go? 

People may object to his lack of education, and to his non-Sudanese origins, but that has not prevented him becoming a key player on the national and regional scenes.

Gerard Prunier is a French academic and historian specialising in the Horn of Africa.
This article was originally published by our partners Orient XXI
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.