Ali Karti, SG of Sudan’s Islamic Movement, widely seen as a mastermind of Sudan's war, has now announced a truce with RSF will never be accepted

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Dame Rosalind Marsden in the following analysis 'Sudan's forgotten war: A new diplomatic push is needed' says there needs to be a concerted diplomatic push at the highest level: "the aim must be to change the calculations of the generals and counter the influence of hard-line Islamists from the Bashir-era who are blocking negotiations. This requires pressing for a coordinated mediation process to prevent warring parties’ forum-shopping between mediation initiatives; targeting the financial flows and military supplies fuelling the war; and supporting efforts to unify those Sudanese working for the goal of democratic transition."

It is difficult to see why Dame Rosalind is recommending "a coordinated mediation process" as even she says "Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of Sudan’s Islamic Movement, who is widely seen as a mastermind of the war, has now announced that a truce with the RSF will never be accepted." 

Many Sudanese civilians online are saying they don't want Sudan to be led by Gen. Burhan and his Islamist regime nor by Hemeti and his terrorist militia. I've not seen a solution. Maybe the people could join hands in peace.

Note, in her analysis Dame Rosalind rightly publicises the Emergency Response Rooms, aka ERRs, by saying: "Donors will also have to step up to address the spiralling food crisis, by reducing the UN funding gap and supporting grassroots first responders in the Emergency Response Rooms.' 

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From Chatham House

EXPERT COMMENT
By Dame Rosalind Marsden

Associate Fellow, Africa Programme 

Email Rosalind  Twitter

Dated Thursday, 14 March 2024 - here is a copy in full:

Sudan’s forgotten war: A new diplomatic push is needed

After nearly a year of devastating conflict, there is little sign of a ceasefire. Concerted high-level international pressure is needed to change the calculations of the generals and support a democratic transition.

Image — People rally in Wad Madani, Sudan, in December 2023. 

(Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

On 8 March, the UN Security Council adopted a UK-drafted resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Sudan during the month of Ramadan, a sustainable resolution to the conflict through dialogue, compliance with international humanitarian law and unhindered humanitarian access.

Eleven months into the war, this is the first time that the Council has been able to agree on a resolution. The mandate of the UN Panel of Experts that monitors the sanctions regime in Darfur was also renewed by the Council. Does this signify hope that efforts to end the war might gather momentum? Or is Sudan likely to face a protracted conflict?

The war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fatah Al Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as ‘Hemedti’) is a competition for power and resources between rival factions of the regular armed forces.

But it is also rooted in Sudan’s long history of internal conflict, marginalization of the peripheries and lack of accountability for atrocity crimes. Both the SAF’s officer corps and the RSF are creations of former President Omer al-Bashir’s regime. 

Each has shown disregard for the lives of Sudanese civilians by waging war in densely populated urban areas. The scale of destruction is unprecedented in Sudan’s modern history.

With the world’s attention focused on Gaza and Ukraine, the war receives woefully little high-level political, parliamentary or international media attention, raising serious questions about double standards in dealing with global crises, particularly conflicts in Africa.

A humanitarian catastrophe

Sudan is suffering from a humanitarian disaster, with a looming famine and the world’s biggest displacement crisis: 8 million people are newly displaced inside or outside the country, in addition to over 3 million displaced by previous conflicts.

The head of the World Food Programme has warned that the war risks creating the world’s largest hunger crisis. Yet the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan is only 4 per cent funded.

The conflict has the potential to destabilize already fragile neighbouring countries, create large new migration flows to Europe, and attract extremist groups.

Meanwhile, regional actors are fighting a proxy war in the country, giving military, financial and political support to the warring parties. 

The involvement of Russia and Iran has given the war a geopolitical dimension linked to Putin’s war in Ukraine – partly funded with Sudanese gold – and competition for influence on the Red Sea coast.

Food as a weapon of war

Both RSF and SAF forces have used hunger as a weapon of war. The RSF has looted humanitarian warehouses and besieged cities. 

The SAF-controlled Humanitarian Aid Commission has systematically withheld authorization for crossline movement of life-saving aid to RSF-controlled areas.

One limited outcome from recent international pressure has been the partial reversal of the SAF’s ban on cross-border humanitarian access from Chad into Darfur. The de facto SAF authorities in Port Sudan have agreed to open limited border crossings from Chad and South Sudan. However, MSF International have criticized this as a partial solution at best.

The UN will need to monitor implementation to ensure neutrality in the distribution of aid, while intensifying pressure for unhindered cross-border and crossline humanitarian access.

Donors will also have to step up to address the spiralling food crisis, by reducing the UN funding gap and supporting grassroots first responders in the Emergency Response Rooms.

Growing pressure for a cessation of hostilities

The fact that the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security Council, the African Union, and the League of Arab States joined forces to call for a Ramadan truce, represents a significant increase in pressure on the warring parties.

Nevertheless, Ramadan has started with further fierce fighting. It is unclear how the Security Council expected a truce to take effect without prior diplomatic engagement to agree an implementation and monitoring mechanism. 

Command and control is fragmented on both sides and the warring parties have failed to abide by previous temporary truces negotiated through the Saudi/US-sponsored Jeddah Platform.

Moreover, Sudan’s security state has no history of respecting the month of Ramadan: the current war began during the holy month on 15 April 2023, and peaceful protestors were brutally dispersed in Khartoum on 3 June 2019.

Burhan cautiously commended the Secretary-General’s proposal for a Ramadan truce, but the Islamist-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SAF’s General Yasir al Atta poured cold water on the idea by announcing a list of preconditions amounting to surrender by the RSF.

8 million

Number of newly displaced people as a result of the war in Sudan.

This response follows a familiar pattern: any indication by Burhan of readiness to negotiate is immediately negated by Islamist elements of the Bashir regime, who hope to return to power on the back of an SAF victory. 

Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of Sudan’s Islamic Movement, who is widely seen as a mastermind of the war, has now announced that a truce with the RSF will never be accepted.

Both sides still seem determined to gain the upper hand militarily. The SAF, hitherto on the back foot, has launched an offensive to regain lost territory in Omdurman and Gezira state, supported by Iranian drones, Islamist militias, the Special Operations Forces of the Bashir-era Intelligence Service, former Darfuri rebels and armed civilians. 

The RSF, whose human rights violations have alienated much of the population, welcomed the UN’s call for a truce, but are also engaged in recruitment, particularly among Arab tribes in Darfur.

The longer the war continues, the greater the risk that it will evolve into a full-scale ethnicized civil war, and that the country will be engulfed by famine.

A concerted diplomatic push

Concerted diplomacy at the highest level is therefore urgently needed. The aim must be to change the calculations of the generals and counter the influence of hard-line Islamists from the Bashir-era who are blocking negotiations.

This requires pressing for a coordinated mediation process to prevent warring parties’ forum-shopping between mediation initiatives; targeting the financial flows and military supplies fuelling the war; and supporting efforts to unify those Sudanese working for the goal of democratic transition.

Civilians are the main victims of the war and should be involved in each stage of any peace process. They, not the generals, should shape Sudan’s post-war transition. Those responsible for atrocities must be held accountable.  

There has been some recent evolution in regional dynamics. Egypt and the UAE, who have been backing opposite sides, co-facilitated RSF/SAF talks in Manama in January, alongside the US, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

There are also signs of a stronger international commitment to active diplomatic engagement. The AU has created a High-Level Panel on Sudan, while the US has appointed a dedicated Special Envoy. The Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General has been empowered by the Security Council to complement and coordinate regional peace efforts.

But a strong push is now needed to silence the guns and push the warring parties to resume talks under the Jeddah Platform, preferably in an expanded format. More visible, high-level political commitment is badly needed, if the conflict in Sudan is not to remain a forgotten war.

This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

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Postscript from Sudan Watch Editor:

Dame Rosalind Marsden was the EU Special Representative for Sudan from September 2010 until October 2013. Before joining the EU, she had a long career in the British diplomatic service, including postings as Consul-General in Basra, British Ambassador to Sudan and British Ambassador to Afghanistan. 

She has also served as Head of the United Nations Department and Director (Asia-Pacific) in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. 

Earlier in her career she served twice in the British Embassy in Tokyo and spent two years on secondment to the private sector, working in the corporate finance department of an investment bank. 

She received her BA in Modern History from Somerville College, Oxford and her D.Phil from St Antony’s College, Oxford.

View original: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/03/sudans-forgotten-war-new-diplomatic-push-needed

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Related 

Chatham House - 18 December 2023 

How a transnational approach can better manage the conflict in Sudan

Approaching conflict as a national issue sidelines a complex web of transnational influences and threatens prospects for sustainable peace.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/how-transnational-approach-can-better-manage-conflict-sudan

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UN News - 3 February 2024

Youth-led ‘emergency rooms’ shine rays of hope in war-torn Sudan

© ERR Emergency response rooms are finding innovative approaches to providing rapid assistance to millions facing war in Sudan. 

https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146187

END

Can Sudan Achieve Peace and Democratic Transition? (Dame Rosalind Marsden)

Article from Chatham House, UK

Written by DAME ROSALIND MARSDEN

Associate Fellow, Africa Programme

Dated 09 August 2019

Can Sudan Achieve Peace and Democratic Transition?

• Sudan has a unique opportunity to embrace democratic transition but there is no room for complacency
• Comprehensive reforms and a united democratic front will be key to achieving peace, freedom and justice, as will continued international pressure

Photo: Sudanese demonstrators in Khartoum celebrate a hard-won transitional agreement on 4 August 2019. The agreement provides for a joint civilian-military body to oversee a civilian government and parliament for a three year transition period. Photo: Getty Images.

A compromise agreement

After more than seven months of peaceful pro-democracy protests, leading to the fall of former President Omar al Bashir’s regime in April, Sudan’s Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the opposition coalition of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) agreed on 4 August to form a civilian-led transitional government, paving the way for democratic transition. 

The agreement is a step forward but still leaves considerable power in the hands of the military. Given the power imbalance between the military and unarmed civilians, the FFC concluded that a compromise was needed in order to establish a transitional government, however imperfect, so that civilians could push their reform agenda from inside government and avoid a political vacuum. Such a vacuum could leave room for counter-revolutionary coups or escalating violence by Sudan’s many security forces.

The TMC realized the limits of its power when its attempt to halt the revolution with a brutal crackdown on 3 June backfired, sparking international outrage. Defiant protestors continued to demonstrate, with many Sudanese determined to sustain the revolution and the FFC able to mobilize mass support.

Strong African and international pressure for the rapid formation of a civilian-led transitional authority, US/UK diplomatic intervention with the TMC’s backers, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, and a coup attempt by counter-revolutionary Islamist forces may all have persuaded the TMC that they had to strike a deal with the pro-democracy movement.

Will Sudan have a genuinely civilian-led transitional government?

Mediated by the African Union and Ethiopia, the deal provides for a transitional period of three years and three months to prepare for national elections in 2022. During this period, the government will be composed of three transitional bodies: a joint military/civilian Sovereign Council acting as a collective head of state, with six civilian and five military members; a civilian prime minister and Cabinet of technocrats; and a Legislative Council to be formed within 90 days.

The constitutional declaration initialled on 4 August builds on a power-sharing deal agreed in July and details the powers and responsibilities of the three bodies. A signing ceremony is expected to be held on 17 August with the members of the new government to be announced shortly afterwards.

Some opposition forces have criticized the agreement for being too weak, particularly as the military will chair the Sovereign Council for the first 21 months and will be able to veto its decisions. FFC negotiators point to gains made in the constitutional declaration, such as confirmation that the FFC will have 67 per cent of the seats in the Legislative Council, the increasingly powerful RSF Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia will come under army control and government officials will not enjoy blanket immunity from prosecution.

But political dynamics will matter more than pieces of paper. The unity of FFC forces has been strained by the negotiation process, continuing street violence and internal bickering. If civilian authority is to prevail, the FFC will need to create a united political front.

Ending Sudan’s internal wars

While civilian rule and civic rights are the main demands of protestors in urban areas, Sudanese living in conflict zones attach more importance to achieving peace and ending the marginalization of Sudan’s peripheries.

The armed movements in the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which fought for years against Bashir’s regime, have stressed that peace and democratization must go hand in hand if the revolution is to enable people in the peripheries to become equal citizens and take full part in national elections – putting an end to long-established forms of governance which favoured a privileged political elite in Khartoum.

The constitutional declaration recognizes that achieving a comprehensive peace settlement should be the first priority for the transitional period and includes a peace agenda developed with the SRF.

However, the SRF are calling for the constitutional declaration to be amended before it is signed so that formation of the transitional government can be calibrated with the peace talks. Solutions will also have to be found for the armed movements who remain outside the agreement.

Other challenges facing the new transitional government

The incoming transitional government will face huge challenges, including strong public pressure for justice and accountability, especially for the 3 June massacre, and a national economy in collapse that will require immediate stabilization and fundamental structural reforms.

The biggest challenge facing the government will be dismantling the Islamist deep state created over thirty years by the former regime, which took control of all state institutions and key sectors of the economy, including hundreds of businesses owned by the military-security apparatus.

Key to dismantling the deep state will be the implementation of a comprehensive programme of security sector reform aimed at establishing a professional and inclusive national army and reducing the power of the intelligence service.

Much will depend on whether it is possible to control the RSF by reducing its funding from the Gulf states and the gold trade, as well as containing the political ambitions of its commander, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemeti), who will be an influential figure during the transition.

Recruiting from Chad and Niger as well as from the Janjaweed Arab militia in Darfur, the RSF is an ill-disciplined transboundary militia, which could destabilize Sudan as well as the wider region. As a first step, the RSF should be withdrawn from all law enforcement activities across Sudan.

Another challenge will be to ensure proper representation of youth and women in the new governance structures. These groups were the driving force of the revolution but have been largely excluded from FFC decision-making bodies. Including these new social forces and other marginalized groups in the political process will be crucial if Sudan is to transform established patterns of power and privilege. 

Robust support for security sector reform, as well as political and economic restructuring should be prioritized by the international community if there is to be any prospect of democratic transition, development and stability. Given its size and strategic geopolitical position, the stakes in Sudan and for the wider region are high.

With its vibrant civil society, plural political environment and new social forces, Sudan has a unique opportunity to embrace democratic transition and equal citizenship. If this opening is wasted, the country could be plunged into further chaos or revert to military dictatorship. 

View original article here:  https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/can-sudan-achieve-peace-and-democratic-transition