- The money that Hemeti has acquired in recent years is all Sudanese national wealth: it has come to Hemeti primarily for his killing of civilians in Darfur, and more recently in Khartoum and El Obeid. And the killing will not end until Hemeti is brought under control and removed from any governance plans for the future of Sudan.
- One key off-shore “money storage unit” is the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and run by Hemeti’s brother Abdelrahman.
- Other “investors” include some of the richest members of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, largely responsible for the decades of torture and repression under the al-Bashir regime and continuing under the Transitional Military Council (TMC) junta. Read full story here below.
Article written by Prof Eric Reeves
Dated 01 August 2019
“General” Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”): One of the Most Powerful Men in Sudan—and One of the Richest
As the international community dithers, obfuscates, and contents itself with “grief” and “outrage” at the violence and massacres for which Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces are conspicuously responsible, it must be pointed out that not only has Hemeti become the most powerful military figure in Sudan, but one of the richest. His vast wealth money comes from control of the Jebel Amir gold mines of North Darfur (which Hemeti took with inordinate amounts of bloodshed, particularly that of the Beni Hussein); his mercenary activities over the past six years in Darfur; the funds from the European Union’s disastrously conceived “Khartoum Process” to stanch the flow of African migration to Europe; and from the discretionary “political budget” that permits unrestricted and unrecorded diversion of national wealth to NISS, army, and RSF leaders—chiefly Hemeti.
Where has Hemeti’s wealth gone? How does he hide it? How does he ensure he will be wealthy whatever changes there are in Sudan?
One key off-shore “money storage unit” is the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and run by Hemeti’s brother Abdelrahman. Other “investors” include some of the richest members of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, largely responsible for the decades of torture and repression under the al-Bashir regime and continuing under the Transitional Military Council junta.
The significance of Hemeti’s holdings in the Al Junaid Industrial Group is twofold: it shows just how close Hemeti is to the UAE leadership is, preeminently Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed; and it makes clear that if the international community wishes to pressure Hemeti, it should impose immediate sanctions on Hemeti and all his off-shore holdings. If the UAE resists such efforts, they themselves should be subject to sanctions, especially banking and travel sanctions.
We should recall that despite the public relations campaign by the UAE—which has attempted to make Dubai and Abu Dhabi destination resorts of the most luxurious sort, with promise of exotic and unrestricted tourist opportunities—the Emirates are, with Saudi Arabia, responsible for the unfathomably brutal and destructive war in Yemen against Houthi rebels. The war has created what is regularly (and I believe rightly) described as the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world, if one rendered largely invisible by Saudi denials of access.
Hemeti and General al-Burhan (chief of the Transitional Military Council) have been willing warriors in Yemen’s bloodbath, including in some of the deadliest fighting along the Yemeni coastline, through which humanitarian access is required. The Saudis have richly rewarded Sudan—but particularly Hemeti and al-Burhan—and unsurprisingly Hemeti’s RSF forces are now deploying to “intervene” in Libya’s ghastly civil war, joining the forces of General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. Haftar’s forces are battling to unseat the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. His forces recently gained notoriety for the bombing attack on a migration detention center outside of Tripoli, a bombing that left “at least 44 dead and more than 130 severely injured, [the UN] describing the attack as ‘a war crime and odious bloody carnage [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/03/air-strike-kill-libya-tripoli-migrant-detention-centre ] .’”
Whose Money Is It?
The money that Hemeti has acquired in recent years is all Sudanese national wealth: it has come to Hemeti primarily for his killing of civilians in Darfur, and more recently in Khartoum and El Obeid. And the killing will not end until Hemeti is brought under control and removed from any governance plans for the future of Sudan.
Moreover, that Hemeti has chosen to take this Sudanese wealth abroad—to the very actor that has done most to enable the Transitional Military Council, the UAE—is particularly outrageous. Sudan itself is desperate for such investment of national wealth, and such large diversion of that wealth by Hemeti, his brother, and NISS officials should make clear to all that they have no interest in Sudan and its collapsing economy, but only in their self-enrichment.
The international community, as well as the activist community, should target Al Junaid Industrial Group—and the UAE—in all ways possible ways. Products should be boycotted, bank transactions blocked, travel to the UAE should be limited in all possible ways.
I provide here the publicly available contact information for Al Junaid Industrial Group:
Al Junaid Industrial Group
Office #9, Industrial Area# 13, Sharjah, UAE
Landmark: Behind Tasheel
P.O. Box 61401, Sharjah
Tel: +971 6 5440233
Fax: +971 6 5440302
Email : info@aljunaidgroup.com
Facebook | https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Company/Al-Junaid-Industrial-Group-314139131999489/
Instagram | https://www.instagram.com/aljunaidgroup/?hl=en
To view the original article click here: http://sudanreeves.org/2019/08/01/general-mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-hemeti-one-of-the-most-powerful-men-in-sudan-and-one-of-the-richest/
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eric Reeves has been writing about greater Sudan for the past twenty years. His work is here organized chronologically, and includes all electronic and other publications since the signing of the historic Machakos Protocol (July 2002), which guaranteed South Sudan the right to a self- determination referendum. There are links to a number of Reeves’ formal publications in newspapers, news magazines, academic journals, and human rights publications, as well as to the texts of his Congressional testimony and a complete list of publications, testimony, and academic presentations. LEARN MORE
