Britain and France Lead The Attack Against Sudan

This article appears in the May 8, 2009 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
Britain and France Lead The Attack Against Sudan
by Douglas DeGroot

[PDF version of this article. See also interviews with Sudan Undersecretary for Foreign Affiars, Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, and the Governor of North Dafur, Osman Yosuf Kibr.]

April 30, 2009 —President Barack Obama's Special Envoy to Sudan, Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Gration (ret.) and Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have signaled a change in approach of U.S. policy toward Sudan, away from confrontation, and toward bilateral diplomatic engagement. After meeting officials at the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 2, Gration said: "The United States and Sudan want to be partners, and so we are looking for opportunities for us to build a stronger bilateral relationship."

Later, after a three-day trip to Sudan, Kerry said on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" program on April 20: "I found a government that is far more prepared to move on other issues that are of importance to the United States, and I think it's important for us to deal with those officials. And we'll have to work around and deal with the complications of the ICC." (The International Criminal Court is the privately established body, of which the United States is not a member, which issued an "arrest warrant" in 2008 for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.)

Given this shift, the head of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Rodolphe Adada, was apparently surprised when he was criticized by U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice at a closed session of the UN Security Council on April 27, according to the Sudan Tribune. Adada, a former foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, told the UNSC, "Darfur today is a conflict of all against all. The armed movements fight amongst each other, or violently purge their own members."

He countered the anti-Sudan media hype, saying that the situation in Darfur has now become a low-intensity conflict, and provided figures of 2,000 people who died from violence there since January 2008. Adada said that the ICC arrest warrant has complicated prospects for a political solution.

Rice, a dyed-in-the-wool anglophile, questioned his use of the phrase "low-intensity conflict." She claimed he was not in agreement with his superior, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. However, it is clear that Adada and the Secretary General are collaborating closely on operations in the region. Prior to Adada's meeting with the UNSC, a UNAMID spokesperson said that Adada intended to review issues affecting the deployment of UNAMID, which "required key enablers to enhance the capacity of the Mission and enable it to carry out its mandate more effectively." This refers specifically to helicopters, which are desperately needed by UNAMID, and is the precise terminology which has been used by Ban Ki-Moon.

Colonial Powers Push Regime Change

Despite the U.S. shift, the two primary former colonial powers in Africa, the U.K. and France, have remained steadfast in their policy of regime change. On April 21, a high-level Sudanese delegation ended talks in Paris with French officials and Britain's Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, a Foreign Office Secretary, and a key figure in the founding of the ICC. The two ex-colonial powers refused to establish bilateral relations with Sudan, and "reiterated their commitment to international criminal justice and cooperation with the ICC," according to the Sudan Tribune. One of the Sudanese participants in the talks, Presidential Assistant Nafi Ali Nafi, called the ICC "a political tool used against African leaders who are viewed to be uncooperative with Western programs in Africa." While speaking at Khartoum University on April 28, Nafi revealed that the proposal put forward to Sudan at the Paris meeting, was for the formation of "a national interim government" headed by al-Bashir. France would support suspending the ICC arrest warrant against him, if he withdrew as a candidate in the 2010 elections. U.S. anti-Sudan activist John Prendergast had offered Sudan the same deal earlier.

Nafi charged that those who are collaborating with foreign powers to accomplish regime change in Sudan were committing treason. He pointed out that the Darfur rebel group, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was not founded to better the lot of the Darfur population, but was merely an arm of the Popular Congress Party led by Hassan al-Turabi, in the latter's fight with the government. Turabi is a long-time member of the British-intelligence-connected Muslim Brotherhood. The JEM's mostly London-based leadership refuses to negotiate agreements with the government on Darfur issues.

The Darfur the West Isn’t Recognizing as It Moralizes About the Region

From New York Times
By HOWARD W. FRENCH
March 29, 2009
The Darfur the West Isn’t Recognizing as It Moralizes About the Region

For many who survey an African landscape strewn with political wreckage, nowadays merely to raise the subject of European colonialism, which formally ended across most of the continent five decades ago, is to ring alarm bells of excuse making. Clearly, the African disaster most in view today is Sudan, or more specifically the dirty war that has raged since 2003 in that country’s western region, Darfur.

Rare among African conflicts, it exerts a strong claim on our conscience. By instructive contrast, more than five million people have died as a result of war in Congo since 1998, the rough equivalent at its height of a 2004 Asian tsunami striking every six months, without stirring our diplomats to urgency or generating much civic response.

Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan-born scholar at Columbia University and the author of “When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda,” is one of the most penetrating analysts of African affairs. In “Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror,” he has written a learned book that reintroduces history into the discussion of the Darfur crisis and questions the logic and even the good faith of those who seek to place it at the pinnacle of Africa’s recent troubles. It is a brief, he writes, “against those who substitute moral certainty for knowledge, and who feel virtuous even when acting on the basis of total ignorance.”

Mr. Mamdani does not dismiss a record of atrocities in Darfur, where 300,000 have been killed and 2.5 million been made refugees, yet he opposes the label of genocide as a subjective judgment wielded for political reasons against a Sudanese government that is out of favor because of its history of Islamism and its suspected involvement in terror.

At his most provocative Mr. Mamdani questions the distinction between what is often labeled counterinsurgency and genocide, saying the former, even when it kills more people, is deemed “normal violence” while the latter is considered “amoral, evil,” and typically it is the West that does the labeling.

Although he uses the United States war in Iraq as an example, with the International Criminal Court recently issuing an arrest warrant for Sudan’s leader, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Mr. Mamdani’s most compelling example is the treatment of a crisis in neighboring Uganda.

In Uganda, long one of Washington’s closest African friends, Mr. Mamdani traces the history of ethnically targeted “civilian massacres and other atrocities” against the brutal insurgency known as the Lord’s Resistance Army. In 1996, under President Yoweri Museveni, a second phase of that war began “with a new policy designed to intern practically the entire rural population of the three Acholi districts in northern Uganda,” Mr. Mamdani writes. “It took a government-directed campaign of murder, intimidation, bombing and burning of whole villages to drive the rural population into I.D.P. (internally displaced persons) camps.”

In 2005 Olara Otunnu, a former Ugandan ambassador to the United Nations, denounced the government’s tactics, saying, “An entire society is being systematically destroyed — physically, culturally, socially and economically — in full view of the international community.”

But as elsewhere in Africa, Mr. Mamdani says, the International Criminal Court has brought a case against only the enemy of Washington’s friend, the Lord’s Resistance Army, remaining mute about large-scale atrocities that may have been committed by the Ugandan government. In this pattern the author sees the hand of politics more than any real attachment to justice.

Many argue that what makes Darfur different from other African crises is race, with the conflict there pitting Arabs against people often called “black Africans,” but here again Mr. Mamdani takes on conventional wisdom. “At no point,” he states flatly, “has this been a war between ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs.’ ”

Much foreign commentary about Sudan speaks of its Arabs as settlers, with the inference that they are somehow less African than people assumed to be of pure black stock. If whites in Kenya and Zimbabwe, not to mention South Africa, vociferously maintain their African-ness, what then to make of the Arab presence in Sudan, whose slow penetration and widespread intermarriage, Mr. Mamdani writes, “commenced in the early decades of Islam” and “reached a climax” from the 8th to the 15th century, “when the Arab tribes overran much of the country”?

More interestingly, the author maintains that much of what we see today as a racial divide in Sudan has its roots in colonial history, when Britain “broke up native society into different ethnicities, and ‘tribalized’ each ethnicity by bringing it under the absolute authority of one or more British-sanctioned ‘native authorities,’ ” balancing “the whole by playing one off against the others.”

Mr. Mamdani calls this British tactic of administratively reinforcing distinctions among colonial subjects “re-identify and rule” and says that it was copied by European powers across the continent, with deadly consequences — as in Rwanda, where Belgium’s intervention hardened distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi.

In Sudan the result was to create a durable sense of land rights rooted in tribal identity that favored the sedentary at the expense of the nomad, or, in the crude shorthand of today, African and Arab.

Other roots of the Darfur crisis lie in catastrophic desertification in the Sahel region, where the cold war left the area awash in cheap weapons at the very moment that pastoralists could no longer survive in their traditional homelands, obliging many to push southward into areas controlled by sedentary farmers.

He also blames regional strife, the violent legacy of proxy warfare by France, Libya and the United States and, most recently, the global extension of the war on terror.

This important book reveals much on all of these themes, yet still may be judged by some as not saying enough about recent violence in Darfur.

Mr. Mamdani’s constant refrain is that the virtuous indignation he thinks he detects in those who shout loudest about Darfur is no substitute for greater understanding, without which outsiders have little hope of achieving real good in Africa’s shattered lands.

MSF: Darfur, Sudan has not been an emergency since 2004

MSF says the magnitude of violence in Darfur has been huge but it is not genocide. The situation on the ground has not been an emergency since 2004.

UPI report May 04, 2009 KHARTOUM, Sudan:
Experts differ on 'genocide' in Darfur

Accusing the Sudanese government of genocide in Darfur may have prolonged the conflict and complicated peace talks, some activists and diplomats said.

"Genocide puts a moral price on this that limits the room to maneuver," a Western diplomat in Khartoum told the Los Angeles Times. "How can you deal with a genocidal government? Can you compromise with evil?"

Two consecutive American presidents and several activist groups have labeled as 'genocide' the bloody campaign by the Sudanese Arab-led government and allied militias. Others doubt the six-year war fits the legal definition, including Human Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders, the Times reported Monday.

The magnitude of violence in Darfur has been huge but it is not genocide, said Thierry Durand, director of operations for Doctors Without Borders.

"The situation on the ground has not been an emergency since 2004," Thierry said. "The real problem is the dependency in the camps. But the whole thing has become over-politicized."

Ceasefire committee formed to stop the conflict between Murle and Lou-Nuer

From Sudan Radio Service 30 April 2009 (Pibor county):

A ceasefire committee formed to stop the conflict between Murle and Lou-Nuer communities has begun meeting with local authorities community leaders in Pibor county, Jonglei state.

A member of the ceasefire committee, Gatkouth Dup, spoke to Sudan Radio Service by phone from Pibor county on Thursday.

[Gatkouth Dup]: “We formed two committees, the ceasefire committee that I am a member in and the committee that will process the full reconciliation for all the counties in the conflict. That is why we decided to come to Jonglei. We started in Bor and this morning we came to Pibor.

Our mandate is to bring the two communities together, Lou-Nuer and Murle. It is disturbing to hear that our people are killing themselves and we represent them. It’s a concern for all of us. The approach is for the two communities to come together and if they agree then we can bring all the communities such as Dinka, Nuer, Murle and Anyuak communities. All eleven counties should be represented and then we can negotiate for the best reconciliation.”

Dup said the team will spend three days in Pibor then travel to Akobo, Nyirol and Uror counties on the same mission.

The teams were appointed last month by the southern Sudan Peace Commission to find a solution to the conflict between Murle and Lou-Nuer.

Nile Commercial Bank has been temporarily closed

From Sudan Radio Service 30 April 2009 (Juba):

The branch manager of the Nile Commercial Bank in Juba has refuted media reports that the Government of Southern Sudan suspended her.

The Sudan Tribune website reported that Martha Michya had been suspended by the Government of Southern Sudan for allegedly accusing senior government officials for failing to pay back loans that they had borrowed.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service from Juba on Thursday, Martha Michya said the report was untrue.

[Martha Michya]: “No, I was not suspended by the government. I work in Nile Commercial Bank. I was suspended by my office and not by the legislative assembly. They got the report from Sudan Tribune about me, and the office suspended me about it without any investigation. It’s not because of my work but because of what was written in Sudan Tribune.”

Nile Commercial Bank has been temporarily closed.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service last week, a member of the board of directors of the bank attributed its closure to bankruptcy caused by outstanding loans and the bank’s rapid expansion within a year.

ICRC has its largest operation in the world in Sudan

From Sudan Radio Service 30 April 2009 (Juba):

The International Committee of the Red Cross has revealed that Sudan is its largest operation in the world, with a budget of over 90,000 million USD in 2009.

An ICRC spokesman, Saleh Dabagge, told journalists at a workshop in Juba that most of the money is spent in Darfur:

[Saleh Dabagge]: “The ICRC has its largest operation in the world in Sudan and this year, 2009, our budget is about 92,000 million USD for the whole of Sudan. But because of the crisis in Darfur and because the ICRC mandate covers before anything else the situation of armed conflict, most of our budget, I think around 80 or 85 percent of this budget, goes to Darfur because of the armed conflict taking place there.”

Saleh added that the ICRC is mainly involved in dialoguing with partners in conflict to avoid violation of international humanitarian law. It also visits prisoners of war, tracks unaccompanied minors, and re-unites family members.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has been working in Sudan since 1978 mainly in the eastern part as a result of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It started operating in south Sudan in 1986.

President Obama and Sudan - A Blueprint for Peace (By John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, Jerry Fowler, and Sam Bell)

Friday 01 May 2009 opinion piece (via www.africancrisis.co.za/AllAfrica)
Sudan: President Obama and Sudan - A Blueprint for Peace
By John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, Jerry Fowler, and Sam Bell. Copy in full:

The third in a series of open letters to President Obama spelling out a practical roadmap to end the crisis in Sudan.

On March 30, key activists met with President Obama and his Special Envoy for Sudan, Major General Scott Gration, in the West Wing of the White House. President Obama made it clear that his administration would work vigorously to bring an end to the war in Darfur and help implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South. After extensive consultations with members of President Obama's team, UN officials, diplomats from other key countries, and Sudanese actors, this paper is an attempt to put forward a blueprint to achieve President Obama's objective of a comprehensive peace for all of Sudan. The good news is that this is a goal shared widely throughout the international community. The key missing ingredient for its achievement is strategic leadership from the United States.

In this paper we lay out the structures we think are necessary to achieve peace in Darfur and implement it in the South, East, and transitional zones between the North and South, all areas of active or potential conflict. We also lay out a set of focused and meaningful sticks and carrots necessary to leverage the various parties to find a peaceful solution to the interlocking conflicts within Sudan and regionally.

In Darfur, the expulsion of key humanitarian aid groups and closure of Sudanese aid organizations have created increasingly precarious conditions for the 2.7 million internally displaced camp dwellers, although some arrangement to expedite the resumption of some aid operations appears to be pending. Brutal harassment of Sudanese human rights defenders has silenced internal voices of dissent. President Omar el-Bashir's use of starvation as a weapon of war is an attempt to distract the world from the real issues of accountability in Darfur, the elections in Sudan early next year and the implementation of the CPA. The Government of Sudan should face clear costs from the international community for so blatantly abrogating its responsibility to protect its own population.

In the South, there is a mere one year and nine months left before the scheduled date for an independence referendum, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, is grinding to a halt on key benchmarks. Meanwhile, localized violence demonstrates both the South's institutional fragility and vulnerability to traditional divide-and-conquer strategies directed from Khartoum. If left unchallenged, Bashir will continue to view efforts to foment violence, instability, and displacement in the South and Darfur as his most effective instruments of control. Bashir's use of proxy militias (the Janjaweed in Darfur, the Murahaliin in North-South border areas, and other militias throughout the South) has served as an effective means for him to maintain power in Khartoum, but it has also unleashed the centrifugal forces that could violently rip Sudan apart.

President Obama must be firm in responding to the impending humanitarian crisis, promoting protection of civilians and accountability, and working toward a viable long-term peace that includes both Darfur and a reinvigorated CPA. If the expulsion of key groups from Darfur and elsewhere was suddenly lifted by Khartoum, the situation on the ground would improve greatly. But the essential dynamics of the situation would remain unacceptable - with no clear peace process for Darfur, the CPA fraying, UNAMID ineffective, civilians desperately vulnerable, and President Bashir still a wanted fugitive from international justice.

Forging A Multilateral Peace Strategy

Here's the opportunity: a global consensus exists for peace in Sudan, even if there is not agreement on the best path to achieve this goal. China, the Arab League, the African Union, the European Union, and the United States all want peace, but little has been done to build the necessary infrastructure to help bring it about. What has long been missing in Sudan is America's strategic leadership. The rebels, the ruling party, Sudan's neighbors, and other key actors have all been waiting for President Obama and his team to engage.

The CPA itself was reached after a sustained investment in diplomacy, led in part by the United States, supported by relevant regional and international powers, and backed by significant incentives and pressures. That hard-won agreement would not now be in jeopardy if the investment in diplomacy had been maintained and the international community had continued its pressure to ensure that the agreement was implemented. It is not too late for the United States to re-invest in ensuring that the outstanding issues preventing full implementation of the CPA are addressed, and the Obama administration must take these steps or watch the possible violent disintegration of Sudan and destabilization of the broader region over the next several years.

The Obama administration must lead in constructing a multilateral strategy for peace by establishing an inclusive peace process for Darfur, re-vitalizing implementation of the CPA and the dangerously neglected Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and ending Sudan's proxy war with Chad. Toward that end, General Gration should focus on building a multilateral coalition of countries with significant leverage. At the same time as the processes are being constructed, the United States should work assiduously to create the necessary unilateral and multilateral carrots and sticks to press the parties in the direction of a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of Sudan's multiple, interlocking conflicts. It is vital that the administration work closely with other key governments in dealing with Sudan; a reliance on bilateral diplomacy will provide Khartoum the opportunity to play one party off against the other, as it has historically done with great success.

• Darfur peace process: The structure should be similar to the Naivasha talks that produced the CPA, and some of the ingredients are already in place. As did Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo with the Naivasha process, AU/UN mediator Djibril Bassolé should lead the Darfur process, which can be based in Doha, Qatar (although Qatar's recent diplomatic support for Bashir in the wake of the ICC indictment has impaired its credibility as a facilitator of negotiations). He must be supported by a strong team of diplomats and regional experts and backed by a small group of countries with leverage, high-level support, and full-time representation at the talks. We believe that this inner circle should consist at a minimum of the US, UK, France, China, and Egypt. An outer circle group of countries and multilateral organizations (UN, AU, Arab League) should also be engaged in a formal manner to discourage spoilers, and other key nations such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa would need to be thoroughly consulted.

• CPA implementation: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission established by the CPA is clearly insufficient to monitor and press the parties to implement the deal (largely because it lacks sufficiently senior representation and clear reporting guidelines). As a matter of international peace and security, CPA implementation should be at the forefront of the U.N. Security Council's agenda and the Council should back a new ad-hoc mechanism to guide implementation. The Obama administration should quickly work with other Security Council members, relevant U.N. agencies, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, to establish core benchmarks for the parties, a clear timeline, and genuine penalties for failure to meet deadlines. An international meeting on CPA implementation could provide a vehicle for reenergizing efforts around the CPA and provide the launching pad for the creation of the ad-hoc implementation mechanism.

• Chad/Sudan peace process: The Sudanese government continues to seek a military solution for Darfur through regime change in Chad, and Chad continues to back the JEM in response. The Obama administration should work with France and China to support high-level negotiations in Libya aimed at reducing state support for foreign armed groups and eventual normalization of relations.

• Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement monitoring: Eastern Sudan remains volatile. The Obama administration should work with its international partners (particularly the UK and Norway) and with the Eritrean and Saudi governments to establish a monitoring group for the agreement that will report on implementation and make recommendations for improvements.

Building The Necessary Leverage

A serious peace process with credible mediation putting forward fair proposals will secure a deal for Darfur. A competent and higher level oversight mechanism with the involvement of countries with influence will ensure the implementation of the CPA. Having the right balance of meaningful pressures and incentives will ensure that prospects for success are much greater.

In broad strokes, the U.S. should present the Sudanese regime with a choice:

Behind Door One: if the Sudanese government permits unimpeded humanitarian access, removes the indicted president, and secures peace in Darfur and the South, a clear process toward normalization will be mapped out. Almost all of the incentives for Sudan come in the form of more normal relations with much of the world, the lifting of sanctions, a return to more normal patterns of trade and diplomacy, and the other benefits that would naturally flow from Sudan achieving stability as a result of more equitable power and wealth sharing.

Behind Door Two: if President Bashir and his party remain defiant by continuing to undermine efforts at peace for the country, a series of escalating costs will ensue, including diplomatic isolation, targeted economic sanctions, an effective and expanded arms embargo, and, if necessary to stop massive loss of civilian life, eventual targeted military action.

If the benefits of Door One and the consequences of Door Two are meaningful, the chance for peace in Sudan increases dramatically. The missing ingredients in efforts to date for Darfur and CPA implementation have been adequate leverage and lack of strategic vision for resolving comprehensively the country's conflicts. Without real sticks and carrots, the warring parties in Sudan will remain focused on military confrontation. The international community needs to help change the incentive structure in Sudan from war to peace.

On the incentive side, phased cooperation with and-ultimately-normalization with the United States is the largest carrot the Obama administration has to offer. Removal of certain unilateral sanctions and penalties could be undertaken in response to verifiable changes on the ground in Darfur and the South. Full normalization should only occur once the Sudanese government adheres to its obligations under various peace agreements. Any negotiating process must be guided by the reality that Khartoum has a long history of grabbing carrots, then failing to follow through on commitments.

On the pressures side, there seems to be an erroneous belief that there are no meaningful pressures left to use. We have spelled out a number of points of leverage that are available. That reflects our view that the Sudanese government responds much more directly to pressures than they do to incentives. Until now, most sticks have been unilateral and have had limited effect on the regime's calculations. Substantial and focused multilateral pressures have not been tried and should form the basis of the new administration's strategy. Clearly, equally robust pressures and incentives should be developed and applied impartially to the rebel factions and SPLM to the degree to which their actions may warrant these measures.

We believe leverage for peace in Sudan can best come from the following actions. Some of these initiatives should occur immediately to build leverage for negotiations, while others should be utilized only if the situation in Darfur deteriorates as a result of ruling party actions or intransigence.

Immediate Points Of Leverage

• Isolate Bashir: Although Bashir is experiencing a short-term surge in support from Arab and African governments in the aftermath of the arrest warrant, this will erode quickly in the face of longer term trends that include his use of starvation as a weapon, continuing support for Hamas, and Khartoum's warmongering, which puts Chinese and Arab investments at risk. Private diplomacy can explore ending Bashir's tenure and finally addressing the impunity that has reigned throughout his two decades in power. There are already telling signs that support for Bashir in key Arab and African states is more rhetorical than practical, with a number of senior leaders increasingly seeing him as a distinct liability. Bashir's actions are making Sudan's fragmentation more likely, not less, and that is an outcome that key players in the region should hope to avoid. Personal and direct diplomacy by President Obama will be crucial in shaping regional attitudes toward Bashir.

• Reinforce the Government of Southern Sudan: The main deterrent to the resumption of war between the ruling party and the South is a strong GOSS. That requires investing in good governance, anti-corruption measures, agricultural production, and the modernization of the South's army (the SPLA). This includes providing the air defense system that President Bush promised to the GOSS well over a year ago in order to neutralize the ruling party's one military advantage: air superiority.

• Support the elections and referendum: The national elections recently re-scheduled for 2010 and the 2011 referendum could trigger a return to war in the South if they are unilaterally undermined by the ruling National Congress Party. International support should be directed to holding fair and transparent processes that allow the Sudanese people to choose their leaders and decide their fate. Sudan's multiple crises all stem from a failure to establish reasonable power-sharing mechanisms in this large and incredibly diverse country, and a great deal of attention needs to be put into ensuring that elections can be conducted in an environment of safety and security.

• End simmering regional conflicts: Conflicts and rivalries throughout the broader region of East and Central Africa make it much harder to resolve Sudan's internal wars. Multilateral efforts should focus chiefly on the simmering conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, on ending the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army, and on ending Chad's destabilizing civil war.

• Re-contextualize counter-terrorism cooperation: Khartoum has for years used its cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism to deflect serious pressure over human rights and implementation of the CPA. Consistent with its stated policy, the Obama administration must make clear to the Sudanese government that cooperation on counter-terrorism is not a chit it can trade for U.S. compromises on human rights and peace efforts.

• Secure the support of key diplomatic players: As stated above, some of Bashir's staunchest supporters have new reasons to back away slowly from their despotic ally. If the CPA collapses and the North-South war resumes, China and Egypt would be among the biggest losers. Former southern rebel commanders indicate that if they are forced to go back to war, the first targets they will hit will be Chinese oil installations. And if they go back to war, some of the southerners will fight for independence this time, rather than their previous vision of unity, and previous divisions within southern communities would likely be stoked in a violent fashion by Khartoum. Egypt's worst fears of a potentially hostile new state in the Nile Basin could be realized. These two countries, along with key African countries, Saudi Arabia and other Arab League states, should be engaged to become part of the solution in Darfur and the South. President Obama should also make clear to relevant nations that ending blind support for Bashir to the detriment of the peace process is a priority for his Administration and has the potential to affect bilateral relations with the U.S. if not addressed.

• Military planning: Military planning should begin to develop ways to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid if the regime continues to deny aid as a weapon of war. It would be irresponsible not to prepare for worst case scenarios.

Future Sticks If The Situation Deteriorates

• Strengthen multilateral, targeted economic pressures: President Obama should work through the U.N. Security Council to bring on board a larger collection of nations with targeted sanctions against those individuals and parties most responsible for violence in Sudan, whether they are government or rebel actors. If the Security Council fails to pass these broader sanctions, then the U.S. should build an international coalition to bring this pressure, working particularly with the European Union, individual European countries and Japan. Along with the ICC, these instruments can create much higher legal, financial, and political costs to those who are responsible for violence against civilians and preventing progress toward peace.

• Expand the arms embargo: Given the Sudanese government's continued attacks against civilians in Darfur and compelling evidence that weapons from other nations, including China, are finding their way to the frontlines, a comprehensive arms embargo on offensive weapons against the Bashir regime should be imposed by the U.N. Security Council. The embargo should include a robust international monitoring mechanism to ensure its effectiveness.

• Protect civilians: UNAMID is failing to achieve its central goal of protecting the civilian population in the region, but the question of how to bolster UNAMID's ability to protect civilians seems to have fallen off the international community's radar screen in recent months. Much of this failure can be traced directly to the practice of giving the Sudanese government-the prime perpetrator of the genocide-a de facto veto over the mission's composition and operations. This has to change. A robust force on the ground in Darfur with a competent lead nation, an experienced division-level headquarters staff, and a clear command-and-control structure is essential for saving lives, creating an environment amenable to the peace surge, and establishing the international credibility required to ensure that a broader peace strategy succeeds. Galvanizing the political will necessary to build this capacity could finally give UNAMID a chance to succeed in protecting civilians. The effort to fully staff the U.N. force in Darfur at 26,000 should be accompanied by a shift in the U.N. force's mandate that would allow it to protect civilians who want to go home to their villages of origin, which should be the ultimate goal of our Darfur policy.

• Effectively end offensive military flights: President Obama and other key members of the administration have taken a robust position in the past regarding the need to counter Sudan's aerial attacks on civilians in Darfur, and have voiced support for enforcing a no-fly zone. Continued Sudanese aerial attacks in Darfur-there were over 40 last year-have rightly generated considerable attention, as has the expulsion of key relief agencies. The U.N. Security Council has demanded an end to offensive military flights several times, most recently in Resolution 1769, which authorized UNAMID. UNAMID has not enforced that demand. It is clear that the administration and the U.N. Security Council need to consider how best to counter these continuing aerial attacks.

Putting It All Together: Building The Coalition For Peace

President Obama and members of his administration have spoken passionately about their intention to act boldly to end the crisis in Darfur and promote international efforts toward a peaceful future in Sudan. Now they have the chance to do so at a crucial juncture in Sudan's history.

But the United States can't do it alone, and the Obama administration's engagement and close coordination with other key governments is essential. Special Envoy Gration can lead U.S. efforts toward peace in Sudan, but he must recognize the need to work closely both with U.S. allies and with those leaders who continue to back Bashir following the ICC arrest warrant issuance.

President Obama should now begin stronger and more sustained efforts to build a coalition for peace. But this effort will only be successful if the President himself treats the situation in Sudan as a strategic priority, sets objectives for U.S. policy, builds the necessary leverage, and invests in the diplomacy necessary to achieve an equitable and lasting solution.

Original date published: 1 May 2009

Source Url: http://allafrica.com/stories/200905010193.html?viewall=1

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AfricanCrisis Webmaster
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Save Darfur Coalition, ENOUGH Project, and Genocide Intervention Network came together and outlined a strategy for peace in Darfur

Email just received from Save Darfur Coalition at savedarfur.org:

Friend, with the rainy season in Darfur approaching and aid yet to be restored, we're calling for bold, agenda-setting leadership on Sudan. Join us by signing on to a citizen open letter to President Obama.

Dear Friend,

Civil disobedience is not something I would normally do. But dramatic times call for dramatic action.

Just ask Rep. John Lewis, a living civil rights hero who was arrested 40 times during the civil rights movement—and as of Monday morning, twice for Darfur.

John Lewis believes that citizens of conscience must stand up to injustice. So with aid yet to be restored to Darfur and the rainy season coming soon, he stood up. Will you join us?

We need bold leadership to restore aid and end the violence—click here to sign a citizen open letter to President Obama.

The rainy season in Darfur is coming soon, and it will only make matters worse for the over 1.1 million people at risk due to Sudan's expulsion of major aid organizations.

Yesterday, the Save Darfur Coalition, the ENOUGH Project, and the Genocide Intervention Network came together and outlined a strategy for peace in Darfur that presents the Sudanese regime with a choice:

Behind Door One: If Sudan permits unrestricted humanitarian access, secures peace in Darfur, fully implements the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan, ensures free and fair elections in Sudan, and removes the indicted President, a clear process toward normalization of relations with the U.S. will be mapped out.

Behind Door Two: If President Bashir and his party renege on recent humanitarian commitments and continue to undermine efforts at peace, they will face diplomatic isolation, targeted multi-lateral economic sanctions, an effective multilateral arms embargo, and if necessary to stop massive loss of civilian life, targeted military action.

Now is the time for bold agenda-setting leadership to help ensure that Sudan chooses the most mutually beneficial path, and to prepare real consequences if it does not.

Add your name to the citizen open letter today.

We will end this genocide by speaking out, loudly and as one, from the steps of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. to our homes and communities.

Please don't spare a moment before signing on to the citizen letter—it is your hard work and support that gives all of us hope.

Sincerely,

Jerry Fowler
President, Save Darfur Coalition

P.S. I hope you will join me in thanking Representatives John Lewis, Donna Edwards, Jim McGovern, Keith Ellison, and Lynn Woolsey; Rabbi David Saperstein; and ENOUGH Project founder John Prendergast. There's no better way to show your appreciation than adding your name to the citizen open letter.

Donate to Help Save Darfur
Help build the political pressure needed to end the crisis in Darfur by supporting the Save Darfur Coalition's crucial awareness and advocacy programs. Click here now to make a secure, tax-deductible online donation.

The Save Darfur Coalition is an alliance of over 180 faith-based, advocacy and human rights organizations whose mission is to raise public awareness about the ongoing genocide in Darfur and to mobilize a unified response to the atrocities that threaten the lives of more than two million people in the Darfur region. To learn more, please visit http://www.SaveDarfur.org.

SLA-Nur's Hussein Abu Sharati "spokesperson of Darfur displaced" says IDPs not to cooperate with UNAMID

Hussein Abu Sharati, the spokesperson of Darfur displaced, slammed a statement made by the joint representative and head of the UN peacekeepers in Darfur, known as UNAMID.

"We have a minimum of 160 deaths every month and 56 women raped this month of April. This month also we have 136 people detained by the security forces," said Hussein Abu Sharati, referring to the displaced. The spokesperson further said they collected their information from all the IDPs camps.

He added that water shortages, cholera and polio outbreaks have affected the IDPs since the eviction of the aid groups — though the figures cited by Adada had only counted violent deaths.

Adada’s remarks had already provoked a reaction from a rebel leader serving under the Sudan Liberation Army command of Abdel-Wahid Al-Nur, who said that Darfuri civilians had handed a letter to the SLA founder declaring that they would not deal with the UN peacekeepers unless Adada retracts the report.

Abu Sharati today added that they decided to not cooperate with the UNAMID. He urged the UN and the African Union to replace Adada by another official. "We request the UN and the international community to give the necessary attention to ensure the protection of the displaced population there,” he said in Darfur by phone.

Source: Sudan Tribune Monday 4 May 2009:
Darfur displaced dismiss UN-AU monthly death figures

May 3, 2009 (NYALA) – A prominent figure among the internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Darfur criticized statements made by the African Union-United Nations joint envoy in Darfur saying that violence in the war-torn region has subsided substantially.



Photo: Rodolphe Adada (ST)

Speaking before the UN Security Council, Rodolphe Adada said last Monday that some 130-150 people were dying each month due to violence in Darfur, versus the tens of thousands who were killed in 2003-2004. The number includes civilians, fighters and peacekeepers themselves, he added.

Yet people in the camps are still dying every day as result of the ongoing violence said Hussein Abu Sharati, the spokesperson of Darfur displaced, who slammed the statement made by the joint representative and head of the UN peacekeepers in Darfur, known as UNAMID.

"We have a minimum of 160 deaths every month and 56 women raped this month of April. This month also we have 136 people detained by the security forces," said Hussein Abu Sharati, referring to the displaced. The spokesperson further said they collected their information from all the IDPs camps.

He added that water shortages, cholera and polio outbreaks have affected the IDPs since the eviction of the aid groups — though the figures cited by Adada had only counted violent deaths.

Adada’s remarks had already provoked a reaction from a rebel leader serving under the Sudan Liberation Army command of Abdel-Wahid Al-Nur, who said that Darfuri civilians had handed a letter to the SLA founder declaring that they would not deal with the UN peacekeepers unless Adada retracts the report.

Rebels warned that UNAMID personnel would not be allowed into “liberated areas” until a retraction and apology were made.

Likewise, Abu Sharati today added that they decided to not cooperate with the UNAMID. He urged the UN and the African Union to replace Adada by another official. "We request the UN and the international community to give the necessary attention to ensure the protection of the displaced population there,” he said in Darfur by phone.

Nevertheless, the UNAMID spokesperson Noureddine Mezni had stood by the data, saying it was comprehensive.

Abu Sharati also urged Abdel-Wahid Al-Nur to not engage in talks with the government unless the government and its militias definitively stop violence and attacks on the civilians.

Sudan has more displaced people than any other country in the world. According to a report released Friday by the Norwegian Refugee Council, during the year 2008 the country had 4.9 million or about one in eight of the population, more than half of them in Darfur.

Comment on this article...

1 Comment

Darfur displaced dismiss UN-AU monthly death figures

4 May 2009 06:25, by Akol Liai Mager
United Nations has clearly misused Donors money. The monies were donated to feed/protect Darfur civillians, but UN got to pay these wrong groups: UNAMID, the Basole’s group, Thabo Mbeki’s group and who knows which group is next in the row.

IDPs and Ocampo are suppose to be recipients of Donors money. IDPs should get 80% of these donors’ money, 10% to "Save Darfur Now & Darfur Friends" for papers-work and 10% to protect Ocampo who has received several dead threats.

For Mr. Ocampo, IDPs’ Chairperson has more evidences for you to note; figures of monthly death and raped.

"Save Darfur Now" & "Darfur Friends" should lodge a join application to the UN’ Headquaters in New York to demand from it’s Secretary General Ban Ki-Mon to sack Adada, Mbeki and reconsider UNAMID’s roles in Darfur.

Down, Down with Adada!

Note activist groups referred to as: "Darfur displaced", "Save Darfur Now" & "Darfur Friends".

MU professor to run for presidency of Sudan

MU professor to run for presidency of Sudan
By MARÁ ROSE WILLIAMS
The Kansas City Star, 03 May 2009

Abdullahi Ibrahim has taught history at the University of Missouri for more than 15 years, but now he is retiring to follow his heart and soul.

That path will take the history professor home to Sudan and, he hopes, lead to his election as president of the African nation.

While in Sudan on a one-year sabbatical in 2008, Ibrahim announced his candidacy for president of his homeland, which has been led nearly 20 years by a military dictator.

“We are sad to lose professor Ibrahim, but we understand that his country needs him,” said Jonathan Sperber, the chairman of MU’s history department.

That Ibrahim, 67, would seek to become the next leader of Sudan is no surprise to his colleagues, Sperber said. Actually, it fits with his life.

In the 1960s, when young Americans rallied for social justice, Ibrahim became a political activist in Sudan.

“It seems like it was a global spiritual movement for change,” he said. “In our country, it toppled a dictatorship. This is the reason why I know change happens. I saw it. I was part of it. So nobody can make me pessimistic about Sudan.”

Sudan has been embroiled in civil wars since 1956. In recent years, the western Darfur region has gotten global attention because of a conflict that has included the rape, torture, murder and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens.

In March, the International Criminal Court indicted Sudan’s current president, Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

The victory that Ibrahim and the other Sudanese revolutionaries of the 1960s won was short-lived, “but it had a lasting impact,” Ibrahim said.

Ibrahim continued as a political activist, and was arrested and jailed in the 1970s in Darfur.

Ibrahim left Sudan in 1981 to get a doctorate in history from Indiana University. He worked as a researcher and professor at several universities before joining the MU faculty in 1994.

But Ibrahim — who had left his family in Sudan — never lost touch with his homeland.

Since 1996, he returned every other year, visiting his wife and an ailing mother who has since died. Ibrahim’s wife now lives with him in Missouri.

Ibrahim’s said his desire to be at the forefront of change in his country has never waned.

“I’m not just a scholar,” he said. “I am an activist, too. And now I’m tempted to bring this alliance into center stage to try and reconnect with the past. We have a record of change. We have seen dictators come and go.”

Ibrahim has no party affiliation. He will run as an independent on a platform of peace and to re-establish the alliance of farmers, students, intellectuals and business class that he worked for as a young activist.

“I’m confident,” he said. “I can win.”

To reach Mará Rose Williams, call 816-234-4419 or send e-mail to mdwilliams@kcstar.com.

SLA-Nur rebel group says UNAMID personnel cannot enter "the liberated areas"

SLA-Nur rebel group condemns "fabricated" UN report.

Group says civilians will not deal with peacekeepers.

Rebels criticise U.N. report on Darfur conflict

KHARTOUM, April 30 2009 (Reuters) - A Darfur rebel group criticised on Thursday a U.N. report which said violence in Sudan's western Darfur region had subsided into a "low-intensity conflict".

The joint U.N.-African Union special representative to Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, said on Monday about 130-150 people were dying each month due to violence in Darfur, versus the tens of thousands who were killed in 2003-2004.

"We in the Sudan Liberation Army strongly condemn this fabricated ... and unfortunate report," Al-Sadig Rokero told Reuters via satellite phone. Rokero is from a branch of the SLA controlled by its founder Abdel Wahed Mohamed Ahmed el-Nour.

He said refugees, internally diplaced persons (IDP) and civilians had handed a letter to the rebel group's chief commander saying they would not deal with the joint U.N.-AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, known as UNAMID, unless Adada retracted the report.

"This decision is effective today. It means UNAMID personnel cannot enter the liberated areas based on the objection of IDPs, refugees and civilians and the decision of the chief commander unless there is a correction in the fabricated report ... and a clear apology to the people and the world."

UNAMID spokesman Nourelddine Mezni said Adada's report was "comprehensive and reflected the reality on the ground".

"We are neutral. We are working with all stakeholders on the ground to create an environment conducive to peace," he said.

According to diplomats, the United States and its allies had disagreed with Adada's assessment.

According to figures collected by UNAMID, some 2,000 people died from violence in the region during the 15 months between Jan. 1, 2008 and March 31, 2009, one third of them civilians.

Many non-governmental organisations agree with the U.S. view that Darfur is still in the throes of genocide orchestrated by the Khartoum government, a charge it rejects.

U.N. officials say as many as 300,000 people have died and more than 2.7 million driven from their homes in almost six years of ethnic and political violence. Some 4.7 million people rely on humanitarian aid. Khartoum says 10,000 have died. (Reporting by Yara Bayoumy; editing by Robert Woodward)

UK combat operations end in Iraq

Photo: A Rifleman makes his last combat operational patrol (Gett Images via BBC)

British troops are to formally end combat operations in Iraq marking the end of a six-year military campaign.

A memorial service has taken place in Basra for the 179 British personnel who have died during the conflict.

The focus was a memorial wall featuring the names of the 234 British and foreign troops and civilians who lost their lives on the UK-led operation in Iraq.

Army chaplain Father Pascal Hanrahan, who opened the ceremony, said: "Today is about remembrance and thanksgiving. We remember by name and acknowledge the ultimate sacrifice paid by the 234 men and women who lost their lives during Operation Telic."

The last post was sounded by a bugler and prayers were said. There was also a roar overhead as a lone Tornado aircraft conducted a fly-past in tribute.

UK combat operations ended as 20 Armoured Brigade took part in a flag-lowering ceremony with a US brigade. In London, Prime Minister Gordon Brown said a new chapter in relations between the two countries had begun. (BBC News In Pictures)

See BBC News report 30 April 2009:
UK combat operations end in Iraq



Photos: The names of those who died during the UK's Operation Telic were read out at the memorial service, which also honoured Italian, Dutch, Danish, American and Romanian troops who died. (Photo by Press Association via BBC)



Photo: Getty Images via BBC.

See more pictures at BBC News In Pictures 30 April 2009.

Darfur, Sudan: where were the media in 2003?

From Making Sense of Darfur, Media and Advocacy
Tuesday, April 28th, 2009
2003: All Quiet on the Western Front?
By Guy Gabriel

Recently on this blog, an an interesting question was posed: where was Save Darfur “and its advocacy and influence” in 2003? It is a good question, but seems to valorise advocacy excessively (as has this whole Mamdani / Save Darfur debate) when it has not (yet) supplanted the media as the Fourth Estate. Undoubtedly, there is a degree of cross-pollination between the two, and the conflict has been further entrenched on both their watches. However, it is also necessary to ask where were the media in 2003? Getting to the bottom of this can help shed light on the foundations upon which advocates such as Save Darfur built.

During the calendar year following 26 February 2003 (for arguments sake, the attack on Golo is taken to be the start of the conflict), five articles about Darfur appeared in the British mainstream media, three of which were news-in-brief in the Independent (culled from newswires) - a combined total of 165 words. The other two were in the Guardian (both in early 2004). By this stage, the frequency of attacks had peaked, according to statistics used by the Prosecution in preparing their case at the International Criminal Court.

This virtual silence seems counter-intuitive from today’s perspective, as this was a large chunk of the period of high-intensity conflict that set the tone for much of the future media coverage and advocacy as characterised by Save Darfur. Nevertheless, the very low exposure of Darfur in the British media in 2003 is a matter of record, and is a state of affairs replicated among major publications in the US.

If a particular subject is missing from a newspaper, the explanation is that there is no editorial appetite for it. Undoubtedly, Khartoum actively opposed reporting from Darfur. In fact, then-minister of information and communication, Al-Zahawi Ibrahim Malik, in March 2003 was already complaining that the media “had magnified events and portrayed untrue facts” (13 March 2003, Al-Khartoum). Amnesty International in July 2003 drew attention to the case of Yusuf Al-Beshir Musa, a correspondent of Al-Sahafa in Nyala, South Darfur, who was arrested and beaten by the security forces “apparently because he wrote about the destruction of Sudan air force planes and helicopters in El Fashir airport by the Sudan Liberation Army.” Having said that, Sudan normally fares better than many other countries in the neighbourhood (such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya among others) in the Reporters Without Borders Annual Press Freedom Index, having kept a cushion of 24-38 other countries in between them and least free country press-wise in the world since these records began (2002). However, its lowest ever ranking was 2003.

Nonetheless, a wide range of sources were available to journalists potentially covering Darfur, which was most certainly on the radar of newswires in early 2003 (among others, Agence France Presse, the Associated Press, Reuters, the Pan African News Agency, United Press International and Integrated Regional Information Networks were reporting Darfur then).

The Arab media has been criticised in the past for its scant regard for Darfur, but it did cover the region in 2003. For example, a report on Al-Jazeera prompted then-Governor of North Darfur Lt-Gen Ibrahim Sulayman to refute on Sudanese TV on 27 February 2003 its claims that a rebel movement had occupied Golo. A further exempli gratia: the attack on Al-Fasher airport was reported by a number of Sudanese outlets (print and broadcast), and regional news agencies and newspapers, including Egypt (MENA), the Gulf (Al-Watan, Qatar), Jordan (Al-Bawaba), the Saudi Press Agency, and the London-based Arabic-language newspapers Al-Hayat and Asharq Al-Awsat.

However, one caveat to mention is that the freedom given to these agencies and their staff to report is another matter, as is the appetite they themselves had to report in any depth; Darfur has never been an ideal reporting environment for a wide range of reasons, not just government obstruction.

The one British newspaper to report the attack on Al-Fashir airport, the Independent on Sunday (27 April 2003), then reported nothing further until nine months later (24 December 2003) because nothing in its opinion happened there that was newsworthy, though this was not the opinion of the various outlets mentioned above.

In fact, it was NGOs that began drawing attention to Darfur - this much is confirmed in one of the early broadsides to a dormant public about Darfur. After several attempts and what amounts to sanitizing for public consumption, the Washington Post published a commentary by Eric Reeves (Unnoticed Genocide, 25 February 2004) in which the opening paragraphs quote both Doctors Without Borders and Amnesty International, an organisation that the author writes “has led the way in reporting on Darfur.”

This was an accurate observation. For example, Amnesty noted the “deteriorating situation” in Darfur in February 2003. The International Crisis Group likewise pre-dated mainstream media interest with Sudan’s Other Wars (25 June 2003), as did Sudan: Empty promises? Human rights violations in government-controlled areas (15 July 2003), again from Amnesty. A 3 February 2004 report, Darfur: “Too many people killed for no reason”, yet again from Amnesty, coincided with the start of much greater media interest in Darfur.

Incidentally, one further avenue of study is to trace the evolution of language used to describe Darfur in NGO work and the media; Amnesty in July 2003 referred to an emerging conflict between ‘sedentary groups’ and ‘nomadic groups’, terms that are contextualised - but which would be simplified in the future to ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs’ in the absence of sufficient contextualisation.

However, the reports produced by NGOs are not categorised in the same way as articles produced by journalism. While newspaper reporters are by definition (textbook, at least) ‘objective’ and required to provide ‘both sides of the story’ (in news articles, as opposed to opinion pieces), NGOs have no similar, developed branch of ethics requiring them to do so. In fact, they profess to lobby for a particular outcome: Amnesty campaigns for “human rights for all,” while the ICG says it provides, among other things, “sharp-edged policy prescription and high-level advocacy.” No newspaper or news agency would claim the same.
Undoubtedly, this is a vital role to fulfill in civil society, especially in areas, such as Darfur, where the media simply cannot cover everything, if at all, to the tastes of a wide range of consumers. Darfur in 2003 was at best an esoteric subject, at worst almost completely ignored by the mainstream. However, it also needs to be said that it is entirely legitimate for journalism to draw upon secondary post-event accounts as source material, such as interviews, recollections, contemporary photos etc - but this is not the same as being eyewitness to something.

The question we are left with is what quality does NGO-led news agenda-setting bequeath the journalism on Darfur once they have caught up? Inevitably, subsequent (Western) journalism is qualified by its absence in the early period, as it was obliged to build on foundations provided by others that operate in a different way to it.

In contrast to Darfur, the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in the same year received global blanket coverage that pushed the boundaries of journalism and of credulity at times. This comparison merely makes the point that if there is an editorial appetite - such as the US-led coalition removing one of the West’s great bogeymen - the media consumer can be made to feel that there is nothing he or she does not know about a subject. This in Darfur came much later.
It is worth adding that news from Iraq (which was very well-attended by journalists) - in 2003 and ever since - is still contested in areas for its legitimacy of journalistic practices, such as embedding and venturing no further than the Green Zone for whatever reason.

2 Responses to “2003: All Quiet on the Western Front?”
Bikem Ekberzade:
April 28th, 2009
Dear Mr. Gabriel,
When you asked “where were the media in 2003?” I immediately responded Iraq, which you later layed out in your article. Iraq was straightforward, well marketed (it had to be, I mean afterall it WAS invasion not intervention) and when international media is concerned, other than journalists on staff, as most freelancers cater to the US press, Iraq was the ultimate destination. It was inevitable. Africa has always been complicated. And media doesn’t like complicated. It is not cost effective. And brutal as it may sound, media doesn’t like black either. Were they to choose between a black and a white conflict, the white is definitely more attractive.

Africa, you have to explain. You have to educate even, and media leaves education to the schools. “Journalists” are interested in “objective” coverage, with a “subjective” stance on things (as well as large expense accounts which they can blow off in hotel rooms and write articles based on press releases) So when you run out of conflicts, or rather when conflicts turn stale you turn to Africa.

Ah, and you also turn to Africa if one of your countrymen is over there fighting (”could be fighting” is also good enough)
Even today, with all these popular and much debated advocacy movements, the average civilian has no clue as to what is going on in Darfur. Not a day passes when a friend strolls in with the question, “so what IS really going on in there?”
However now there certainly is a load of material on the internet. When I first started covering the conflict, I could find hardly anything on the internet. 2003-2004 was a relative dead zone. And myself not being a Sudan specialist, was groping in the dark. This is no longer the case (I still am not a Sudan expert but at least I have a myriad of literature to research on). It is amazing how much has been written (correct or erroneous) on Darfur alone. Even Chad. Once a hole in the world of information now there are at least 7 books I can think of describing the tarmac runway of the Nd’jemena airport before jumping into tell about Darfur.

And now with Obama stepping in to the White House, curious days are here. I wonder if with a black president in office, the attitude of the mass media towards Africa will change. It would be a good day if it did.

Eric Reeves:
April 28th, 2009 at 7:36 pm
Guy Gabriel raises extremely important questions, and his account of failure by the international news media is chilling in its accuracy. How could it be that multiple reports from Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, the International Crisis Group, and Human Rights Watch were not taken seriously? They were authoritatively researched and devastating in implication. (One feature that needs greater highlighting here is the focus of international news coverage on the Naivasha peace talks between Khartoum and the SPLM).
I for one had no difficulty or reservation, on the basis of precisely these reports and other information readily available, to declare the reality of genocide, the need for compelling reporting on the growing catastrophe, and the risks of a partial peace:
On Genocide in Darfur:
December 30, 2003
from Africa InfoServe (Sudan publications of AfricaFiles.org)
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=4075

by Eric Reeves
It is intolerable that the international community continues to allow what all evidence suggests is genocide. For surely if we are honest with ourselves we will accept that the term “ethnic cleansing” is no more than a dangerous euphemism for genocide, a way to make the ultimate crime somehow less awful. As Samantha Power has cogently observed, the phrase “ethnic cleansing” gained currency in the early 1990s as a way of speaking about the atrocities in the Balkans—“as a kind of euphemistic halfway house between crimes against humanity and genocide” (page 483, “‘A Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide”). But linguistic half-measures are not enough when the question is whether an “ethnical [or] racial group” is being destroyed “in whole or in part”—“as such.”

The present realities in Darfur must urgently be rendered for the world to see and understand—fully, honestly, and on the basis of much greater information than is presently available. In turn, these realities must guide a humanitarian effort that will not allow Khartoum’s claim of “national sovereignty” to trump the desperate plight of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians caught up in a maelstrom of destruction and displacement. That no such efforts are presently being undertaken—Ambassador [Tom] Vraalsen declared (December 8, 2003) that humanitarian operations in Darfur have “practically come to a standstill”—is of the gravest concern.

Indeed, the logic of the situation is so compelling that one can only surmise that the failure of the international community even to speak of the possibility of a humanitarian intervention in Darfur derives from some morally appalling failure of nerve, and an unwillingness to roil the diplomatic waters with a peace agreement so close between Khartoum and the SPLM/A. But this latter concern represents exactly the wrong way to view both Darfur and its relation to the last major issue outstanding in the present peace negotiations between Khartoum and the south, viz. the status of the three contested areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile. For unless the international community shows its concern for the various marginalized peoples of Sudan, peace will be only very partial and ultimately unsustainable.

ICRC Arranges for Return of 14 Child Soldiers from Chad

From Sudan Vision Daily
By Al-Sammani Awadallah (Khartoum) 30 April, 2009:

ICRC declared its intention to return 14 child soldiers from Chad to Sudan.

DDR Northern Sudan Commissioner, Dr. Sulaf Addeen Saleh revealed, after his meeting with the ICRC Chairman in Sudan, that they received a notification from the ICRC to return 14 children from Chad to Sudan, of whom ten were under-aged and 4 child soldiers.

Sulaf Addeen affirmed their keenness to develop its relations with Chad in the child soldiers issue adding that they will continue contacts with Chad to implement our part in the programme.

He expected that the reintegration of the child soldiers in Eastern Sudan will be completed by the end of this year, adding that the programme will last for three or four years to follow up the redeployed elements and assure their integration in the community.

He said that the commission is arranging to redeploy about 2254 from SAF and Popular Forces in Eastern Sudan.

Sulaf Addeen affirmed that the commission is committed to review the DDR appendices in eastern Sudan next week, adding that they will implement their programme in South Kordufan next Monday pointing to the political harmony with SPLM institution to make the programme a success.

Eastern Sudan Representative in the DDR Commission, Nafie Ibrahim Nafie revealed about an agreement between the commission and UNICEF to establish rehabilitation centres for child soldiers in each of Kassala, Port Sudan, and Gedarif targeting more than 300 child soldiers.

Quotation - JP Getty

"There are 100 men seeking security to 1 able man who is willing to risk his fortune." - JP Getty

Source: Twitter / whiteafrican 29 April 2009.

JEM preparing to overthrow Sudan's Government of NU

JEM says it is in the process of overthrowing the Sudanese government.

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Khartoum):

The Government of National Unity says that JEM, backed by Chadian forces, are preparing another attack against GONU.

The spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Ambassador Ali Al-Sadeq, spoke to Sudan Radio Service from Khartoum on Wednesday.

[Ali Al-Sadeq]: “They are massing their troops across the border and they have done that on a couple of occasions when they are preparing for an offensive against the country. This is information gathered from across the border. We did not say they are inside Sudan. They are in Chadian territory; we have information that there are at least 40 vehicles with Chadian registration belonging to the army.”

However JEM dismissed the claim by GONU officials.

Ahmed Mohamed Togud, JEM’s political secretary, spoke to Sudan Radio Service from an unidentified location in Darfur on Wednesday.

[Ahmed Togud]: “First of all, this statement is a lie, the truth is that GONU has completely prepared Chadian rebels in al-Geneina in western Darfur after a big military show for the Chadian rebels inside the town, these groups have moved to three different sectors with the support of the air force in government sectors to attack Chadian territory, so the statements by the Sudanese officials are just to cover their activities and to hide the movements of the Chadian rebels.”

Togud did not dismiss the prospect of a military operation against GONU.

[Ahmed Togud]: “The government is afraid of JEM, and it thinks it is the only body which is threatening it as a regime and a government, we are in the process of overthrowing this government, it is just a matter of time, and we are going to do it.”

JEM launched an attack on Omdurman in May last year in which 200 people were killed. GONU and JEM signed a goodwill agreement in Doha in February 2009.

JEM has accused GONU of violating the goodwill agreement by issuing death sentences against 81 men who were captured during the attack.

All Sudanese citizens must register by June to vote in upcoming elections

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Juba):

All Sudanese citizens must register with relevant authorities by June this year to be eligible to vote in the upcoming general elections.

The SPLM deputy secretary-general - southern sector, Dr. Ann Itto, says that people without national identity cards must be identified by local authorities.

[Ann Itto]: “First, you must be a Sudanese citizen; secondly you must be 18 years of age then you must register in June. If you don’t register by June and then you come to your chief to register you will not be eligible because registration is scheduled for June only. July is for the verification of names that were registered in June, whether those registered are still alive, missing or the names were wrongly written, this is done in July only.”

She said that in August the electoral commission will start receiving the names of people contesting various positions, after the registration and verification of names in June and July respectively.

Dr. Itto also urged women to register in large numbers and come out to vote on the voting day.

[Ann Itto]: “My message is come out and cast your vote and decide the destiny of your country because it is your right, if you don’t come out now, those who can will change the Sudan but it may not be in favor of women.”

Dr. Ann Itto was speaking to Sudan Radio Service on the phone from Juba.

- - -

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Juba):

The deputy chairman of the SPLM and speaker of southern Sudan legislative assembly, James Wani Igga, says that the SPLM will win the general elections scheduled for next year.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service from Juba, Igga said that SPLM will get votes from the people who have been marginalized by successive governments in Khartoum.

[James Wani]: “Actually, 70 percent of Sudan is marginalized. For example the whole of the south is marginalized, southern Blue Nile is marginalized, southern Kordofan is marginalized, Darfur is marginalized, eastern Sudan is marginalized and far north is also marginalized. So you are left with not more than 25 percent of Sudanese who have been in power since the British left the country.

But not all of them, of course there are a good number of them who are supporting the change SPLM is aspiring to bring in the country. In terms of marginalization, you can say that over 70 percent of Sudan is marginalized and if you can get support from all these then you have won the upcoming elections.”

Igga said that he is confident that SPLM has enough supporters, both in southern Sudan and northern Sudan, to win the 2010 general elections.

INTERVIEW: Sir Derek Plumbly re Abyei

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Khartoum):

The chairman of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission in Sudan says he is optimistic that the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is achievable within the year if the current pace is maintained.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service on the phone, Sir Derek Plumbly said that there is a need to speed up the implementation of the outstanding issues which separate the two signatories to the CPA before the end of this year.



[Derek Plumbly]: “Yes it can be done, but the calendar is very tight. There are only 20 months left to the date set for the referendum in the south which is the last main event in the CPA implementation. And ahead of us we have elections in the Sudan which clearly requires a lot of preparation. I was projecting that the essential things can be done, but I think it will require reaffirmation of vital partnerships which exist between the SPLM and the NCP in the north and the south. Now we are approaching a crucial period when continued partnership and cooperation and a greater pace of implementation will be needed to achieve the objectives of the agreement.”

Sir Derek added that there is a need for the government of national unity to act quickly in order to solve the outstanding CPA issues.

[Derek Plumbly]: “The outstanding issues which I think need to be addressed quickly include the demarcation of the border between north and south. Because without clarity about where the border is, a lot of other things, including the elections, the referendum, future wealth-sharing and redeployment becomes impossible to complete, so it leaves things in suspense and may indeed seriously affect the election process in particular. I was concerned about the condition of the joint integrated unit which is supposed to be the basis for a future united army but in fact they are poorly equipped and supplied. And I was concerned too that the referendum bill, which needs to be passed without further delay if the preparation of the referendum are to be made in good time, needs to be forwarded, in parallel with discussion about arrangements after the referendum either in the event of unity or in the event of secession in the south. It can’t be delayed if that very important stage of the CPA implementation is to be properly prepared.”

Sir Derek is also concerned about the slow pace of implementation of the disputed region of Abyei since the Abyei Road Map was signed last year.

[Sir Derek Plumbly]: “Abyei is a very important issue, I confirm that the people who were displaced in the fighting last May haven’t yet been able to return and a lot of the things which were agreed in the Abyei road map have been done. The administration although in place, is still not properly financed to look after people’s needs and to facilitate return and reconstruction. And ahead of us we have the prospect of the arbitration decision on the boundaries of Abyei and whether the Abyei Boundary Commission exceeded its mandate. It’s very important the two work together as partners rather than rivals at this time to reassure the Dinka Ngoc and the Messiriya that their rights and their interests will be protected whatever happens. That is very necessary because it is a sensitive time.”

The Assessment and Evaluation Commission was established in 2008 to monitor and evaluate the prospect of the CPA implementation.

The commission meets regularly in Khartoum and Juba to report on the progress of the CPA.

It is represented by members from the SPLM, NCP, NGOs, and a team of international observers.

For further reports, click on Abyei label here below.

Bari and Mundari clashed over cattle raiding in Jebel Lado, north of Juba, S. Sudan

Recent inter-tribal conflict in Jonglei and Warrap states claimed more than 300 lives. Bari and Mundari communities clashed last week over cattle raiding in Jebel Lado area, north of Juba.

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Juba):

The speaker of southern Sudan legislative assembly James Wani Igga is urging the Bari and Mundari communities to stop fighting and live peacefully.

The Bari and Mundari communities, who have lived peacefully over the years, clashed last week over cattle raiding in Jebel Lado area, north of Juba.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service James Wani Igga explains how the fighting started.

[James Wani]: “Mundari boys are the ones who attacked Bari in a place called Nyarkenyi, they took Bari cows, killed people, and also looted some villages. Now if you go to a village like Pöyiti Gwerikek, it has become deserted and everything is looted. This thing is wrong. Let our brothers the Mundari, if they really started the attacks as I heard, let them know that ever since there was no fighting between Bari and Mundari, let Mundari elders tell those boys that this is not the time to start fighting ourselves as one community. Our grandfathers did not fight each other. If we finish ourselves now, what will happen if the enemies come? Now even the people of Wonduroba are complaining that Mundari boys have raided their cattle, and they are also fighting.”

Mister Igga asked the Mundari elders to calm those fighting and urged the elders of the two communities to sit down and solve the dispute.

- - -

From Sudan Radio Service 29 April 2009 - (Khartoum):

The National Congress Party - southern sector is calling for the formation of a joint NCP/SPLM committee to fight tribalism and inter-tribal conflicts in southern Sudan.

The official spokesperson of NCP - southern sector, Khamis Haggar, told Sudan Radio Service in Khartoum that southern Sudan is in need of reconciliation conferences and workshops to stop the conflict in the towns and villages in southern Sudan where tension exists.

[Khamis Haggar]: “The SPLM and the NCP should sit down and form a body that will maintain security and stability in southern Sudan and this step should consider inter-communal reconciliation between various communities and the formation of a joint army between the NCP and SPLM, police forces and a separate security organ to curb tribalism and inter-tribal conflicts. There should also be an executive organ to maintain justice which gives each aggrieved party his or her rights and there must be an inter-communal mechanism that can prevent tribalism. If these tribal conflicts continue, they will impede elections in southern Sudan and also the referendum for the self determination of southern Sudan which is the right of each citizen in the south. If we fail to maintain security in southern Sudan, it will be considered that we southern Sudanese are incapable of ruling ourselves.”

Recent inter-tribal conflict in Jonglei and Warrap states claimed more than 300 lives.

Al Qaeda in Somalia Threatens Kenyan Invasion?

Some news reporters and bloggers out of Africa have suggested that the Mungiki are being supported by outside Muslim extremists groups, from Somalia, Sudan, and Ethopia.

Source: The Jawa Report April 28, 2009. Here is a copy:
Al Qaeda in Somalia Threatens Kenyan Invasion

With all eyes focused on the Somali piracy problem this story serves as a reminder that a bigger threat is looming from the Horn of Africa: violent Islamism.

Libertarian Republican noted two days ago the relationship between President Obama's first cousin, Kenya's new Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the Mungiki Islamist movement, and al Qaeda's Somali affiliate, the al-Shabaab:

The Mungiki are now leading a violent uprising in nothern and central regions of the Nation, while also fanning violence in the slums of the Capitol City in Nairobi. Mungiki rebels who support the imposition of strict Sharia Law, have brutally hacked to death hundreds of villagers in remote regions who've opposed their local rule. It is rumored that Odinga approves of the actions.

Some news reporters and bloggers out of Africa have also suggested that the Mungiki are being supported by outside Muslim extremists groups, from Somalia, Sudan, and Ethopia. The Mungiki's "Mafia style" operation is transporting weapons and funds from these sources into the hands of Mungiki fighters on the ground inside of Kenya.

Go read the rest here. Looks like he scooped the VOA as this morning they noted that the al Shabaab are threatening to invade and annex majority-Muslim areas of Kenya:

The [al-Shabaab], which has refused to recognize President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's government threatened Monday to annex parts of northern Kenya and implement Islamic Sharia law. Nairobi on the other hand has begun strong measures to counter such an attack by deploying extra troops to man the Kenya-Somali border and maintain the disarmament of residents in the province....

Nairobi said recent abductions of several Kenyans at the border town of Mandera forms part of a wider scheme to force a reaction from the Kenyan government.

Described by Washington as a terrorist organization with close links to al Qaeda, al-Shabab officially informed Nairobi of its intentions to invade Kenya's Northeastern Province and make it part of their country and rule it with their religious laws.

But don't panic, because the terrorists in the new Islamist government have promised to put a stop to al Shabaab -- if the international community will just give them money enough to buy weapons and troops. What could possibly go wrong?

Thanks to Libertarian Republican.

Read the original posting with hyperlinks: http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/197451.php