Monday, November 18, 2024

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)


It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 


This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.


The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.


During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.


Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.


Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.


It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.


While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.


As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.


It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.


A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)


In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)


The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.


Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.


While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.


In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.


Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.


View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php


View video:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting 


Live broadcast by UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg


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Thursday, November 07, 2024

Sudan conflict spilling into oil-rich Abyei. South Sudan postpones its December 2024 election by two years

THE WORLD must not forget what is happening in South Sudan and Abyei, an oil-rich area on the border of South Sudan and Sudan. South Sudan postponed its first elections scheduled for December. Read more below.

Report from defenceWeb
Dated 07 November 2024 - full copy:

 Sudan conflict spilling into Abyei
UNISFA peacekeepers on humanitarian duty. Picture: United Nations.


The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) this week heard ongoing conflict in Sudan is “exacerbating instability” in Abyei, a 10 000 plus square kilometre contested area between Sudan and the world’s youngest country, South Sudan.


According to the world body, which has a peacekeeping mission on the ground in the oil-rich area, Abyei is claimed by both sides – RSF (Rapid Support Forces) and the Sudan Armed Force (SAF). The UN mission – UNISFA (UN Interim Security Force for Abyei) was first deployed in June 2011 and currently has 4 190 uniformed members and 3 743 civilians on its personnel strength.


Martha Pobee, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa at the UN Department of Peace Operations, told ambassadors on the Security Council the Sudan war continues to have a profound impact on the security, economic and humanitarian situations in South Sudan and Sudan.


Since the power struggle between rival militaries in Sudan began last April, Abyei and its neighbours have grappled with disruptions in oil production and surging refugee arrivals. These setbacks left already stretched resources in South Sudan under greater strain, with thousands of refugees enduring shortages of clean water, food and healthcare services.


Pobee highlighted continued proliferation of arms and heightened tensions, as observed with the recent incursion of RSF combatants into Abyei’s Aman-Aquak and Mijak counties, with reports of looting.


“The movement of armed groups is compounding the fragile security situation in South Sudan and Abyei,  particularly in relation to the pre-existing tensions between the Twic Mayardit and Ngok Dinka communities across Warrap state and Abyei,” she said.


Also this week, the African Union (AU) by way of its special envoy on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, added its condemnation of the ongoing Sudan conflict.


A statement has Adama Dieng saying reports of “grave crimes” including mass killing, summary executions, sexual assault, abduction, torture and looting have emerged despite a telecommunication black-out. As special envoy he urges the leaders of the two main fighting forces General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Dagalo “Hemedti” to de-escalate the fighting and, among others, refrain from targeting civilians.


View original: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/sudan-conflict-spilling-into-abyei/

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Related reports


From Al Jazeera 

Dated 14 September 2024 - excerpt:

South Sudan postpones December election by two years

Government says it needs more time to complete a census, draft a permanent constitution and register political parties.

President Salva Kiir, who has led South Sudan since it became independent from Sudan in 2011, had promised to hold elections in 2024 
[File: Gregorio Borgia/AP Photo]

South Sudan’s government has announced it is postponing long-delayed general elections until December 2026, citing a lack of preparedness. This is the second time the country, which gained independence in 2011, is postponing elections and extending a transitional period that started in February 2020. 

Full story: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/14/south-sudan-postpones-december-election-by-two-years

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From What's In Blue 

Dated 06 November 2024 - excerpt:

South Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

An expected focus of tomorrow’s [07 November] meeting is the 13 September decision by the signatories to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) to extend the transitional period by 24 months. The decision postponed again the country’s first post-independence elections, which were scheduled for December 2024, until December 2026, and extended the transitional period until February 2027. The original transitional period outlined in the R-ARCSS was set to end in February 2023; it had been extended until February 2025 through a roadmap adopted in August 2022. (For background and more information, see the brief on South Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

Full story: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/south-sudan-briefing-and-consultations-26.php

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From The Conversation 

By Steven C. Roach

Dated 08 November 2024 - excerpt:

Salva Kiir: South Sudan’s president fought for independence, but then fuelled division, violence and corruption

Salva Kiir Mayardit has served as South Sudan’s president since the country’s independence in 2011. South Sudan’s secession from Sudan came on the heels of a long and bloody civil war that resulted in a referendum on independence. The initial optimism about the new state faded within two years when Kiir fell out with his vice-president, Riek Machar. The resulting civil war displaced some four million people and killed an estimated 388,000 people. With the two warring sides unable to reach agreement, the government postponed elections indefinitely in 2015 amid continuing civil strife.

Full story: https://theconversation.com/salva-kiir-south-sudans-president-fought-for-independence-but-then-fuelled-division-violence-and-corruption-242747

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From The East African 

By Garang Malak

Dated 08 November 2024 - excerpt:

South Sudan holdouts agree to resume peace talks in Nairobi

President Ruto says parties to the South Sudan peace process have agreed to resume mediation

Kenya's President William Ruto makes remarks, during the swearing-in ceremony of his new Deputy President, Kithure Kindiki, at the Kenya International Convention Centre (KICC) in Nairobi on November 1, 2024. Kindiki is an academic turned politician who was thrust into the limelight when he defended his boss President William Ruto at the International Criminal Court. The 52-year-old millionaire served as interior minister for more than two years before taking over as deputy president on November 1, 2024 following the historic impeachment of his predecessor, Rigathi Gachagua. (Photo by SIMON MAINA/Agence France-Presse (AFP)/AFP

South Sudan’s holdout groups, the non-signatories to the 2018 peace agreement, have agreed to resume peace talks in Nairobi after months of expressing security concerns and dissatisfaction with the process. This development follows Kenyan President William Ruto’s visit to Juba on Wednesday, where he held talks with President Salva Kiir, First Vice President Riek Machar and other key stakeholders in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU).

Full story: https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/africa/south-sudan-holdouts-agree-to-resume-peace-talks-in-nairobi-a3ontus8


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Sunday, October 27, 2024

Sudan: UN Security Council closed consultations may discuss measures to support protection of civilians

TOMORROW'S UN Security Council briefing and consultations "may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC [protection of civilians] as well as assess existing strategies

In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. 

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan." 

Read more from What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday, 27 October 2024 - full copy:


Sudan: Briefing and Consultations


Tomorrow morning (28 October), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the consultations.


Eighteen months into the conflict, hostilities continue unabated as the warring parties engage in a protracted war of attrition. Over the past several weeks, fighting intensified across multiple front lines as the rainy season subsided. In September, there was a severe escalation in El Fasher—the capital of North Darfur state, which has been under siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since May—after the RSF launched a coordinated attack on the city, followed by intensive shelling and airstrikes from both sides, resulting in civilian casualties. On 26 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive in Khartoum and surrounding areas in a bid to besiege areas under RSF control, making significant advances in the ensuing days. In addition, the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces (a coalition of armed movements from Darfur) engaged in fighting with the RSF on several front lines in North and West Darfur states. In the past few weeks, the SAF has reportedly been able to make strategic advances in Sennar and Al Jazira states. Media reports indicate that, on 24 October, the RSF launched a retaliatory attack on villages in East Al Jazira, following the defection to the SAF of Abu Aqla Kikal, a prominent RSF commander. While some sources report that the attack killed about 50 people, others suggest that the death toll could be much higher. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and listen to our 4 September podcast episode.)


Tomorrow, Guterres and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across the country and stress the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Guterres is likely to highlight that the conflict has resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Sudan and has had destabilising effects on the region. On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. The report describes an alarming intensification of intercommunal and identity-based violence and highlights a significant increase in human rights violations and abuses in areas under the control of both warring parties. It outlines the widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks carried out by the warring parties in residential neighbourhoods and sites sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres and several Council members are likely to emphasise the crucial need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and medical and humanitarian personnel.


Guterres is likely to focus on the recommendations outlined in his report under three broad headings: intensifying diplomacy towards ending the fighting, changing the behaviour of the warring parties, and supporting broader protection measures. The report highlights an urgent need for a renewed diplomatic push, including through the “personal involvement” of some heads of state, to ensure that the warring parties uphold their legal obligations. It calls on the warring parties and relevant stakeholders to pursue scalable, locally negotiated ceasefires and other measures to reduce violence, protect civilians, and prevent the spread of conflict. It strongly recommends that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The report calls for an immediate cessation of the direct or indirect flow of weapons and ammunitions into Sudan, which continue to fuel the conflict. Highlighting the need to monitor violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, the report underlines the importance of supporting and cooperating with regional and international independent investigation bodies. It further calls on the international community to provide technical and financial support to Sudanese civil society organisations and community-based initiatives.


Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan. Some Council members are apparently exploring options for a possible deployment of an African Union (AU)-led mission and how the mission could be supported in the context of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). The Secretary-General’s report acknowledges these calls but notes that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. However, it expresses the UN Secretariat’s readiness to engage with the Council and relevant stakeholders on “operational modalities”, including localised efforts feasible under the current conditions that can contribute to effectively reducing violence and protecting civilians.


Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing regional and international initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis, his engagement with key regional and international interlocutors, and his efforts to coordinate different peace initiatives. With the mediation efforts, not having achieved any breakthrough as yet, members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps, including strategies for enhancing cooperation among stakeholders and addressing the underlying issues hindering the peace process. Tomorrow’s closed consultations may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC as well as assess existing strategies.


On 3 October, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members undertook a field mission to Port Sudan to engage with senior officials from the Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders. In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AUPSC members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.


Wosornu is likely to highlight the spiralling humanitarian situation in the country, especially food insecurity, and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid across Sudan. She and several Council members are likely to reiterate the critical need to ensure full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and criticise impediments to such access. They may also call on the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorisation for the use of the Adre crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for humanitarian operations, which was initially authorised on 15 August for a three-month period.


In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. While expressing appreciation for assurances of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities, they underlined the need to operationalise these commitments. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan.


Earlier this month, during negotiations on a draft press statement proposed by the UK (the penholder on Sudan), Russia apparently requested the removal of the phrase “administrative or other impediments”, arguing that it suggests that Port Sudan authorities are creating artificial barriers for aid delivery and distribution. Some members, such as France, however, contended that several obstacles remain to the delivery of aid. Continuing disagreements among members led the penholder to withdraw the draft text after four revised drafts. (For background on Council dynamics regarding the issue of humanitarian access, see the brief on Sudan in our October Monthly Forecast and 13 June What’s in Blue story.)


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-9.php


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