Sunday, August 11, 2019

Eid in Sudan: 9 killed, several injured after RSF launched assault on Shangal Toubaya, North Darfur

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Samir R. Osman @samir_r_osman timestamped 4:11am and 12:11 11 Aug 2019 saying “Nine killed and several injured, on the first day of Eid-al-adha, after Janjaweed (RSF) launched an assault on ٍShangal Toubaya Village in the state of North Darfur, Western Sudan.”
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/samir_r_osman/status/1160509039996014598

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 1 - Sun 11 Aug 2019 14:42 GMT UK
9 killed (some say 12-unconfirmed) & many injured in what some say is an RSF attack, and what others say is conflict between some shepherds and the citizens in Nevasha camp in Shangel Tobai-West Darfur. The camp is now under siege by an armed force.  

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 2 - Sun 11 Aug 2019 15:44 GMT UK
Reports coming out of the region are saying "janjaweed" launched the attack.  A name historically given to armed militias, including the rebranded RSF. Sources unable to confirm if the attackers are RSF or armed herders. 

 SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 3 - Sun 11 Aug 2019 19:26 PM GMT UK
The news below was tweeted in Arabic by باهي سطيح @IsSudanNewDubai at 10:34 am on 11 Aug 2019. So, I used Google translator for an English version. The translation gives a picture of what happened. To view the Arabic tweet click here: https://twitter.com/IsSudanNewDubai/status/1160605352846614528 

Facts in the details of this incident:
An armed group of shepherds killed three farmers and wounded another displaced people west of Shangel Toby, North Darfur, 60 km southeast of Al-Fashir.
The shepherds entered their livestock farms in Shangel Tubai, and human rights activist Haitham Silva told Page News, a resident of the area, that the shepherds had been killed.
Three farmers injured, another injured during skirmishes to remove livestock from farms
The rescue tracked down the perpetrators until their logic reached their point and the two sides gathered to fight, but the mayor of the area committed to bringing the perpetrators to justice. The relatives of the dead refused to bury the bodies until the state government and the regular forces were present and separated the two sides. [Ends]

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 4 - Mon 12 Aug 2019 12:55 GMT UK
Article by Radio Dabanga.org online
Dated Monday 12 August 12 2019 - SHANGIL TOBAYA
Herders shoot three farmers dead in North Darfur
Rizeigat camel herders in North Darfur (Albert González Farran/Unamid)

Three farmers were killed and another was wounded in a revenge attack by herdsmen in El Salam locality in North Darfur on Saturday. The farmers had removed the herders’ livestock from their farms.

“When a group of camels trespassed on farms in the neighbourhood of Dolma, 20km north of Shangil Tobaya, on Saturday morning, the farmers took the animals and handed them to the police of Shangil Tobaya,” a relative of one of the victims told Radio Dabanga.

“That evening, about 20 armed herdsmen on camels and four others on motorcycles arrived at the area, and immediately started shooting at the farmers present. Abdelrahman Saleh, Ahmed El Nur, and Ali Yahya died instantly. Adam Abdelshakour was wounded.”

The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in North Darfur condemned the killing in a statement on Sunday.

The FFC members called on the acting state governor “to fully play your role in protecting unarmed civilians and agricultural land”. They proposed the establishment of a joint team of regular forces tasked with protecting farmers and people living in the area from such attacks. The herders should graze their livestock at pastures defined in the state maps.

The North Darfur activists also proposed the establishment of an independent committee to investigate the crimes committed by militant herders and other gunmen in the state in the past years.
The area of Shangil Tobaya (OCHA map of North Darfur)


SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 5 - Mon 12 Aug 2019 13:26 GMT UK
Here is a copy of a tweet by Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated 14:06 11 Aug 2019: “This map indicates where violence in North #Darfur has been most concentrated over much of the past two years (Jan 2017 - March 2019). There has been especially intense violence just north of Shangil Tobaya, but much of North and Central Darfur have seen seen genocidal violence”
To visit the tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1160538001598046209

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 6 - Mon 12 Aug 2019 13:50 GMT UK
Article from The National.ae
Written by Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Dated Monday 12 August 2019 11:06 AM
Clashes kill 3 civilians in Sudan's Darfur
Violence over grazing land, one of the causes of the war that erupted in 2003, had been rare in Darfur recently
Photo: Sudanese villagers walk in the war-torn town of Golo in the thickly forested mountainous area of Jebel Marra in central Darfur on June 19, 2017. AFP PHOTO/ASHRAF SHAZLY

Clashes over pasture between farmers and herders in Sudan's western region of Darfur killed three civilians on Sunday, a doctors' committee linked to the country's protest movement said.

"Three citizens were killed this morning in Shengel Tobay, in North Darfur state, and another was wounded," the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors said.

Violence over grazing land, which was one of the root causes of a deadly war that erupted in 2003, has been relatively rare in Darfur recently.

The latest incident marred the first day of the Eid Al Adha and was Sudan's first since months of protests brought down longtime ruler Omar Al Bashir and created an opportunity for civilian rule.

Ethnic African rebels took up arms against Mr Al Bashir's regime, which they accused of marginalising the remote region, in the war that broke out more than 15 years ago.

Khartoum armed Arab pastoralists to quash the rebellion, leading to massacres that resulted in genocide charges against Mr Al Bashir and others in international courts.

While the fighting has subsided in Darfur, tension over pasture remains and those responsible for the war's darkest hours have not been brought to justice.

"The former regime fuelled the conflict and contributed to deepening the crisis by not helping to provide sustainable solutions, and not holding perpetrators accountable," the doctors committee said.

Mr Al Bashir was removed in April after 29 years in power and a temporary power-sharing agreement was reached a week ago by the country's generals and civilian protest leaders.

But the document that will serve as Sudan's de facto interim constitution does not mention the fate of Mr Al Bashir and others wanted by the International Criminal Court.


 SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 7 - Mon 12 Aug 2019 14:07 GMT UK
Here is a copy of a tweet by Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves “Shangil Tobaya has been one of the most ravaged areas of North Darfur over the past several years (see monograph at https://wp.me/p45rOG-2qm ). It is clear that #Hemeti, the #RSF, and the #TMC have no desire or will to rein in ethnically-targeted murder, rape, and destruction: https://twitter.com/samir_r_osman/status/1160509039996014598 
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1160534886501031936

 SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 8 - Tue 13 Aug 2019 11:39 GMT UK
Here is a copy of a tweet posted by Tariq Haleeb on his Twitter page @TariqHaleeb date stamped 3:10 am 12 Aug 2019:
1. Janjaweed were armed herders & still continue familial ties.
2. A simple armed shepard has enough ammunition for defence only.
3. To launch and sustain an attack needs a lot of ammunition which a simple shepard cannot buy.
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/TariqHaleeb/status/1160856157491257344

SUDAN WATCH UPDATE 9 - Fri 16 Aug 2019 14:02 GMT UK
Here is a copy of a 15 August 2019 tweet by Eric Reeves @sudanreeves
- with a great map (explanation here: http://sudanreeves.org/2019/06/28/unamid-withdrawal-and-international-abandonment-violence-in-darfur-2017-2019-a-statistical-analysis/) - showing violence in North Darfur, January 1, 2017 - March 2019 - saying, “The new TMC-appointed governor of North #Darfur lies just as shamelessly as his political predecessor. There has been no meaningful effort to bring marauding Arab militia forces or #Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces under control; their ethnically-targeted violence is unrelenting:”
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1162040001460350977 

Further Reading
Film: MEET THE JANJAWEED - Hemedti is positioning himself as paramilitary ruler of Darfur (Alex de Waal)
Sudan Watch - Tuesday, August 13, 2019

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TMC VP RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Hemeti Dagolo: One of most powerful and richest in Sudan


  • The money that Hemeti has acquired in recent years is all Sudanese national wealth: it has come to Hemeti primarily for his killing of civilians in Darfur, and more recently in Khartoum and El Obeid. And the killing will not end until Hemeti is brought under control and removed from any governance plans for the future of Sudan. 
  • One key off-shore “money storage unit” is the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and run by Hemeti’s brother Abdelrahman. 
  • Other “investors” include some of the richest members of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, largely responsible for the decades of torture and repression under the al-Bashir regime and continuing under the Transitional Military Council (TMC) junta.  Read full story here below.
Article written by Prof Eric Reeves
Dated 01 August 2019
“General” Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”): One of the Most Powerful Men in Sudan—and One of the Richest

As the international community dithers, obfuscates, and contents itself with “grief” and “outrage” at the violence and massacres for which Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces are conspicuously responsible, it must be pointed out that not only has Hemeti become the most powerful military figure in Sudan, but one of the richest. His vast wealth money comes from control of the Jebel Amir gold mines of North Darfur (which Hemeti took with inordinate amounts of bloodshed, particularly that of the Beni Hussein); his mercenary activities over the past six years in Darfur; the funds from the European Union’s disastrously conceived “Khartoum Process” to stanch the flow of African migration to Europe; and from the discretionary “political budget” that permits unrestricted and unrecorded diversion of national wealth to NISS, army, and RSF leaders—chiefly Hemeti.

Where has Hemeti’s wealth gone? How does he hide it? How does he ensure he will be wealthy whatever changes there are in Sudan?

One key off-shore “money storage unit” is the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and run by Hemeti’s brother Abdelrahman. Other “investors” include some of the richest members of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, largely responsible for the decades of torture and repression under the al-Bashir regime and continuing under the Transitional Military Council junta.

The significance of Hemeti’s holdings in the Al Junaid Industrial Group is twofold: it shows just how close Hemeti is to the UAE leadership is, preeminently Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed; and it makes clear that if the international community wishes to pressure Hemeti, it should impose immediate sanctions on Hemeti and all his off-shore holdings. If the UAE resists such efforts, they themselves should be subject to sanctions, especially banking and travel sanctions.

We should recall that despite the public relations campaign by the UAE—which has attempted to make Dubai and Abu Dhabi destination resorts of the most luxurious sort, with promise of exotic and unrestricted tourist opportunities—the Emirates are, with Saudi Arabia, responsible for the unfathomably brutal and destructive war in Yemen against Houthi rebels. The war has created what is regularly (and I believe rightly) described as the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world, if one rendered largely invisible by Saudi denials of access.

Hemeti and General al-Burhan (chief of the Transitional Military Council) have been willing warriors in Yemen’s bloodbath, including in some of the deadliest fighting along the Yemeni coastline, through which humanitarian access is required. The Saudis have richly rewarded Sudan—but particularly Hemeti and al-Burhan—and unsurprisingly Hemeti’s RSF forces are now deploying to “intervene” in Libya’s ghastly civil war, joining the forces of General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. Haftar’s forces are battling to unseat the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. His forces recently gained notoriety for the bombing attack on a migration detention center outside of Tripoli, a bombing that left “at least 44 dead and more than 130 severely injured, [the UN] describing the attack as ‘a war crime and odious bloody carnage [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/03/air-strike-kill-libya-tripoli-migrant-detention-centre ] .’”

Whose Money Is It?
The money that Hemeti has acquired in recent years is all Sudanese national wealth: it has come to Hemeti primarily for his killing of civilians in Darfur, and more recently in Khartoum and El Obeid. And the killing will not end until Hemeti is brought under control and removed from any governance plans for the future of Sudan.

Moreover, that Hemeti has chosen to take this Sudanese wealth abroad—to the very actor that has done most to enable the Transitional Military Council, the UAE—is particularly outrageous. Sudan itself is desperate for such investment of national wealth, and such large diversion of that wealth by Hemeti, his brother, and NISS officials should make clear to all that they have no interest in Sudan and its collapsing economy, but only in their self-enrichment.

The international community, as well as the activist community, should target Al Junaid Industrial Group—and the UAE—in all ways possible ways. Products should be boycotted, bank transactions blocked, travel to the UAE should be limited in all possible ways.

I provide here the publicly available contact information for Al Junaid Industrial Group:
Al Junaid Industrial Group
Office #9, Industrial Area# 13, Sharjah, UAE
Landmark: Behind Tasheel
P.O. Box 61401, Sharjah
Tel: +971 6 5440233
Fax: +971 6 5440302


ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eric Reeves has been writing about greater Sudan for the past twenty years. His work is here organized chronologically, and includes all electronic and other publications since the signing of the historic Machakos Protocol (July 2002), which guaranteed South Sudan the right to a self- determination referendum. There are links to a number of Reeves’ formal publications in newspapers, news magazines, academic journals, and human rights publications, as well as to the texts of his Congressional testimony and a complete list of publications, testimony, and academic presentations. LEARN MORE
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Saturday, August 10, 2019

BBC has evidence suggesting attack on protesters in Khartoum Sudan June 3 was ordered from the top

THE BBC has uncovered evidence that suggests the attack on protesters in Sudan on 03 June 2019 was ordered from the top and planned in advance.  The internet is now back on in the country so even more footage has emerged online.  BBC Africa Eye has analysed over 300 mobile phone videos shot in Khartoum that morning, piecing them together into a detailed account of a massacre in which dozens of people were killed. 

 Here is the schedule for a 30-minute BBC film broadcast from the UK starting today:
Sat 10 Aug 2019  18:30 Local time 
Sat 10 Aug 2019  23:30 Local time 
Sun 11 Aug 2019 05:30 Local time 
Sun 11 Aug 2019 11:30 Local time 
Thu 15 Aug 2019 10:30 Local time 

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Evidence points to TMC's Hemeti and RSF responsible for June 3 attack on protestors in Khartoum Sudan

ALL evidence points to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) being responsible for the 03 June attack on protestors in Khartoum, Sudan and the deputy chair of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and de facto ruler of Sudan, General Mohamed 'Hemeti' Dagalo giving the order for the attack. Here is a copy of another important tweet by Sudan expert Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated Wednesday 07 August 2019:

Absent an independent, int’l investigation of the "June 3 Massacre," we are left with the fact that all evidence points to #RSF responsibility, with #Hemeti giving the order for the assault. Despite his conspicuous responsibility, Hemeti continues to lie shamelessly, viciously:
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1159143025957888000
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ICC could investigate killing of protestors in Sudan

WHEN will the United Nations (UN) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) begin investigating the killings in Sudan of innocent protesters by the military junta and determine who gave the orders for the attacks?  Here is a copy of a tweet by longtime Sudan researcher Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated Tuesday 06 August 2019:
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1158725231369957377
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Rome Statute of the ICC Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity: Ongoing murder of civilians in Sudan by the TMC junta meets definitional threshold

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Sudan expert Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated 01 August 2019: Our best definition of “crimes against humanity” comes from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (#ICC). Though the most difficult class of atrocity crimes to define, ongoing murder of civilians in Sudan by the #TMC junta clearly meets the definitional threshold.
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1157028222015627264
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Ongoing atrocity crimes in Darfur Sudan committed by SAF and RSF forces under control of TMC junta

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Sudan researcher of 20 years Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated 29 July 2019: Ongoing atrocity crimes in #Darfur—committed by regular SAF and #RSF militia forces nominally under the control of the #TMC junta—cannot be ignored in assessing the TMC’s commitment to addressing the most pressing of issues in Sudan: war against civilians in marginalized regions.
To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1155968898748911617
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Incoming Sudan govt will inherit $8.7-9.2bn trade deficit & business environment beset by corruption

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is an interesting thread of tweets by Sudanese economist Yousif Elmahdi posted on his Twitter page 02 August 2019 @Usiful_ME. 

Note, in the final tweet Yousif reveals the source of his data is as follows: Macro data is from IMF;  agriculture productivity estimates come from a private sector study commissioned by government;  export data is from a mix of sources. 

Yellow highlighting is mine for future reference. I have used green to highlight Yousif's sense of humour.

The incoming #Sudan government will be inheriting an economy highlighted (as of 2018) by:
— $8.7-9.2bn trade deficit 
— Fuel subsidy of 8% GDP (over $3bn)
— Wheat subsidy of around $500m, on top of $800m import bill 
— 60% power coverage deficit (4,000 megawatts)
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Alongside this:
  • — International reserves were as low as $1bn gross by end-2018. 
  • — In reality, there are no reserves because the budget deficit meant Central Bank was financing a parallel budget. On-budget expenditure was covering roughly:
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    - All of Chapter 1 (wages and salaries), of which 20-25% security sector wages.
  • - 30% of Chapter 2 (capital expenditure)
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    — Tax to GDP ratio was 6%. For reference, sub-Saharan Africa average is around 18%.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    — Oil production declined from 160,000 to 70,000 barrels, all of it consumed locally (w/ deficit imported) covering around: 
  • - 30-40% diesel needs. For reference, total diesel consumption composition is est: 50% transport sector; 10% industry; 10% agriculture; 5% general)
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    - 40-50% gasoline needs. For reference some of locally produced gasoline is exported to Ethiopia in exchange for 100-200 megawatts power. 
  • - 70-80% LPG needs.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    — Gold production estimated at 100 tonnes ($4bn), but only 20/30 tonnes ($1.5bn) accounted. 80% artisan produced.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    — Agriculture sector v. low productivity and high cost of 45 million cultivated acres: 44m rain-fed; 1m irrigated (against 5m capacity). 
  • Some examples: 
  • - 8 million acres sesame: 100kg/acre ($300m exports). For comparison, Turkey produces around 1,700kg/acre.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Another example:
  • - 2 million acres sorghum: 3 sacks/acre ($20-60m exports).
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    — Business environment beset by corruption, especially around natural resources.
  • - State-owned enterprises completely off-budget, no forensic audit etc.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    To fill gap: 
  • — Govt. monetized (printed money), especially as couldn’t sell debt due to lack of credit worthiness of Govt. bonds. 
  • -> Inflation 73% by end-2018.
  • — KSA and UAE also provide $100m monthly in fuel, wheat, medicine, fertilizer etc.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    In the backdrop you have:
  • — Real exchange rate that’s hugely overvalued. This of course:
  • - renders the whole economy uncompetitive
  • - while different exchange rates create distortions (80% transactions in parallel market).
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Given this context, the new government’s priorities must necessarily include:
  • 1. Competitive exchange rate 
  • 2. Tax reform 
  • 3. Business climate reform (including banking sector) 
  • 4. Infrastructure (especially energy sector)
  • 5. Agriculture 
  • 6. Health and Education
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    The key priority, however, for new #Sudan Govt. will be to find the resources to finance all of this; to fill the budget deficit; and to cushion the poorest.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    On the latter, previous government social safety net program reached 500-600,000 families against 800,000 target. 
  • With poverty rate currently estimated around 36%, about 3 million families (today) need same level of support. 
  • Gap is around 1% GDP (based on $5/month support).
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Above all, any reform measures need to be grounded in citizen engagement, trust and awareness building, and transparency.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    A few additional points to this thread:  
  • — Any serious & sustainable reform package would have to include (as priority) removal of fuel & wheat subsidies, esp. fuel. 
  • - #Sudan fuel prices are amongst lowest in the world and the country simply can’t afford to maintain these
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Difficulty with fuel is that once the subsidy is removed, even if gradually or partially, prices will sky rocket across the entire economy. 
  • We would be dealing with the sorts of numbers (in the 000s) you hear in some other countries across the continent.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Exchange rate competitiveness would also entail initial inflationary pressures, but ultimately helps private sector development by improving competitiveness.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Ramifications in the short to medium term would be severest on those whose incomes are not inflation adjusted (public sector especially), and on the poorest. 
  • In theory, some of the savings could be directed towards expanding social safety nets and adjusting public sector wages
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Ultimately the public sector is severely bloated due largely to excessive administrative structure. 
  • This would need to be reformed at some point but I won’t get into this rabbit hole right now.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Basically, the medicine will be very bitter, for very long before it’s positive effects can start to be felt. 
  • Postponing it only exacerbates magnitude of problems to be addressed. This is what previous regime did, ironically because of regime sustainability considerations.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Previous regime structured economy in this way also for regime sustainability considerations (and perverse incentives) and could afford it while it had substantial oil revenues.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    What works in incoming transitional government’s favor is that it won’t be encumbered by election mandate or future election campaign. 
  • In terms of resourcing it would potentially have many friends.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    So in theory provides an ideal platform to initiate difficult and politically divisive reforms. 
  • However, this assumes the coalition remains stable, Cabinet is well constituted, and public trust can be quickly gained and sustained.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    On wheat imports (approx. $800m), I’ve heard that the major mills believe actual import needs are around $500m i.e. substantial amount of smuggling when you add on the subsidy (approx. $500m).
  • It’s believed Khartoum consumes 65% of actual wheat needs.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Staying on agriculture, livestock is a significant export source, generating around $800m from 5 million heads. 
  • But when you consider total livestock population, this is paltry, and largely due to lack of transport infrastructure.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    Value could also be significantly increased by exporting as meat (instead of live) but at present the infrastructure and value chains don’t exist.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    I sincerely hope those that assume power will recognize this and will be bold, empowered and supported to initiate reversal. We will need a significant leap in transparency and citizen engagement.
  • Yousif Elmahdi
    @Fahad55121907      @Omer58606983  Macro data is from IMF. Agriculture productivity estimates come from a private sector study commissioned by government. Export data is from a mix of sources.

  • To visit and view the above series of tweets at Yousif's Twitter page click here:  https://twitter.com/Usiful_ME/status/1157545777243316227
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Friday, August 09, 2019

State-run co along with JV partners China, Malaysia upset as oil dues from Sudan rise to $500 million

SUDAN had denied ONGC and partners an extension of license to operate block 2B after the initial contract expired in November 2016. State-run company along with JV partners China, Malaysia are upset as oil dues from Sudan rise to $500 million. Full story below.

Article by Economic Times.india
By Sanjeev Choudhary, ET Bureau, 02 Aug 2019 09:32

ONGC, its partners likely to exit oil blocks in Sudan

NEW DELHI: ONGC and its Chinese and Malaysian partners have decided to exit their oil blocks in Sudan, frustrated by the years of reluctance by the Sudanese government to pay for the oil it lifts from these blocks.

ONGC has been engaged in an arbitration with Sudan for more than a year to recover its oil dues that have now climbed to $500 million. 

ONGC owns 25% stake in a joint venture that operates blocks 2A and 4 in Sudan whose output the local government had been lifting but not paying for since 2011. The balance stakes in the two blocks are split between China’s CNPC (40%), Malaysia’s Petronas (30%) and Sudan’s Sudapet (5%). 

“The company has reviewed the geopolitical situation in Sudan and has considered the option for exit from the operations in Block 2A, 4 in terms of article 14.1 of the JOA. The intention in this regard has been conveyed to the government of Sudan on 10 May 2019,” ONGC Videsh, the overseas arm of the state-run explorer, said in its financial statement. “Consequently, the company has provided Rs 5,979.71 million against the associated oil and gas and other assets in its consolidated financial statement.”

The amount being provided for is the carrying value of the oil assets in blocks 2A and 4 of Sudan, said a person familiar with the matter, adding that the project has already paid back the investment. 

ONGC Videsh declined comment for the story. 

The joint venture partners have requested Sudan to terminate the production license by August 31 and are awaiting a formal order from the government, the person quoted above said. 

Meanwhile, arbitration tribunal at the International Court of Justice has been formed to deal with the ONGC’s request for recovery of oil dues from Sudan. At the request of Sudan, the tribunal had suspended arbitration proceedings by three months until August 2, the person said. 

In 2003, ONGC Videsh had acquired 25% stake in the joint venture, Greater Nile Oil Project, which comprised blocks 1, 2 and 4, located about 800 km from Sudan’s capital Khartoum. After South Sudan was carved out of Sudan in 2011 following years of civil strife, all the blocks were split between the two countries. 

Sudan had denied ONGC and partners an extension of license to operate block 2B after the initial contract expired in November 2016.

Operations at blocks in South Sudan resumed this year after being shut for five years due to security issues. 

- - -

USAID 2001 Sudan Oil & Gas Concessions Map

To view a larger version of the following 2001 Sudan map from Wikipedia click here.  
Click, once or twice, on the image at Wikipedia to see full screen size.
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