South Sudan has been officially admitted to NAM

South Sudan has been officially admitted to the global Non-Aligned Movement, according to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. #SouthSudan #SSOT https://t.co/jfmsf8bzvp

— Eye Radio (@EyeRadioJuba) July 6, 2023

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Sudan: It's time for civilians to claim control of govt

"Strong statements from, among others, African heads of state and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have stressed that the future of Sudan lies with civilian leadership. But there’s no practical plan to make this happen. 

It falls to Sudan’s civilians to set the agenda. The civilian parties have the legitimacy to claim what is theirs — the government — and demand recognition, funds, and the authority to convene. 

It’s bold, better than the worn-out options on the international table, and could change the political landscape. The U.S. should change its nickel-and-dime policies towards Sudan and put its weight behind civilian institutions of state, independent of the warring parties.

If the Sudanese state is to be saved, Sudanese cannot count on the lethargic junior diplomats assigned to their case. Sudan’s civilian democrats need to seize the initiative themselves. The only card they have to play is their legitimacy. They need to play it now, before they get trapped in pointless talking shops.

The chance to be seized is speaking for the state. When al-Burhan’s delegation signed the Jeddah ceasefire, they did so as SAF—i.e. as a warring party co-equal with the RSF. They didn’t sign as the Government of Sudan. This means no one is representing the state.

The civilians could declare an interim government right away. That’s more than a symbolic act. They could take charge of the financial institutions of the state and bring material leverage to the table." Read more.

Analysis at ResponsibleStatecraft,org
Written by Alex de Waal
Dated Tuesday 06 June 2023 - full copy:

Sudan is bleeding to death and current triage is useless

Stop with the stale remedies. It’s time for civilians to claim control of the government, and for foreign powers to back them up.

Sudan is bleeding to death and its state failure is approaching the point of no return. The question is bigger than a civil war, more than a humanitarian calamity — it’s whether there can be any life in the Sudanese state for the coming decades.

Yet diplomats at the U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia, the African Union and the United Nations still treat Sudan as a containable conflict susceptible to a package of off-the-shelf inducements and castigations. They are producing yesterday’s treatments for yesterday’s ailments — which didn’t succeed then and have zero chance today.

The formulae of ceasefires and humanitarian aid simply don’t do justice to the reality of state collapse in a country of 45 million people.

Strong statements from, among others, African heads of state and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have stressed that the future of Sudan lies with civilian leadership. But there’s no practical plan to make this happen.

It falls to Sudan’s civilians to set the agenda. The civilian parties have the legitimacy to claim what is theirs — the government — and demand recognition, funds, and the authority to convene. It’s bold, better than the worn-out options on the international table, and could change the political landscape. The U.S. should change its nickel-and-dime policies towards Sudan and put its weight behind civilian institutions of state, independent of the warring parties.

Sudan’s most recent war erupted on April 15, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against his erstwhile deputy and head of the Rapid Support Forces, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti. Seven weeks of intense combat in the national capital Khartoum have seen hundreds dead, massive damage to the infrastructure of the city, the emptying of that city of most of its middle class, and an escalating humanitarian crisis. The 100,000 who have fled abroad — thus far mostly to Egypt, to South Sudan and Chad — are but a small harbinger of what is to come as the national economy collapses. In the crisis before the crisis, there were already 13 million people — almost one third of the population — in need of food assistance to meet basic needs. That number is climbing by almost one million every week.

Ten days of intense U.S.-Saudi pressure on the two warring parties produced little. In talks in the Saudi city of Jeddah, the SAF and RSF signed a seven-day ceasefire that began on May 22, and which was renewed for a further five days. The stated rationale was to enable humanitarian aid to get in. The truce was partly respected — mostly because the two sides couldn’t sustain high-intensity combat. Last week, the mediators publicly castigated the warring parties for their failures and made it clear that their effort had run its course. At the time of writing, the war is set to escalate. The SAF appears set on a big offensive to drive the RSF out of its strongholds in Khartoum, while the RSF is mobilizing to attack other cities.

The U.S. announced targeted sanctions on four business conglomerates linked to the belligerents, two on each side. This included the main Hemedti family business, al-Gunaid Multi-Activities Company, and the sprawling Defense Industry System, run by the SAF. The sanctions could either be read as a sign that Washington is finally getting tough, or as a gesture of despair. Either way, sanctions will have an impact only with the cooperation of the generals’ foreign business partners, especially the United Arab Emirates, which buys most of Hemedti’s gold. Sudan’s generals have decades of experience in sanctions-busting. Both sides have links to Russia, which isn’t in favor of the war, but is viscerally opposed to American sanctions.

Sanctions are a tool, not a solution. Until the mediators have fastened onto a strategy, they are only a means of punishing people we don’t like.

The mediators in Jeddah faced three main problems. Most important, Hemedti and al-Burhan each hoped to land a knockout military blow on the other and didn’t want to forgo that chance. Second, the SAF side is a fractious coalition of army and paramilitary units and Islamists, united in opposition to Hemedti’s RSF, but not much more. The SAF delegates to the Jeddah meetings didn’t have the authority to make concessions on a ceasefire, and still less over any political issues.

Most important is that the battlefield is only the tactical arena. The strategic contest is financial — which side will have the resources to expand and consolidate their fighting coalition and to obtain the war material they need. The Sudanese call it “political finance.” Any mediation strategy that doesn’t revolve around political finance is a waste of time.

If Jeddah was the triage station before the emergency room, the duty doctors didn’t diagnose the patient before setting to work.

Much store was put in a meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on May 27, in large part because the 15 members met at heads-of-state level. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was in the chair. He and several others, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, called for the setting up of a panel of high-level facilitators — implying current or former heads of state — to deal with the crisis. This would have allowed the AU to seize the initiative, in part because others would have deferred to the seniority of the panel members.

The AU has no material leverage over the warring parties. What it has is the legitimacy that derives from its principles and the fact that all the major powers — including China and Russia — will defer to an African consensus position, if articulated by a credible African leader. It knows exactly how to do this.* [*Sudan Watch Ed: full copy below incase hyperlink breaks].

There were positive elements in the AU PSC communiqué; for example, its stress on the need for a humanitarian response that maintains and restores basic services such as electricity and telecommunications.

But the key decision at the summit was to maintain the status quo. The same actors will focus on the same agenda as before. The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, kept his own chef de cabinet, Mohamed el-Hacan Lebatt, as special envoy to Sudan — a post he will supposedly fill alongside his other assignments, which already include the Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya. Opinions are divided over Lebatt’s record since he was given the Sudan file four years ago. He insists that he is personally responsible for the August 2019 Constitutional Declaration and every other triumph. With remarkable unanimity, Sudanese actors condemn him as vain, biased, and inept. Democratic activists say he hijacked their revolution to side with the military.

Meanwhile, UN Secretary General António Guterres is sticking with his Special Representative, Volker Perthes — in part because SAF said they wanted him out, and Guterres didn’t want to be seen to be caving to pressure. And, reportedly, Faki didn’t want Guterres to appoint a new envoy — such as a former foreign minister — who would outrank his own staffer.

Sudanese blame Lebatt and Perthes for the failures that led to the crisis. Whether this assessment is fair or not is beside the point. A basic precept of conflict resolution is that the mediator shouldn’t be a problem, and the AU and UN are violating that.

In short, the AU-UN diagnosis of Sudan’s affliction hasn’t changed. The AU’s “roadmap” is a carousel of consultations with Sudanese parties and neighboring countries. It has working groups on security (headed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), humanitarian issues (headed by the UN), and the political process (under the AU). In short: nothing new, nothing commensurate with the stakes.

If the Sudanese state is to be saved, Sudanese cannot count on the lethargic junior diplomats assigned to their case. Sudan’s civilian democrats need to seize the initiative themselves. The only card they have to play is their legitimacy. They need to play it now, before they get trapped in pointless talking shops.

The chance to be seized is speaking for the state. When al-Burhan’s delegation signed the Jeddah ceasefire, they did so as SAF—i.e. as a warring party co-equal with the RSF. They didn’t sign as the Government of Sudan. This means no one is representing the state.

The civilians could declare an interim government right away. That’s more than a symbolic act. They could take charge of the financial institutions of the state and bring material leverage to the table.

Similar things have happened elsewhere. In Libya, for example, the central bank remained independent of the warring militias, receiving dollars from the sale of oil and paying salaries across the country. Sudan’s independent banking institutions would need technical, diplomatic and financial support from the U.S. and other donors. This would be a test of Washington’s seriousness in halting state collapse and supporting democracy.

Sudan needs bold thinking commensurate with the scale of its crisis. The ideas are there. What’s lacking is leadership to make those ideas real.

IMAGE Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan stands among troops,in an unknown location, in this picture released on May 30, 2023. Sudanese Armed Forces/Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT

View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/06/06/without-bold-new-diplomatic-approaches-sudans-state-will-collapse/

- - -

*It knows exactly how to do this 

ANALYSIS at ResponsibleStatecraft.org

Written by Alex de Waal

Published 20 April 2023 - here is a full copy incase in future the link breaks:

Sudan is tearing itself apart and Washington lost its capacity to help

The truth is that no one was doing the basics of multilateral diplomacy to prevent the bloody power struggle we’re witnessing today.

Sudan is tearing itself apart, and Washington is watching, seemingly unable to do anything to stop the carnage. America’s diplomats lament that the U.S. has lost leverage. The truth is that no one is doing the basics of multilateral diplomacy — coordinating disparate actors.

Two Sudanese warlords are intent on destroying one another, and in the process are destroying the nation’s capital Khartoum. A city of more than seven million people is wracked by street fighting. Two rival armed forces — the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), a passable imitation of a professional army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary of comparable size and combat capacity — are battling for control.

It’s a simple power struggle between two generals. Abdel Fattah al Burhan is the chairman of the Sovereignty Council and de facto president. He commands the SAF and has the support of most of what Sudanese call the “deep state” — the network of crony capitalist companies entangled with the army, intelligence, and Islamist networks. Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Hamdan Dagolo is the leader of the RSF and sits atop a transnational conglomerate that includes gold mining and export, supply of mercenaries to neighboring countries, and other business interests, including a partnership with Russia’s Wagner Group.

The two men collaborated in the 2019 overthrow of long-standing military kleptocrat President Omar al-Bashir when a non-violent popular uprising led by an alliance called the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) made his rule untenable. The soldiers cooperated to thwart the democratic movement. But each wanted to rule Sudan. 

The fighting in Khartoum came as no surprise to close observers. 

A complicated international mediation process had adopted a “Framework Agreement” and was winding its way towards finalizing a document that would bring a civilian prime minister and resolving the question of security sector reform. The crux of this was whether Hemedti would agree for the RSF to be integrated under SAF command in two years, or whether he could retain them as a separate force for ten years—long enough for him to make a bid for power at some future date.

Any mediator knows that the most dangerous moment in a peace process is the last moment, and the most explosive issues are the security issues.

The Sudanese mediation involved no fewer than seven diplomatic actors. The “tripartite” of the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an eight-country regional grouping, convened the talks involving the FFC and the military. The “tripartite” was supported by the “quad”, consisting of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

With all those diplomatic eyes on the ball, why wasn’t the conflict stopped before it erupted to such devastating effect?

The answer is, it was a low-level diplomatic traffic jam. All the actors were going in different directions. No one wanted what has now transpired — but no one was coordinating the signaling to prevent it from happening. 

Sudan is no stranger to wars, and diplomats have experience in preventing them. It’s salutary to compare other instances when diplomats averted all-out war.

In April 2011, just two months before South Sudan’s scheduled independence day, fighting erupted in Abyei, a disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan. Each side blamed the other for firing the first shots, and the Sudan Armed Forces launched a military operation that drove out the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the army of the south) and burned and looted Abyei town. The South’s independence was in peril.

Aware of the perils of the separation process, the African Union had set up a High Level Panel of three former presidents — Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdulsalami Abubaker of Nigeria, and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi. In turn, the United Nations and western governments deployed experienced diplomats with a sharp political sense.

When Abyei exploded, a joint delegation of AU Panel, UN representative (Haile Menkerios) and the U.S. Special Envoy (Princeton Lyman) intervened with both sides, insisting on de-escalation. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi called an emergency summit and, when the negotiations stalled on the question of security, he offered to dispatch a brigade of peacekeepers, provided it was mandated by the UN Security Council. 

The Sudanese Government had confidence in Ethiopia’s neutrality and in the effectiveness of its peacekeepers but distrusted the western countries. The U.S. secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, personally assured the Sudanese assistant president, Nafie Ali Nafie, that — contrary to normal procedure for UN peacekeepers — the mandate and specifics of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei would be exactly as agreed in the agreement in Addis Ababa. The peacekeepers were dispatched. War was avoided.

A year later, fighting erupted on the border between the Sudan and newly independent South Sudan at a nearby place called Heglig. Again, all-out war threatened. Guided by the AU Panel under its Chairperson Thabo Mbeki, the African Union immediately convened its Peace and Security Council and issued a communiqué, setting out a roadmap for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts — and all the underlying disputes that had led to the crisis. 

While the PSC’s communiqués don’t have the same legal standing as UN Security Council resolutions, a united African position, coordinated with the UN and the U.S., and outreach to Russia, China and the Arab League, created the formula for the UN to act. At a time when the Security Council was paralyzed by U.S.-Russian sparring over Syria, it unanimously adopted resolution 2046, copied almost word-for-word from the PSC’s communiqué. 

Mbeki’s panel, working with the UN and the U.S., then facilitated the negotiations that led to the two countries signing a raft of cooperation agreements.

It wasn’t a question of trust or leverage. Al-Bashir was paranoid, and no U.S. official could even speak with him after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him. The key was diplomatic tradecraft.

As well as frequent meetings and phone calls, Mbeki wrote often to the Sudanese leaders, precisely framing the issues, principles and proposed steps. Formal correspondence is often underrated. But it can challenge often-impulsive military men to respond with equal thoughtfulness—helping to restrain their worst impulses.

That kind of coordination now seems like a dream. The current AU Chairperson, Moussa Faki, has undermined his own institutions. On the Ethiopia war, for example, he and his High Representative, General Olusegun Obasanjo, kept the mediation as their own personal initiative, cutting out the PSC and thwarting any discussion at the UN Security Council. 

The UN’s representative in Khartoum, Volker Perthes, is a technocrat without the political savvy of his predecessor. A decade ago, U.S. Special Envoy Lyman was in regular — sometimes daily — contact with Secretary Clinton and then-Senator John Kerry (at the time, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Sudan at key moments) and could get them to intervene at crucial moments. The Biden Administration has deployed no one of remotely comparable stature to the region for more than a year.

The Trump Administration delegated its policy to the Horn of Africa to its main Middle Eastern allies — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. After the peaceful uprising in Sudan in April 2019, it worked with the Saudis and Emiratis to help secure the deal between the FFC and the generals that led to a civilian-led government. 

But the idea that the Saudis and Emiratis wanted democracy in Sudan was wishful thinking. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi wanted a junior version of himself in power in Khartoum, and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu got what he wanted from General al-Burhan — recognition of Israel, in return for which the U.S. finally lifted Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terror.

For the Biden Administration, Sudan was never such a sufficient priority that it would push its Middle Eastern allies to support democracy in that country. Eighteen months ago, al-Burhan and Hemedti launched a joint coup, sweeping the civilian leaders into prison. The two generals were confident that their backers in the region would overrule any strong U.S. reaction. They were right. After a brief period of diplomatic activism, U.S. policy reverted to a low-wattage policy of “stability,” and that meant dealing with the de facto strongmen. Washington supported the “tripartite” mediation to restore the democratic transition, but it was little more than a box-ticking exercise.

Each of the outside power brokers has its own preferences. Egypt backs al-Burhan. The UAE leans towards Hemedti. But none of them want a war that will cause millions of refugees, destroy their investments and cause mayhem in their backyard. Russia has ties to the RSF but it has a bigger stake in keeping Egypt onside. Ten years ago, China and the U.S. agreed that they had complementary interests in Sudan, and that reality should not have changed.

There’s no doubt that the U.S. has lost a lot of leverage over the last decade. What’s tragic is that it seems to have rationed its diplomacy as well, and left Africa adrift.

Alex de Waal served as an advisor to the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan, 2009-2013.

View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/04/20/sudan-is-tearing-itself-apart-and-washington-lost-its-capacity-to-help/

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Sudan: Salesian Sisters care for wounded & displaced

THE Salesian Sisters of Don Bosco in Sudan run a primary school with 840 children. However, because of the conflict, there have been no classes since April 15. For now, the sisters run a small dispensary that functions as a first aid room for the children and others injured by the fighting.

The sisters say they "have nothing special to help the wounded with" and are forced to use an over-the-counter antiseptic and disinfectant to clean wounds. They occasionally administer antibiotics. 

Most clinics and hospitals have been forced to close, and humanitarian assistance such as medications and food are often looted while access to affected areas has at times been restricted, according to MSF. Read more.

Report at National Catholic Reporter Online - ncronline.org
By Tawanda Karombo in Harare, Zimbabwe
View Author Profile
Published Thursday 29 June 2023 - here is a full copy:

Remaining Salesian Sisters brave Sudan war to care for wounded and displaced

People board a truck as they leave Khartoum, Sudan, on June 19. Clashes resumed between Sudan's military and a powerful paramilitary force after a three-day cease-fire expired June 21. (AP, file)

Sr. Teresa Roszkowska remembers May 24 — the worst day in her 44 years as a Salesian Sister of Don Bosco living in Sudan — with a sense of trepidation, fear and insecurity. 

On this day, Roszkowska and three others of her order were saying the rosary inside the dining room at their house 20 kilometers outside the capital city of Khartoum when "heavy and horrible shootings" broke out. It was not for the first time, nor would it be the last.

Despite ceasefire agreements between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the two warring parties at the center of the civil conflict have been plaguing Sudan since April 15. 

Sudan fell into the hands of military control in 2021 after Omar Ahmad al-Bashir was thrown out of power in a coup in 2019. 

The military-controlled government has now fractured, leading to the outbreak of war as they fight for control of power.

The SAF and RSF have been dueling, with intense fighting on the streets of Darfur and Khartoum, affecting ordinary citizens, destroying infrastructure and halting school and church activities, as well as shutting down about 11 hospitals. The war has plunged the country into a crisis, leaving 600 people dead and 1 million others displaced from their homes, many of them fleeing into neighboring countries.

'There are days when we are full of abnormally fearful silence and all we do is just pray, and hope that God will touch those hearts of stone.'

—Salesian Sr. Teresa Roszkowska

Roszkowska, who is from Poland and arrived in Sudan on Jan. 24, 1989, has been witnessing the impact of the war on ordinary Sudanese people firsthand. She has had to stand steadfast amid the gloom of war at a time when other religious have been forced to flee.

On May 24, "we could not hear each other because of the noise from the shootings," she said. She added that, "in fear, some lay on the floor, feeling like it was the end" of the world. 

"We decided to run to the chapel for safety but that is the moment that the scared and wounded people from the shootings started to arrive at our house. As I ran towards the gate to open it, I really felt like it was the end of the world because of the sight of scared people running towards the house," Roszkowska told Global Sisters Report in an interview.

Her fear comes not out of her own vulnerability but out of care and worry for the situation that the war-ravaged citizens and children of Sudan have found themselves in, she said. 

There has been no real abatement to the crisis as the war rages on, disrupting telecom services and electricity supplies for lengthy periods. In fact, says Roszkowska, in mid-June the situation was "still worse" as several gunmen exchanged fire and shot wantonly into places where civilians were.

"The house was full of people as they were exchanging shooting and many more poor people, some with their children, were arriving wounded. Actually, one of the soldiers was the one bringing many of them from the shacks around our area. 

"There has been no day without these kinds of shootings and we are actually starting to get used to the sounds."

The Salesian Sisters of Don Bosco in Sudan say they "have nothing special to help the wounded with" and are forced to use an over-the-counter antiseptic and disinfectant to clean wounds. They occasionally administer antibiotics.

Most clinics and hospitals have been forced to close, and humanitarian assistance such as medications and food are often looted while access to affected areas has at times been restricted, according to Médecins Sans Frontières.

"After the looting of one of our medical warehouses in Khartoum, fridges were unplugged and medicines removed. The entire cold chain was ruined so the medicines are spoiled and can't be used to treat anyone," said Jean-Nicolas Armstrong Dangelser, emergency coordinator for Médecins Sans Frontières in Sudan. 

Religious flee Sudan war

Over the years, a strong community of international Catholic sisters and other religious has been active in Sudan. According to Roszkowska, there have been many Catholic sisters from as far as India, El Salvador, Vietnam, South Sudan and Poland.

However, after the latest war erupted in April, only four Salesian Sisters of Don Bosco remain in Sudan. Global Sisters Report recently reported on Sr. Angelina Ebrahim Trilly Koko of the Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd saying that her congregation had already shut down several schools and hospitals serving thousands of residents and stopped pastoral work. 

On April 30, Archbishop Michael Didi Adgum Mangoria of Khartoum confirmed that "many people, including priests and nuns, have fled the most contested areas" of Sudan since April 15.

A man walks by a house hit in fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum, Sudan, on April 25. (AP/Marwan Ali)

Amid this situation, Roszkowska and the other three remaining Salesian Don Bosco Sisters continue to assist those affected by the war in Sudan. Roszkowska says the sisters are "living and working among poor people living round our house in shacks and tents," after being displaced from their homes.

The Don Bosco Sisters run a primary school with 840 children. However, because of the war, there have been no classes since April 15. For now, the sisters run a small dispensary that functions as a first aid room for the children and others injured by the war.

Before the war, the sisters assisted women in learning to be self-reliant through courses such as pasta and bread-making, as well as baking biscuits and dressmaking. But the courses cannot be conducted now because the beneficiaries are constantly on the move, fleeing the war.

"True and deep love for the people to whom I am sent is keeping me going and I feel this strength is from God as a religious mission," Roszkowska said. "By being with the people of Sudan, all their troubles and suffering are mine too; when they cry, I cry with them."

At present, the Don Bosco Salesian Sisters of Sudan are providing shelter and food to some of those affected by the war, Christians and Muslims, and helping to save them from "bullets and senseless" fighting.

Smoke rises over Khartoum, Sudan, June 7, as fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces continues. (AP)

"Daily about 100-140 children and mothers, sick, old, wounded are staying with us and they also get food here too," Roszkowska said. "Other pastoral programs are not possible at all. Every evening, we say the rosary with all the children and mothers in our house."

What is further compounding the situation for the Don Bosco Sisters of Sudan is that "there are not any agencies working or collaborating" with them. Being aged above 60 "and not in good health," the four Salesian Sisters have however resumed Mass which they have not had for more than a month.

'Hope for the better'

Very often, especially when the shootings are nearby, it is easy to feel hopeless, explained Roszkowska. However, greater hope for a better and peaceful Sudan gives the sisters the divine urge and unexplainable power to soldier on with the work of assisting the people.

"Yes, very often we feel hopeless, and more so at this current time we are in now," she said. "We just live as best as we can, knowing that we only have today to live as tomorrow may not be ours. But deep down, we have this overwhelming hope for the better."

In this sudden and horrible situation, there is nothing special to be happy about, Roszkowska said.

After the sisters' courage and decision at the beginning of the war to "open our home for whoever needs shelter and food," the house started to fill up with "children and poor people day and night." Seeing these people have access to food and shelter, their hearts were filled with "immense, unspoken deep joy" until now. 

Yet amid the turmoil, senseless destruction of property and shootings, displacement of innocent civilians and killings, the Salesian Sisters' optimism is tinged with a sense of uncertainty for the future. 

Their only faith that the situation will turn around for the better is in God's ability to turn the hearts of steel and bullets of those at the center of the conflict into hearts of peace.

"We can't imagine what 'they' are planning to do next, or which ways they want to pursue to stop this senseless war," Roszkowska said. "There are days when we are full of abnormally fearful silence and all we do is just pray, and hope that God will touch those hearts of stone, change their minds and that the situation will be better."

This story appears in the Hope Amid Turmoil: Sisters in Conflict Areas feature series. View the full series.

View original: https://www.ncronline.org/news/remaining-salesian-sisters-brave-sudan-war-care-wounded-and-displaced

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Sudan: Towards intervention?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Although some parts of this article are inaccurate and misleading, particularly about ICC v Bashir (no time to correct it) it is documented here to lay the groundwork for understanding future posts regarding the birth of Sudan's civilian-led government.   

Article at Al-Ahram online

Written by Asmaa Al-Husseini 
Published Tuesday 04 July 2023 - here is a full copy:

Sudan: Towards intervention?

As Sudan’s warring parties refuse to compromise foreign intervention looms ever closer, writes Asmaa Al-Husseini

The Sudan war has been raging for three months with no realistic prospects for a peaceful resolution. Initiatives to halt the bloodshed have all failed and the warring sides - the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - continue to target civilians who are subjected to air strikes, looting, sabotage, and intimidation, circumstances that have created an opening for international and regional intervention.

 

In recent weeks, the international community has indicated it is unwilling to remain a passive spectator as the conflict in Sudan not only continues but expands. Several international and regional players have hinted that they may resort to more stringent measures to halt the fighting which has spread to Kordofan, Darfur, and other regions, and assumed a growing ethnic and tribal dimension.

 

There are growing fears the conflict may become a civil or regional war, and in recent weeks Darfur has witnessed horrific atrocities which some international officials classify as war crimes.

 

Sudanese officials have called for the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a commission to investigate these crimes. Mona Arko Minawi, the governor of Darfur, Darfur lawyers, and other groups have described events in the western region as genocide.

 

The atrocities, taking place away from media coverage amid the interruption of essential services and communication, evoke memories of the war in Darfur between 2003 and 2018 which resulted in the ICC indicting president Omar Al-Bashir and other regime leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. They resulted in Sudan being subject to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing UN and African forces to be deployed to the region.

 

The SAF and RSF have turned down several ceasefires proposed in Jeddah by the US and Saudi Arabia as well as initiatives put forward by the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

 

The SAF rejected AU mediation on the grounds that the organisation had suspended Sudan’s membership following what it deemed a coup when, on 25 October 2021, the army dissolved its partnership with civilian forces. The SAF has also declined IGAD mediation, claiming that Kenya, the leader of the initiative, has sided with the RSF, providing its members with shelter. The army has said statements by Kenyan President William Ruto and his foreign minister constitute interference in Sudan’s internal affairs and undermine its sovereignty and requested that South Sudan take the lead in the Quartet for mediation, replacing Kenya.

 

The IGAD initiative had proposed a direct meeting between SAF leader Abdel-Fattah Al-Borhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in an attempt to forge a lasting solution to the crisis. The initiative also recommended a dialogue between Sudan’s civil forces and the opening of humanitarian corridors.

 

Malik Agar, the new deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, has visited several regional countries as well as Moscow, seeking assistance and mediation. The move may be interpreted as an attempt to alleviate US, European, African, and Saudi pressures, though the step is unlikely to achieve the changes desired by the Sudanese army.

 

The army is perturbed that the RSF is being treated as an equal partner in the proposed initiatives. The SAF describes the RSF as a rebel force and as the vanguard of a foreign invasion, alluding to the RSF’s use of fighters from neighbouring African countries.

 

The SAF has welcomed Turkey’s involvement in mediation efforts. Media outlets aligned with the army have expressed optimism that Turkey will provide support, just as it did to the Libyan government in Tripoli.

 

During its latest session, the African Peace and Security Council endorsed the IGAD initiative. IGAD’s plan calls for the demilitarisation of Khartoum, an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the initiation of a comprehensive political process. While stressing that a political solution is the only exit from the current impasse, the 15-member-State Council warned that violators of international human rights laws in Sudan would be held accountable for their actions.

 

IGAD has proposed a 50 km buffer zone around Khartoum and the deployment of African forces to safeguard key institutions in the capital, with the police and security forces responsible for securing key public facilities. Agar dismissed the proposals as an occupation rather than a solution to the crisis. He emphasised his government’s opposition to any initiative that does not respect Sudanese sovereignty.

 

Following SAF and RSF responses to the Jeddah initiative, the US has indicated it will adopt stricter measures to stop the war in Sudan. The European Union is also speaking about imposing sanctions against parties involved in the conflict.

 

Some observers anticipate international intervention — involving a collaboration between Western powers, the African Union, and IGAD — under Chapter VII if the warring factions do not heed calls for peace. Others believe Russia and China may veto such intervention unless it is mediated by the African Union given that the Sudan war threatens regional security and international interests, including those of Moscow and Beijing.

 

Meanwhile, Sudan’s civil forces are busy holding meetings of their own to launch initiatives and form a unified civil front to end the war and restore the country to a democratic course.

 

Al-Baqir Al-Afif, a Sudanese writer and representative of the Civil Front to Stop the War and Restore Democracy, told Al-Ahram Weekly a unified front could help fill the void and prevent armed groups from determining Sudan’s future in the absence of a strong civil force. To this end, steps are being taken to convene a meeting that includes political parties, trade unions, professional federations, resistance committees, civil society organisations and public figures in Sudan with the goal of agreeing a declaration of principles.

 

“There are proposals to create a representative committee to join international initiatives aimed at ending the war and kickstarting the political track. Some have suggested the formation of a shadow government or a government in exile,” he said.

 

“Having a group representing the civilian voice in Sudan is crucial. It will help convey the Sudanese people’s point of view to the world and be part of these international initiatives, which must also be unified.”

 

The priority is to end the war and the bloodshed and brutal massacres in Khartoum and Darfur, added Al-Afif. Regional and international communities should collaborate to exert pressure to stop the conflict and establish mechanisms to effectively monitor the ceasefire. It is also essential to provide urgent relief to those affected by the war, including displaced persons, refugees and those stranded at crossings.

 

It is also essential to engage civilians in future peace negotiations to ensure a democratic transition led by civil forces, he said.

 

Major General Kamal Ismail, head of the Sudanese National Alliance and leader of the Forces for Freedom and Change, told the Weekly meetings to unify Sudan’s civil forces have already taken place in an attempt to restore stability and advance a democratic civil path.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 July, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

View original:  https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/504119.aspx

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Sudan: Only a united civilian coalition can bring peace

Article at World Politics Review - worldpoliticsreview.com
Written by Yasir Zaidan 
Published Thursday 22 June 2023 - here is a full copy:

Only a United Civilian Coalition Can Bring Peace to Sudan

People chant slogans during a protest in Khartoum, Sudan, Oct. 30, 2021 (AP photo by Marwan Ali).

The current conflict in Sudan between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group is a security and humanitarian crisis. But more importantly, it is a political crisis, one that grows out of the failure to build a sustainable democratic transition after the popular uprising that removed former dictator Omar al-Bashir from power in April 2019.

That failure can be traced through the various transitional deals that have been signed and then either ignored or violated since 2019. In that time, the civilian political actors in Sudan’s transition have been unable to overcome their deep divisions, giving free rein to the armed forces under Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemedti—to seize and now compete for control of the country. Tragically, the same thing is recurring now, meaning that when the guns are finally silenced, Sudan’s civilian political actors will be unable to play a meaningful role in steering the country to a sustainable peace.

Sudan’s first transitional agreement was a power-sharing constitutional declaration between the military and the Forces of Freedom and Change, or FFC, the civilian alliance that led the negotiations with the army after the removal of Bashir’s regime. The declaration laid the groundwork for the formation of a joint military-civilian government whose goal was to ultimately guide Sudan back to civilian rule by 2022. But it failed to achieve the uprisings’ demands because of political disputes between rival groups among the civilian participants.

The FFC represented a broad range of political parties that opposed the Bashir regime as well as rebel groups from Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kurdufan. That and its unity gave it a powerful position in leading the uprising that erupted in December 2018 and negotiating with the Transitional Military Council, TMC, once Bashir was deposed. However, differences started to emerge between the FFC’s civilian members and the rebel groups, who criticized the Khartoum-based FFC parties’ decision to begin talks with the TMC before the rebels were able to participate.

After signing a peace agreement with the transitional government in October 2020, representatives of the rebel movements were able to return to Khartoum, where they were incorporated into the transitional governing institutions as political actors. But the distrust that was created within the FFC only increased, due to serious concerns among the rebel groups over how the structures of the power-sharing government benefited the group of parties that negotiated the transitional agreement with the military.

As a result, the FFC split into two factions. The first, known as the FFC-Central Committee, or FFC-CC, compromises the Umma Party, the Unionist Assembly and the Sudanese Congress. The second faction, which included the rebel groups and the Unionist Party, called itself the FFC-Democratic Bloc, or FFC-DB. In addition, the Baathists and communists left the coalition entirely and created a new front called the Radical Alliance. The resulting political disputes combined with the country’s economic deterioration opened the door for the military takeover in October 2021.

Instead of finding a common position to propose a political roadmap out of the current crisis, Sudan’s civilian actors are busy repeating their previous mistakes.

These divisions were exploited and leveraged by Hemedti, who has proved to be a skillful political operator. Hemedti initially sought to inherit Bashir’s political machine, appointing many Bashir loyalists as advisers during the first months of the transition. He also sought the backing of Sudan’s tribal chiefs and traditional institutions by showering them with gifts and financial favors.

But after the military takeover in 2021, Hemedti also sought to mend fences with civilian actors by publicly apologizing for supporting the coup in the months that followed. He subsequently moved closer to the FFC-CC and eventually became an ally. In September 2022, he announced his support for the interim constitutional draft proposed by the FFC-CC to guide the country back to civilian rule, putting him at odds with the armed forces’ position of supporting only initiatives that included all political stakeholders in Sudan and not only the FFC-CC.

Meanwhile, the United Nations-led political process to facilitate talks between the FCC-CC, FCC-DB and the military initiated after the October 2021 military takeover further exacerbated the divisions among Sudan’s civilian factions. The U.N. Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, or UNITAMS, deliberately designed the talks to exclude other important civilian actors, such as the Resistance Committees—the neighborhood groups that have led Sudan’s pro-democracy movement since 2019—and traditional tribal chiefs, and sidelined the FFC-DB from the outline agreement signed in December 2022.

That agreement ultimately served as the catalyst for the current conflict, because it called for integrating the RSF into the Sudanese armed forces, which has been a critical national security fault line ever since the 2019 uprising. Created during the Bashir regime’s war in Darfur, the RSF subsequently maneuvered between several institutional umbrellas. After the war in Darfur subsided in intensity, Bashir used the RSF to protect against potential military coups by the armed forces. Hemedti used that privileged status to gain control of lucrative commercial interests, including gold mines, front companies and banks. After Bashir’s ouster, the RSF further expanded militarily and financially.

The disagreement over the timeline for integrating the RSF into the armed forces—the military proposed a two-year transition, while Hemedti argued the process should take at least 10 years—intensified pre-existing tensions between the two sides as the deadline for signing the finalized UNITAMS-brokered agreement approached. Soon after the deadline was postponed in April, both forces mobilized their troops in Khartoum, with the fighting beginning on April 15.

But if Hemedti sought to leverage the FFC-CC in his rivalry with al-Burhan in the run-up to the conflict, the FFC-CC had similarly aligned with the RSF in an effort to play the different armed services against each other. In September 2022, for instance, Yasir Arman, an FFC-CC leadership council member, said that “the RSF represents a force to build the national army,” giving the RSF equal institutional status as the armed forces. And since the outbreak of war, the FFC-CC has refused to denounce Hemedti’s move to seize power.

There is now an urgent need to stop the war, which has left at least 900 civilians killed and 1.3 million displaced and risks triggering a regional conflagration. So far, talks between the armed forces and RSF hosted by Saudi Arabia have struggled to achieve more than shaky cease-fires and intermittent humanitarian access. In the meantime, instead of finding a common position to propose a political roadmap out of the current crisis, Sudan’s civilian actors are busy repeating the same mistakes. Several Resistance Committees have announced their withdrawal from the FFC-CC-led Civilian Coalition to Stop the War due to the FFC-CC’s neutral stance in the war as well as its narrative equating the RSF with the armed forces.  

Above all, Sudan urgently needs a new broad national front to correct the errors—in particular, the narrow and divisive political process—that led to the war. To be effective, however, any new political alliance should stand with Sudan’s remaining state institutions and insist that ultimately Sudan’s civilians must decide the fate of their country, for only that will sustainably end the war.

Yasir Zaidan is a doctoral candidate at the Jackson School for International Studies at the University of Washington.

View original: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/conflict-sudan-crisis-civil-war-democracy-rapid-support-forces/

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