Monday, April 06, 2026

Middle East Crisis: UN Security Council Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Posted Monday 6 April 2026 - full copy:


Middle East Crisis: Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz


Tomorrow morning (7 April) at 11 am EST, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution which strongly encourages states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.


It demands that Iran immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels and any attempt to impede transit passage or freedom of navigation in the Strait and further calls for the cessation of attacks against civilian infrastructure, including water infrastructure and desalination plants, as well as oil and gas installations. The draft text was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan.


Background

Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transits occur. The escalation follows the US-Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)


Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. Although Iran had initially signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”.


The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities. US President Donald Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Several allied countries—including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the UK—have taken a cautious approach, with some explicitly indicating that they would not participate in enforcement actions to reopen the Strait or provide airspace for such operations.


Regardless of differing approaches, reopening the Strait appears to be a strategic priority for many US allies. France has indicated that it is working with partners to explore a possible international mission to facilitate this objective once the intensity of military operations subsides, while the UK hosted talks on 2 April among 40 countries aimed at forming a coalition for this purpose.


Meanwhile, GCC countries and Jordan have strongly advocated for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region, including through the use of force. Since the escalation began on 28 February, they have faced sustained Iranian attacks targeting vessels, port infrastructure, and energy assets across the Gulf, which have disrupted maritime trade and energy flows and contributed to broader regional economic and supply chain instability.


Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The negotiations on the draft resolution were difficult. Bahrain circulated the zero draft of the text to Council members on 21 March and held multiple rounds of negotiations. Following five subsequent revisions, two silence breaks, and closed consultations on 1 April (held at France’s request), a sixth revised draft was put in blue today (6 April). The process involved intensive, high-level engagement, including meetings at the level of permanent representatives and sustained bilateral consultations between GCC countries and Council members, including at the level of foreign ministers.


Initially, the draft text was put in blue on 2 April for a vote on 3 April; however, persistent disagreements prompted Bahrain to delay the vote to continue deliberations, during which the text underwent significant amendments before being put in blue for a vote tomorrow.


During the negotiations, Council members broadly expressed concern about the escalating regional situation, underscored the unacceptability of attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and stressed the urgent need to address the crisis. However, divergences emerged regarding the appropriate approach and tools to address the crisis.


The initial draft text proposed by Bahrain invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and repress, neutralise, and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait, until such time as the Council decides otherwise. The text also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those who take actions to undermine the freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.


These provisions apparently proved problematic for several Council members, prompting efforts to streamline the text to enhance clarity and narrow its scope. It appears that concerns focused in particular on the reference to Chapter VII and the authorisation of the use of force, as well as the breadth of the mandate, including its nature, geographic scope, and open-ended duration. Positions diverged, with some European and like-minded members seeking clearer parameters and more precise drafting, while others, notably China and Russia, were more fundamentally critical of the initiative.


It appears that China and Russia expressed concerns about the invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that such authorisation could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits. They also raised concerns about the potential imposition of sanctions and maintained that the draft failed to address the root causes of the current crisis in the Middle East. In their view, the text risked exacerbating tensions rather than promoting de-escalation, and they urged Bahrain not to advance the initiative. These reservations led China and Russia to break silence twice.


Responding to these concerns, Bahrain removed the explicit reference to Chapter VII in the third revised draft. However, the authorisation for the use of force and a determination that Iran’s actions near and around the Strait of Hormuz constitute a threat to international peace and security were retained. China and Russia argued that this did not address their concerns, maintaining that the draft continued to legitimise the use of force without accounting for the underlying causes of the escalation. The current draft resolution in blue does not include an explicit reference to Chapter VII and retains the determination regarding Iran’s actions as threats to international peace and security.


Additionally, the reference to sanctions measures was amended based on proposals from Colombia and the UK. The current draft text in blue therefore expresses the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, as appropriate, against those who take actions that undermine the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.


France, supported by some other members, particularly Greece, also expressed concerns about the scope of the authorisation for the use of force, which, as France had argued, should be strictly limited to defensive purposes. The UK, among others, also sought clearer and more concise language to better define the scope of the authorisation.


In parallel to Bahrain’s text, it appears that France also prepared a draft resolution in March, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for wider discussion. Some elements of this text, as proposed by France during the negotiations on Bahrain’s draft, appear to have been incorporated into the current text in blue. This includes language urging de-escalation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; calling for a return to diplomacy; and welcoming ongoing efforts towards a durable peace in the region.


To address concerns raised by several members, the language on the authorisation underwent multiple iterations, with successive drafts introducing qualifiers to clarify its scope and parameters. This included stipulating that any action must be commensurate with the circumstances and undertaken with due regard for the safety of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; the latter edit was based on a proposal by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia). In the fourth revised draft, Bahrain apparently incorporated some suggestions, including narrowing the geographical scope to the Strait and its adjacent waters and introducing a time limit of at least six months from the resolution’s adoption, an issue apparently raised by the UK. While these changes were reflected in the first draft text put in blue on 2 April, some were omitted from the current version in blue following further revisions undertaken in an effort to reach common ground. Of these proposed provisions, only the text specifying that “any action must be commensurate with the circumstances” remains in the current draft in blue.


The proposed limitations on the nature of the mandate did not appear to satisfy some members. In addition to China and Russia, France, supported by Greece, also broke silence, reiterating its concerns. As a compromise, Bahrain ultimately amended the language to authorise member states to “use all defensive means necessary”, as suggested by France.


However, it appears that strong positions expressed by some members persisted, requiring continued deliberations. In the current text put in blue, Bahrain omitted the language on authorisation and instead incorporated elements drawn from the French draft, strongly encouraging states with an interest in the “use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz”.


Based on suggestions from Colombia and France, the draft text in blue also requests the participating states to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the activities they undertake related to this resolution are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and applicable international human rights law, and have due regard for the rights and freedoms of navigation of the ships of any third state. The amended draft text in blue further added language specifying that such measures should be undertaken with a view to urgently ensuring unhampered and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz.


The amended draft text in blue makes several references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including reaffirming the right of member states to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It further affirms that this resolution applies only to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and does not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of member states under international law, including UNCLOS, in any other context, underscoring in particular that it should not be regarded as establishing customary international law.


The draft resolution also introduces a reporting requirement, requesting the Secretary-General to provide to the Security Council a written report within seven days of the adoption of this resolution, and every 30 days thereafter, on any further attacks and provocations on merchant and commercial vessels, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms, by Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php


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Thursday, March 26, 2026

Sudan: UN Security Council Meeting 26 Mar 2026. Increased drone attacks spilling across Sudan borders

Report from What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday 26 March 2026 - excerpts:


Sudan: Meeting under “Any Other Business”


Today (Thursday 26 March) at 4:30 pm, Security Council members will discuss the situation in Sudan under “any other business” following the discussion on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in closed consultations. 


The UK (the penholder on the file) and Denmark, supported by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia), requested the meeting after a 20 March strike on a hospital in East Darfur state reportedly killed around 70 people. 


Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher are expected to brief. The UK may propose press elements on the meeting.  [...]


In a 24 March press release, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warned of a sharp increase this year in the use of drones to conduct airstrikes in the country, highlighting the devastating impact of relatively inexpensive, high-tech weapons in populated areas. It documented over 500 civilian deaths in such strikes between 1 January and 15 March, the majority of which occurred in the Kordofan region.


The press release also highlighted that expanding drone attacks are spilling across Sudan’s borders, raising concerns about further escalation with regional implications. It referred to incidents affecting the border towns of Tina in Sudan and Tiné in Chad following RSF ground offensives. 


On 16 March, around 20 people, including civilians, were reportedly killed and 60 others injured during an RSF ground offensive on Tina. On 18 March, a drone strike in Tiné reportedly launched from Sudan killed at least 24 civilians and injured around 70 others. 


Chad closed its border with Sudan in late February following fighting in Tiné between the RSF and pro-SAF fighters that resulted in the deaths of five Chadian soldiers. 


Following the recent cross-border strike in Tiné, Chadian authorities reportedly reinforced security along the border with Sudan and began the emergency relocation of refugees from border areas.  [...]


Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. 


Pekka Haavisto of Finland, who assumed his role as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan in late February, visited Port Sudan and Khartoum earlier this week. During the visit, he met with, among others, the SAF leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the finance minister and leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) faction Jibril Ibrahim. 


In a statement released yesterday (25 March), Haavisto underscored the importance of dialogue and de-escalation as essential steps towards a comprehensive ceasefire, as well as stressed the need to advance civilian protection and to explore confidence-building measures to create conditions for a meaningful political process. Haavisto further indicated that he would continue consultations in the coming weeks with a broad range of stakeholders across the region.


The US has been leading efforts, in coordination with the other Quad members—Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia—to facilitate a humanitarian truce. 


In his remarks at the 19 February Council meeting on the situation in Sudan, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos called for an immediate humanitarian truce, without preconditions, which he argued must guarantee sustained and unhindered humanitarian access across conflict lines and borders. 


He also noted that the US has been working with the Secretary-General’s office, DPPA, OCHA, and other UN entities to establish a UN mechanism to support implementation, coordination, and oversight of the truce and related humanitarian access commitments. [...]


On 19 February, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned three RSF commanders for their involvement in atrocities in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. The UK and the European Union (EU) have also previously designated these same individuals. 


On 24 March, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee also designated four RSF commanders, including the group’s deputy commander Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo. 


On 9 March, the US Department of State designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It argued that the group uses violence against civilians to undermine conflict resolution efforts and advance its “violent Islamist ideology”, claiming that the group’s fighters have conducted “mass executions of civilians” and have received support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).


Read full report here: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/03/sudan-meeting-under-any-other-business-5.php


Ends

Monday, March 23, 2026

Sudan at crossroads as peace path remains complex. AUPSC's 1330th Communiqué on situation in Sudan

ON 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.


Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    


Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.


Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors. Read more.


From Independent Online (IOL) South Africa
By JESSICA UIRAS 
Dated Sunday 22 March 2026 - full copy:

Sudan at a Crossroads as the Path to Peace Remains Complex
A displaced Sudanese woman who left El-Fasher after its fall with others, walks amid the remains of a fire that broke out at a camp in Tawila on February 11, 2026. Image: AFP


On 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.


The document reflects not only the gravity of the crisis but also the AU’s sustained effort to prevent state collapse, respond to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies, and reassert continental leadership in a conflict increasingly shaped by regional and global dynamics.


Read alongside earlier pronouncements in 2025, including the March press statement rejecting the establishment of a parallel government, and the July statement strongly condemning the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led ‘parallel government,’ the February 2026 communiqué demonstrates consistency in principle, but a heightened sense of urgency.


Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors.


The communiqué expresses deep concern over the continued armed conflict and describes an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. This language builds on the August 2025 communiqué, which had already raised alarm over famine conditions, particularly in El-Fasher.


By February 2026, the PSC’s concern had sharpened further. It explicitly highlights reported famine and starvation, demands unhindered humanitarian access, and calls for the protection of humanitarian workers.


The recurrence of El-Fasher in successive decisions suggests that earlier appeals for lifting sieges and allowing safe access corridors have not yielded sufficient compliance.


The humanitarian crisis is therefore no longer treated as a by-product of armed confrontation. The communiqué strongly condemns systematic killings, ethnic targeting, mass displacement and destruction of infrastructure by parties to the conflict, particularly the RSF in El-Fasher.


By grounding its condemnation in international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the PSC signals that accountability is not optional. It moves the conversation beyond ceasefire appeals to potential legal consequences.


A central and recurring position of the PSC has been that there is no viable and sustainable military solution to the conflict. This formulation appeared in August 2025 and was reiterated again in February 2026. The repetition is deliberate. It reflects frustration with a battlefield logic that continues to dominate the conduct of the warring parties.


The PSC once again calls for a humanitarian truce leading to an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue addressing both security and political dimensions of the crisis. What distinguishes the 1330th Communiqué, however, is its engagement with the Sudanese National Initiative for Peace presented in December 2025.


The PSC welcomes its components, including an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, disarmament, security sector reform, national reconciliation and reconstruction.


Crucially, it stresses that these elements must align with the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. Support for the initiative is therefore conditional on inclusivity and alignment with continental frameworks, with transitional arrangements that reflect the aspirations of the Sudanese people and enable a smooth return to constitutional order through elections.


The question of a ‘parallel government’ has remained a central concern since mid-2025. In March, the PSC categorically rejected such an entity. In July, it reiterated that AU member states and the international community should not recognise any parallel authority in Sudan. The February 2026 communiqué restates this rejection and calls upon member states and partners not to recognise the so-called parallel government.


This consistency reflects a clear normative boundary. The AU will not legitimise fragmentation or unconstitutional political structures emerging from armed groups. The defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity is presented not merely as a legal principle, but as a safeguard against de facto partition and long-term regional instability.


At the same time, the communiqué places increasing emphasis on the issue of external interference. In 2025, the PSC had already condemned external actors fuelling the conflict and called for measures to address such interference.


The February 2026 decision goes further by requesting the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties militarily, financially and politically, and to propose measures to contain them within three months.


This is one of the more operationally significant aspects of the communiqué. If implemented robustly, it could begin to disrupt the transnational networks that sustain the conflict and complicate prospects for peace.


The communiqué also emphasises the centrality of AU leadership in the peace process and welcomes coordination through the Quintet, comprising the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the European Union. This reflects recognition that multiple and sometimes competing mediation tracks risk fragmentation.


Earlier decisions had already called for the consolidation of peace frameworks under AU and IGAD leadership. The February 2026 communiqué reiterates the need to prevent overlap and ensure coherence. The emphasis on Sudanese ownership, combined with coordinated international engagement, illustrates an effort to balance sovereignty with pragmatic diplomacy in an increasingly crowded mediation landscape.


Beyond ceasefire and dialogue, the communiqué includes institutional measures aimed at restoring normative oversight and operational presence. It reiterates the request for a comprehensive human rights report by the AU Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, welcomes the deployment of a humanitarian assessment mission, stresses the urgent need to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Sudan, and reiterates the intention to undertake a PSC field mission.


These measures are designed to translate political commitments into institutional engagement on the ground, ensuring that AU involvement is not merely declaratory but tangible.


Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    


The decisive factor, however, will be implementation. Will sanctions mechanisms effectively identify and constrain external spoilers? Will humanitarian corridors be secured in practice? Will the proposed inter-Sudanese dialogue be genuinely inclusive, reflecting the voices of civilian actors? Will the warring parties accept that military escalation cannot produce sustainable political outcomes?


Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.


* Jessica Uiras is a Peacebuilder from Namibia. This article was originally published at https://www.accord.org.za/

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.


Independent Online, popularly known as IOL, is one of South Africa's leading news and information websites bringing millions of readers breaking news and updates on Politics, Current Affairs, Business, Lifestyle, Entertainment, Travel, Sport, Motoring and Technology


View original: https://iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/world/2026-03-22-sudan-at-a-crossroads-as-the-path-to-peace-remains-complex/


Further Reading


COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 1330TH MEETING OF THE PSC HELD AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ON 12 FEBRUARY 2026 ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

Last Updated on Thursday 12 February 2026

https://aupaps.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1330th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-ministerial-level-on-12-february-2026-on-the-situation-in-sudan

PDF Version https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1330.1.comm-en1.pdf


BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies deadly Eid strike on key hospital in Darfur

The strike killed 64 people, including 13 children, two nurses and a doctor, according to the WHO head.


BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies carrying out hospital attack that killed 64 during Eid

The local rights organisation, which has documented atrocities by both the army and the RSF throughout the war, said the


AFP - Sunday 22 March 2026

'They beat us with whips': Sudan RSF detainees tell of horrors in El-Fasher

In the suffocating darkness of a sealed shipping container, every thud signalled to Ibrahim Noureldin that one more detainee ...


Radio Tamazuj - Sunday 22 March 2026

Kiir returns to Juba after South Africa visit

South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir returned to the capital, Juba, on Sunday evening after an eight-day visit to South Africa. In a statement issued after Kiir’s return to Juba, the president’s press secretary, Arek Aldo Ajou, said the visit followed up on the African Union C5+ engagement led by Ramaphosa and focused on advancing implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, preparations for elections, and strengthening bilateral relations.


Ends