Showing posts with label Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Show all posts

Sunday, August 18, 2019

More RSF than ever in Darfur Sudan - To live in any area controlled by the RSF is to live in constant fear

Article from 3Ayin.com
Dated Wednesday, 07 August 2019
Silence and fear: Life under the RSF in a Darfur town
Amna Daoud Morsal has worked in Nyala’s main market for decades. At 55, she has developed a well-established market stall in Sudan’s third largest city – a city whose name means the “place of chatting” in the local Daju language. But few have time to chat when the sun starts to set, despite a challenging economy [ https://3ayin.com/sudanese-pay-a-price-for-revolution-as-cost-of-living-soars/ ] where Amna struggles with less and less customers, she must pack her wares hurriedly and rush home. “Ten years ago, you could walk around Nyala till morning time and nobody would ask you anything, there was no danger, no one to steal your things –the situation was safe but now, when the sun is setting, you cannot set foot inside Nyala,” Amna Daoud told Ayin. 

Nyala, like most of the towns and villages in Darfur, have struggled with the presence of pro-government militias for decades, but the heaviest presence to date has been the Rapid Support Force. “To live in any area controlled by the RSF (Rapid Support Forces), Nyala included, is to live in a constant state of fear,” says Nyala resident Abu Al-Bashir Adam. Anything could happen while working in the market, Daoud says, “Even daytime is dangerous, they [RSF] start fights with people, steal money and mobile phones, and if you try to say this is wrong they can shoot you.”
More RSF than ever
Nyala residents have grown accustomed to the heavy presence of the RSF militia –but now even more have trickled in since the revolution started last December calling for civilian rule. Nyala residents believe the additional RSF forces came in an effort to consolidate power and ensure authority during this political transition period. 

The deputy head of the military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (aka “Himmedti”) leads the RSF which until recently took direct orders from former president Omar al-Bashir, terrorizing citizenry and rebels alike in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. 

“Himmedti and his gang [the RSF] have always had a presence in Nyala,” said Ahmed Abdallah* a recent university graduate living in Nyala. “But once the revolution started and people called for civilian rule –they started to be deployed in all public areas across the state.” As one of the main recruiting areas, Nyala hosts ten RSF training camps alone. But it’s not only Nyala. “It’s true that the RSF increased dramatically recently, with the idea to show power and control,” a UN worker based in West Darfur State’s capital city, El Geneina, told Ayin. “Now they drive around here at high speeds, if you don’t get out of their way, you’ll be beaten. As a woman, after 7 pm, there is no way I can walk the streets.”

The RSF have always had a heavy, deadly presence in Darfur to date. According to the 2017 UN Panel of Experts report [ https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1740048.pdf ] the RSF militia are the main perpetrators of abuses against civilians in Darfur including looting, rapes and torching of homes. An Amnesty International June report [ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/ ] says they have satellite imagery and testimonials that show the RSF and other government forces continue to commit war crimes and human rights violations in Darfur –including the partial or complete destruction of 45 villages, unlawful killings, and sexual violence. “In Darfur, as in Khartoum, we’ve witnessed the Rapid Support Forces’ despicable brutality against Sudanese civilians – the only difference being, in Darfur they have committed atrocities with impunity for years,” stated Amnesty Secretary General Kumi Naidoo. 

A convenient black hole
The RSF have enjoyed total impunity for years in Darfur partly due to the ousting [ https://africanarguments.org/2009/03/24/ingos-expelled-from-darfur-time-to-acknowledge-the-smoking-and-loaded-gun/ ] of international NGOs and local and foreign journalists 
[ https://nubareports.org/a-q-a-with-award-winning-photographer-adriane-ohanesian/ ] effectively banned [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/captured-in-darfur-south-sudan ] from the region. Phil Cox, a photojournalist and filmmaker, is possibly one of the last foreigners to venture into Darfur in December 2016 when RSF forces kidnapped [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/captured-in-darfur-south-sudan ], tortured and jailed Cox and his colleague Daoud Hari for 70 days. At the time, the Sudanese government issued a massive bounty for their capture, indicative of their deep determination to keep the world’s eyes away from Darfur and what future investigations might reveal, Cox told Ayin. “Darfur has gone from being the focus of global attention and international condemnation that mobilized activists, celebrities and world leaders alike, to a forgotten conflict smothered by an information black hole,” Cox said. “No media team or investigators have had independent access there for years –yet rumours of atrocities and ethnic cleansing have persisted.” 

Darfur Bar Association lawyer, Abdel-Basset Al-Hajj, says the RSF enjoy “official immunity” and no accountability for their actions. “The RSF have no legal justifications to carry out law enforcement, arrest, imprisonment –they enjoy being the police, prosecutor and judge all in one,” Al-Hajj told Ayin. While they enjoy these powers, Al-Hajj said, they carry out these duties with no recourse to the law or training. “They don’t know how to investigate a crime, they simply rely on torture and somehow think this is the rule of law.” 

In July 2017, the RSF raided [ https://nubareports.org/south-darfur-residents-fear-insecurity-with-militia-control-of-police-station/ ] Nyala’s second largest police station in the Al-Masan’i neighbourhood with four heavily armed Land Cruisers, threatening the police officer in charge of the station to leave within 48 hours, according to a police officer from the station preferring anonymity for his security. The RSF order to evacuate the station was made on the pretext that Himmedti purchased the land where the police station was based. A lawyer working for the local land registry who also requested anonymity for security reasons, said the land allegedly purchased by the RSF leader was government-owned property. Lt.-Gen. Mohamed Hamden Daglo did not present any documents regarding the purchase, the lawyer said, and suspect the RSF leader seized the land by force. 

Nyala-based Police Officer Ali Osman* remembers the raid well. “Of course it was not legal but nobody from the local government can talk to them, they may shoot you,” the officer said. Well-equipped and paid salaries five times that of a regular Nyala police officer, Officer Osman told Ayin he is powerless to stop them whenever they steal from the public. “I can’t do anything –those people are outside the law and can kill me.” 
They have made the security situation more precarious here,” lawyer and El-Geneina resident Ibrahim Shamou said, “crime, murder and theft have increased –[it’s] a state of terror and chaos.”

El Geneina, Daein
Since the revolution started, the RSF also increased their presence in other Darfur capitals cities such as El Geneina and Daein in West and East Darfur, respectfully -targeting and terrorising civilians with the same impunity. There are roughly 200 RSF armed four-wheel drive vehicles (commonly referred to as ‘technicals’) patrolling West Darfur State, lawyer and El-Geneina resident Ibrahim Shamou told Ayin. “They have made the security situation more precarious here,” Shamou said, “crime, murder and theft have increased –[it’s] a state of terror and chaos.” Even farmers outside the city are not safe from the RSF, the lawyer said. With no one to protect them while working in the fields, RSF have been looting farmers of livestock and money since June. 

RSF have arrested local government members in Daein during the state of emergency imposed by the former president back in February with no real recourse to the law, according to Daein resident Maala Awad al-Karim. RSF have also imprisoned a large number of citizens arbitrarily, al-Karim adds, some of which still remain there since February. Many people have ran away from Daein and have attempted to eke out a living in outside villages to avoid the RSF, according to Daein resident and lawyer Mohamed Abdallah. “These militias don’t follow any rule of law,” Abdallah added, “even the courts look at them like people who took the authority of the court without any permission.”

According to Officer Osman*, RSF are already recruiting from outside Sudan, particularly via Chad and receive Sudanese identity cards in Nyala … more on RSF’s regional dynamics: http://bit.ly/2KwT3nw
RSF as a regional force
While the RSF have increased their presence in the Darfur region, there are signs the militia could become more of a regional force. According to Officer Osman, RSF are already recruiting from outside Sudan, particularly via Chad and receive Sudanese identity cards in Nyala. Osman said he could identify them as foreigners from their features and the fact they do not speak Arabic. “We must remember RSF is a tribal militia and Himmedti has influence with his ethnic extensions in bordering countries like Chad where they are coming from,” Osman said. Well funded by exploiting Darfur gold reserves independently of the state and as a parallel budget, the RSF are well placed to become regional mercenaries in East and Central Africa, Nyala lawyer Al-Hajj told Ayin. The RSF can “carry out criminal acts internally and externally,” Al-Hajj said, “and will provide those with interests with all the necessary components to continue and control the reins of the state.”

Future of RSF, future of Sudan
The question still remains if the RSF will continue to control large swathes of the country and whether this influence will expand further both nationally and cross borders during the transitional period. The Transitional Military Council’s deputy leader Himmedti will, after all, likely be part of the ruling sovereign council during this stage. A constitutional declaration agreed upon by the Military Council and opposition on Sunday [4 AUG 2019] also ensures the sovereign council to be lead by a military general for the first 21 months of the transitional period. Nevertheless, the parties also agreed that sovereign council members would not be immune to prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the recently penned constitutional declaration, the RSF are meant to be under the command of the Sudanese army and stipulated that citizen’s rights are to be free from arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment. There are signs of more accountability within the RSF ranks –military authorities allegedly detained [ https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Sudan-detains-nine-soldiers-after-el-obeid-killings/4552902-5220132-rs45nn/index.html ] and dismissed nine RSF soldiers last week, implicated in the killing of six protestors in El Obeid. But the fact that security forces killed 
[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/protesters-killed-live-ammunition-sudan-omdurman-190801190332665.html ] four more protestors in Omdurman just a day prior to the prosecution of the RSF soldiers hardly imbibes confidence for reform within Sudan’s security sector and the RSF militia in particular.

While much-needed RSF reforms may not emerge from the political negotiation process-taking place in Khartoum, the people of Nyala may induce change themselves. Despite the daily intimidation by RSF forces, Nyala residents conducted three separate demonstrations [ https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/protests-unabated-across-sudan%20 ] last month to condemn the ongoing detention of Nyala citizens, the attack on protestors in El Obeid, in solidarity with rape survivors across the country and to call for the revival of independent trade unions. “We don’t know what will happen in Khartoum,” said one Nyala activist, “but we will continue to struggle here no matter the outcome.”
* Names changed to protect their security

The law = RSF
“The RSF have no legal justifications to carry out law enforcement, arrest, imprisonment –they enjoy being
the police, prosecutor and judge all in one,” Al-Hajj told Ayin

View original article here: https://3ayin.com/rsf-in-darfur/
- - -

Kidnapped, tortured and thrown in jail: my 70 days in Sudan
A photograph taken by Cox while being held hostage in Sudan on Christmas Day 2016. Photograph: Phil Cox/Native Voice Films
Phil Cox and Daoud Hari on the Chad-Sudan border in December 2016. Photograph: Native Voice Films

Read full story here: http://trib.al/inI80TQ

Saturday, August 17, 2019

Dickens & Madson lobbyists don't know their Darfur Sudan client Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo aka Hemeti

Note from Sudan Watch Editor: With respect to the following nonsensical quote taken from the below copied article, it seems apparent that Canadian firm Dickens & Madson's lobbyist Mr Ari Ben-Menashe does not really know who he is dealing with, his client Hemeti is the "commander" responsible for unspeakable atrocities and destruction, including the maiming, raping and slaying of a countless number of unarmed civilians in Darfur and elsewhere, affecting the lives of millions of civilians.
"The lobbyist also compared Dagalo to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “In spite of his past — if it’s a morality contest, [Dagalo] would beat Netanyahu hands down. How many people died in the Middle East trying to make quote, unquote ‘Israel safe’? Sorry, but I have to make this comment.”
Article from Middle East Monitor
Dated 23 July 2019 at 1:46 pm
Ex-Israel spy admits lobbying US on behalf of Sudan military council
Photo: Israeli businessman Ari Ben-Menache [Twitter] 

A former Israeli spy has admitted to signing a multi-million-dollar contract with Sudan’s Transitional Military Council to lobby the US to support its rule.

The deal was signed by Ari Ben-Menashe, a 67-year-old Israeli businessman based in Montreal, Canada, who heads the “Dickens & Madson” lobbying firm. Menashe is a former Israeli spy and boasts a long, controversial career which has reportedly seen him lobby for African opposition figures, witness US-Iranian hostage deals and execute arms deals.

Dickens & Madson recently signed a $6 million deal with Sudan’s Transitional Military Council, which has ruled the country since former President Omar Al-Bashir was ousted in April.

The documents – submitted to the US Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act – stipulated that Ben-Menashe would lobby “the executive and/or legislative branches of the government of the United States and its agencies to support the Transitional [Military] Council of Sudan’s efforts to establish a democratic government”.

The firm would also work on improving the military council’s media coverage, Haaretz reported yesterday. In a separate deal also disclosed in the documents, Dickens & Madson would work with Venezuelan opposition to replace embattled President Nicolas Maduro and lobby Russia to support his proposed successor, Henri Falcon.

Though the documents were first made public last month, Ben-Menashe confirmed the deals in an interview with the Israeli daily this weekend.

Ben-Menashe discussed his Sudanese client Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – often known as Hemeti – who heads the country’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary unit formed from the remnants of Darfur’s Janjaweed militia. Since 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been investigating allegations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against Janjaweed leaders for their actions in Darfur.

Though the official documents show that Dickens & Madson is also representing Transitional Military Council head Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Ben-Menashe said that Dagalo “is the one with true power”.

Ben-Menashe told Haaretz that despite the RSF’s brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters last month – which saw as many as 100 demonstrators killed, tents burned and women raped in Sudanese capital Khartoum – Dagalo has “promised him that all he wants is for Sudan to have fair elections”.

“I’m not his fan really,” he said of the military leader, “[but] he’s the only guy that can keep order until this civilian government takes hold. What we’re also banking on is that there’s an army and there’s the Rapid Support Forces: one would put [a] check on the other.”

The lobbyist also compared Dagalo to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “In spite of his past — if it’s a morality contest, [Dagalo] would beat Netanyahu hands down. How many people died in the Middle East trying to make quote, unquote ‘Israel safe’? Sorry, but I have to make this comment.”

Ben-Menashe also touched on Dagalo’s relationships with regional powers, which are known to include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt.

Ben-Menashe told Haaretz that the Sudanese leadership is struggling to balance its support of US President Donald Trump’s administration with the president’s “Saudi friends”, who he claims are pressuring Dagalo to continue sending Sudanese troops to Yemen. Ben-Menashe claims that Dagalo “knows the arrangement is not a good thing for Sudan”.

The Transitional Military Council leadership has met with its regional allies on a number of occasions, with council head Al-Burhan in May visiting the Saudi city of Mecca for emergency summits of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss the “threat” of Iran in the region.

This came just days after Al-Burhan met Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, who “stressed the importance of dialogue between the Sudanese people in this sensitive phase”, as well as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who stressed “Egypt’s readiness to fully support the brothers in Sudan”.

Almost immediately after Al-Bashir’s ousting, Sudan and the UAE agreed to send Sudan $3 billion worth of aid in a bid to support the military council. The deal was understood to include $500 million to be deposited in the Sudanese central bank, while the rest would come in the form of food, medicine and petroleum products.

Friday, August 16, 2019

Flooring Hemeti Dagalo the monster from Darfur Sudan may require more than unarmed protesters

  • The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum
  • By creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control
  • In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time
  • When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent
  • Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes
  • Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now
Full story below.

From Foreign Policy
Dated 14 May 2019, 2:34 PM
The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’s Supposed Transition
The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.
Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, the deputy head of Sudan’s military council, speaks at a news conference in Khartoum on April 30. ASSOCIATED PRESS

After Omar al-Bashir was deposed on April 11, Western diplomats made no mistake about who was in charge. Ambassadors from the United States, Britain, and the European Union did not shake hands with the transitional military council’s president, the little known army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; they met with his younger deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known by the nickname “Hemeti.” 

The story of how an uneducated 40-something chief of the janjaweed—the Arab militias that brought death and destruction to Darfur 16 years ago—became more powerful than his seasoned mentors in the Sudanese junta is, to many, a mystery. 

In fact, Hemeti is the main legacy of Bashir’s 30-year rule. Bashir himself was a product of an alliance of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, unseen elsewhere in the Arab world, but the army grew tired of the wars it had to fight in Sudan’s south, and the Islamists fragmented. When a new war began in Darfur in 2003, Bashir was convinced by Darfuri Arab hard-liners that turning their youths to militias would allow him to win. But by creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control and who represents a security threat not only for Sudan but also for its neighbors.

It seems that for a few days after Bashir’s ousting Khartoum’s civilian opposition trusted that it could negotiate a civilian transition with Burhan and Hemeti. Darfuris were more skeptical, given that they were more intimately familiar with the new men in charge. Burhan was a military intelligence colonel coordinating army and militia attacks against civilians in West Darfur state from 2003 to 2005, at a time when Hemeti was already a known warlord, who would gradually become the janjaweed’s primary leader. 

During its first, most intense years, the war in Darfur led to the deaths of several hundred thousand non-Arab civilians and displaced about 2 million people, earning Bashir an arrest warrant for genocide from the International Criminal Court. 

I met Hemeti a couple of times in 2009, first in a vaguely Orientalist furniture shop he owned in South Darfur’s state capital of Nyala (one of his early business efforts), from which I was driven to a more private office setting. He was a tall man with the sarcastic smile of a naughty child—yet he was then the newly appointed security advisor to South Darfur’s governor, his first official government position, obtained through blackmail and threats of rebellion.

Hemeti hails from a small Chadian Arab clan that fled wars and drought in Chad to take refuge in Darfur in the 1980s. As he told me, his uncle Juma Dagalo failed to be recognized as a tribal leader in North Darfur state, but South Darfur authorities welcomed the newcomers and allowed them to settle on land belonging to the Fur tribe, Darfur’s main indigenous non-Arab group. The place, called Dogi in the Fur language, was rebranded Um-el-Gura, “the mother of the villages” in Arabic, an old name for Mecca. The authorities also armed Dagalo’s followers, who, as early as the 1990s, began attacking their Fur neighbors.

Hemeti was then a teenager who, as he told me, dropped out of primary school in the third grade to trade camels across the borders in Libya and Egypt. When the Darfur rebellion began in 2003, he became a janjaweed amir (war chief) in his area, leading attacks against neighboring Fur villages. To justify joining the government-backed militias, he said the rebels had attacked a caravan of fellow camel traders on their way to Libya, allegedly killing 75 men and looting 3,000 camels. That fell short of his own brutal record as a militia leader. 

In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time.  His violent methods even created tensions with accompanying army officers. 

At the same time, Chad and Sudan began a proxy war through their respective rebel groups. The Chadian government used its own Arab officials to push the janjaweed to betray Khartoum. Bichara Issa Jadallah, a cousin to Hemeti, was then the defense minister in Chad. In 2006, he invited the janjaweed leader to the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, and had him sign a secret nonaggression pact with the Darfur rebel Justice and Equality Movement, behind the back of Khartoum. 

Shortly afterward, Hemeti announced that he had become a rebel. He then received a visit from a TV crew working for Britain’s Channel 4, which shot a documentary in his camp—his first exposure to TV—a medium to which he has become addicted since. But the journalists reportedly came late, and, as they were filming, government negotiators were also in the camp, bargaining over the price to bring Hemeti back into the government fold.

He remained a rebel for only six months before going back to Khartoum’s side. “We didn’t really become rebels,” he told me in 2009, sitting in his governor advisor’s chair. “We just wanted to attract the government’s attention, tell them we’re here, in order to get our rights: military ranks, political positions, and development in our area.” 

Other janjaweed leaders were increasingly critical of the government, including the most powerful among them, Musa Hilal, who in 2013 quit his post as presidential advisor in Khartoum and began forming his own movement. At the same time, some janjaweed were openly fighting the Sudanese intelligence service in downtown Nyala. Hemeti was one of the few janjaweed leaders to remain loyal to Bashir’s government. 

Consequently, Hemeti was picked to lead the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an enhanced paramilitary force—initially in an effort to retake control of the janjaweed, but it didn’t work out as planned. The RSF became uncontrollable and engaged in looting, killing, and rape in Darfur, as well as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The RSF also began exporting Darfur’s violence to central Sudan, ransoming civilians at highway roadblocks north of Khartoum and taking part in repressing demonstrations in the capital in September 2013, when at least 200 protesters were killed. First under the intelligence service, then under the direct control of the presidency, the force became Bashir’s praetorian guard, whose role was to protect the president from protests or from any coup attempt by the army—it turned into a third pole of power within Sudan’s security apparatus, rival to both army and intelligence. Hemeti was appointed brigadier general.

Then, in 2016, as Europe began cooperating with Sudan to curb migration flows, Hemeti’s men began to intercept migrants, from Sudan itself as well as other parts of the Horn of Africa, on their way to Libya, exhibiting them on local and foreign TV stations to demonstrate to the European Union that they were the right people for the job. In fact, the RSF played a double game and filled their cars with migrants whom they sold to Libyan traffickers, who would then often jail them in torture houses. Since Muammar al-Qaddafi’s fall in 2011, migrants in Libya are commonly tortured until they call relatives and convince them to pay a ransom to set them free; those who cannot pay are turned into slaves. But on Sudanese national TV, Hemeti claimed to be acting on behalf of the EU, which he also threatened with reopening the border if he was not paid a ransom for his “hard work.”

When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent led by Burhan, then the ground forces chief of staff. The two men got along well. They reportedly had meetings with Emirati and Saudi officials, discussing the post-Bashir era and telling them that they were the men the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian regimes were looking for: Arab military leaders who were not Islamists friendly with Qatar, Iran, or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

The RSF reportedly received Saudi and Emirati support, including money and weapons. Recently, at a press conference, Hemeti claimed to have set aside some $350 million to save Sudan’s finances and explained that he obtained this money for his role in Yemen and mining gold in Sudan. (He had competed with Hilal for gold concessions and eventually managed to have his rival arrested in 2017.)

In another recent TV appearance, Hemeti described how, in April, Bashir asked him and other military leaders to open fire on protesters, quoting an Islamic law supposedly allowing a ruler to kill 30-50 percent of a population in order to save the rest. He said he then decided “not to resist the change” and not oppose the protesters. 

The first head of the transitional military council, Gen. Awad Ibn Auf, resigned after 24 hours, reportedly disagreeing with Hemeti, who preferred Burhan. In the following days, Hemeti continued his public relations campaign, visiting a wounded protester in the hospital. But at a press conference on April 30, he made clear who he was, accusing the protesters of being drug addicts and stating he could not tolerate them continuously “blocking the streets.” Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes. 

Indeed Hemeti positioned his troops—reportedly 9,000 soldiers who were already in Khartoum and 4,000 who came recently from Darfur—at strategic locations all over the city, ready to fight protesters, the army, or anyone else. (On Monday, protest leaders blamed the RSF when five demonstrators and an army major were shot.) 

Hemeti is reportedly backed by some of the same Darfuri Arab politicians who created the janjaweed 16 years ago. If they rise to power, it would threaten to “steal the revolution from the people,” as one protest slogan put it, transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism. 

While the West seems passive, other countries are more worried, especially Chad. In recent years, in spite of his cousin still being a close advisor to Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, Hemeti has appeared more hostile to the Chadian regime and may be supportive of an Arab takeover in N’Djamena. Chad’s president took power a year after Bashir in Sudan, and Bashir’s fall might legitimately worry him. While relying largely on his own non-Arab Zaghawa tribe, Déby also accommodated other groups, not least Arab politicians who held key positions such as the defense and foreign ministries. 

Even so, ambitious Chadian Arab politicians might not refuse Hemeti’s armed support. The RSF’s ranks include hundreds of Chadian Arab youths and ex-rebels against Déby who took refuge in Sudan. Such combatants may well be more interested in regime change in Chad than in Sudan, risking an unprecedented exportation to Chad of Darfur’s racist violence. 

Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now.

Even in the most optimistic scenario—whereby a new civilian government in Sudan tries to disarm the janjaweed—at least some of them will inevitably get involved in armed activities across Sudan’s borders, in countries where they have already been active, including Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. There are also reports that janjaweed were among Sudanese who joined jihadi groups in Mali. 

The janjaweed’s strength is now comparable to that of the Sudanese regular forces or other armies in the region. Opposing them by force could trigger bloodshed, making the stakes of the ongoing negotiations higher than ever before. 

Flooring the monster may require more than unarmed protesters.

Jérôme Tubiana is a researcher and journalist who has covered conflicts in Chad and Sudan for more than 20 years and the author of Guantánamo Kid: The True Story of Mohammed El-Gharani.

Sunday, August 11, 2019

Sudan Hemeti hires lobbying firm to increase his sway in US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, hosts ex US congressman

Article from Foreign Policy
Dated 28 June 2019, 7:17 PM
Seeking to Secure Power, Sudan’s Military Ruler Hires Lobbying Help

Top general brokers a multimillion-dollar deal with a Canadian firm and hosts a former U.S. congressman.

Sudan’s military leaders are increasingly reaching beyond their own borders for help from lobbyists, wealthy Persian Gulf states, and even a former U.S. congressman to shore up their legitimacy and control in the aftermath of a coup.

The de facto military ruler of Sudan, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, brokered a multimillion-dollar lobbying deal to increase his sway in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and multilateral institutions and welcomed a former member of the U.S. Congress to Khartoum for meetings amid a growing power struggle in the east African country. 

The posturing comes ahead of a massive pro-democracy rally in Khartoum on Sunday, which some experts and U.S. officials fear could turn violent, after forces under Hemeti killed at least 100 protesters and wounded hundreds more in a bloody crackdown at the beginning of June. 

Sudan’s Transitional Military Council, which has led the country since the ouster of longtime leader Omar al-Bashir in the wake of widespread protests, signed a $6 million deal with a Canadian lobbying firm in May to curry favor in the United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

The lobbying contract, which was signed by Hemeti, according to public disclosures filed last week with the U.S. Justice Department, sheds new light on the general’s shadowy behind-the-scenes push with foreign interlocutors to consolidate control and illustrates how many foreign governments have worked to stake claims in Sudan. The Canadian lobbying firm working with the military council, Dickens & Madson, seeks to secure a meeting between Hemeti and U.S. President Donald Trump and the heads of Middle Eastern governments and will work to ensure that it “attain[s] recognition as the legitimate transitionary leadership of the Republic of Sudan,” according to the contract. 

The contract also outlines other priorities, including the lobbying firm working to “provide military training and security equipment”; obtain “infrastructural and food security support” from the Russian government; and even obtain funds from a Libyan general vying for power in that country in exchange for military help. 
The lobbying firm is led by a former Israeli intelligence operative, Ari Ben-Menashe, and has worked in the past for the Zimbabwean and Libyan governments.

Hemeti took de facto control after Bashir was toppled in April following months of anti-government demonstrations. Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, remains under arrest in Sudan, but the powerful security forces and military junta that propped up his rule for three decades are still in place. Hemeti, the head of the notorious paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), implicated in war crimes in Darfur, has tried to portray himself as the one man who can bring stability to Sudan.

Main opposition groups and pro-democracy protesters have challenged the military council, insisting that it should cede power to a civilian-led democratic government, calls that are backed by the United States. Hemeti has sought support from wealthy Gulf states and other countries to shore up his legitimacy in the ensuing power struggle. 

In addition to backing from a Western lobbying firm, Hemeti also received a public relations boost from a former U.S. congressman, James Moran, who visited Sudan last week and met with the Sudanese leader. Moran, now a senior legislative advisor and lobbyist at the law firm McDermott Will & Emery, spoke at what appeared to be a rally in Khartoum after meeting with Hemeti, praising his time with the general and saying he was “impressed” with everyone he met, including the Sudanese leader. 

Moran’s visit gave Hemeti a potential public relations win, reinforcing the perception—at least in state media—that he is backed by the international community. During the rally, Moran was incorrectly introduced as a U.S. senator. Hemeti and the junta have shut down regular internet access in Sudan, and Moran’s visit was displayed on state television, making his speech the only information that many Sudanese have regarding the international community’s stance toward the general. 

Moran and his office did not respond to multiple requests for comment from Foreign Policy, including questions on the purpose of his visit with Hemeti and who funded his trip. 

Moran, according to Sudanese opposition figures and former U.S. officials familiar with internal deliberations, also met with the opposition Sudanese Professionals Association and the top U.S. diplomat in Sudan, Steven Koutsis, the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy. The State Department did not answer questions regarding Moran’s apparent meeting with Koutsis, other than to say he is a private citizen and doesn’t represent the U.S. government.

An official trip by current members of Congress, including Democratic Rep. Karen Bass on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was canceled due to the unstable political situation in Sudan. 

Powerful lawmakers in Washington are already raising alarm bells about Hemeti’s rise to power, however. On Friday, Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the Trump administration to slap sanctions on Hemeti and the RSF for their role in violence against protesters

As recently as September 2018, Moran was a lobbyist for Qatar, according to public disclosure filings. The Gulf state paid at least $40,000 per month for Moran and his law firm to speak with journalists, engage with Congress members and their staff, and send letters regarding Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Qatar.

Qatar is a rival to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, which have given substantial support to Hemeti.

Moran’s visit, and Hemeti’s new lobbying contract, comes during a potential flash point in Sudan’s revolution.

Hemeti and the military council face a June 30 deadline set by the African Union to hand over power to civilians. The Sudanese Professionals Association and other civilian groups, called the Forces for Freedom and Change, eventually accepted the proposal from the Ethiopian government to share power with the military, a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy.

The agreement calls for the junta to chair a body of seven civilians, seven military officials, and one civilian agreed to by both sides for the first 18 months of the country’s transitional period. In the following 18 months, a civilian would lead the council, followed by national elections. The military has not yet responded to the proposal. 

Two civilian negotiators told Foreign Policy that they did not expect the military to agree to the power-sharing agreement and said even if the junta signed it, it would not follow it. A million-strong march organized by civilian groups is planned for the June 30 deadline, which has experts concerned. 

“There are a number of warning signs that show violence is imminent for the protest on Sunday,” said Cameron Hudson, a former White House official under George W. Bush and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “The wheels are coming off. The military council is both losing patience and feeling emboldened by the lack of strong international response. They want to prevent a second wave of protests that could reinvigorate the whole movement.”

Central to the negotiations between the civilians and the junta is the role of Hemeti.

Some in the Sudanese Professionals Association say they will not accept a government that includes Hemeti. They demand an investigation into crimes in Darfur and responsibility for the June 3 massacre of protesters. (The general has denied responsibility for the massacre and said he launched an investigation to find the perpetrators.)

But other civilian groups, and even some inside the Sudanese Professionals Association, say they must be practical and include Hemeti in the transitional government. Still, Hudson warned that the military’s involvement in Sudan’s political future may be a formula for disaster.
“The idea that the Transitional Military Council or the Rapid Support Forces can bring stability is insane.”

Justin Lynch is a journalist covering Eastern Europe, Africa, and cybersecurity. Twitter: @just1nlynch
Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @RobbieGramer


Further Reading

The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.

Sudan’s transition hangs in the balance, says Zachariah Mampilly, an expert on protest movements and African politics.

The United Nations halts withdrawal of peacekeepers amid fear that Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces are filling the security vacuum.

Saturday, August 10, 2019

BBC has evidence suggesting attack on protesters in Khartoum Sudan June 3 was ordered from the top

THE BBC has uncovered evidence that suggests the attack on protesters in Sudan on 03 June 2019 was ordered from the top and planned in advance.  The internet is now back on in the country so even more footage has emerged online.  BBC Africa Eye has analysed over 300 mobile phone videos shot in Khartoum that morning, piecing them together into a detailed account of a massacre in which dozens of people were killed. 

Here is the schedule for a 30-minute BBC film broadcast from the UK starting today:
Sat 10 Aug 2019  18:30 Local time 
Sat 10 Aug 2019  23:30 Local time 
Sun 11 Aug 2019 05:30 Local time 
Sun 11 Aug 2019 11:30 Local time 
Thu 15 Aug 2019 10:30 Local time