Showing posts with label UNAMID. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UNAMID. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 04, 2023

Sudan: Towards intervention?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Although some parts of this article are inaccurate and misleading, particularly about ICC v Bashir (no time to correct it) it is documented here to lay the groundwork for understanding future posts regarding the birth of Sudan's civilian-led government.   

Article at Al-Ahram online
Written by Asmaa Al-Husseini 
Published Tuesday 04 July 2023 - here is a full copy:


Sudan: Towards intervention?

As Sudan’s warring parties refuse to compromise foreign intervention looms ever closer, writes Asmaa Al-Husseini

The Sudan war has been raging for three months with no realistic prospects for a peaceful resolution. Initiatives to halt the bloodshed have all failed and the warring sides - the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - continue to target civilians who are subjected to air strikes, looting, sabotage, and intimidation, circumstances that have created an opening for international and regional intervention.

 

In recent weeks, the international community has indicated it is unwilling to remain a passive spectator as the conflict in Sudan not only continues but expands. Several international and regional players have hinted that they may resort to more stringent measures to halt the fighting which has spread to Kordofan, Darfur, and other regions, and assumed a growing ethnic and tribal dimension.

 

There are growing fears the conflict may become a civil or regional war, and in recent weeks Darfur has witnessed horrific atrocities which some international officials classify as war crimes.

 

Sudanese officials have called for the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a commission to investigate these crimes. Mona Arko Minawi, the governor of Darfur, Darfur lawyers, and other groups have described events in the western region as genocide.

 

The atrocities, taking place away from media coverage amid the interruption of essential services and communication, evoke memories of the war in Darfur between 2003 and 2018 which resulted in the ICC indicting president Omar Al-Bashir and other regime leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. They resulted in Sudan being subject to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing UN and African forces to be deployed to the region.

 

The SAF and RSF have turned down several ceasefires proposed in Jeddah by the US and Saudi Arabia as well as initiatives put forward by the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

 

The SAF rejected AU mediation on the grounds that the organisation had suspended Sudan’s membership following what it deemed a coup when, on 25 October 2021, the army dissolved its partnership with civilian forces. The SAF has also declined IGAD mediation, claiming that Kenya, the leader of the initiative, has sided with the RSF, providing its members with shelter. The army has said statements by Kenyan President William Ruto and his foreign minister constitute interference in Sudan’s internal affairs and undermine its sovereignty and requested that South Sudan take the lead in the Quartet for mediation, replacing Kenya.

 

The IGAD initiative had proposed a direct meeting between SAF leader Abdel-Fattah Al-Borhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in an attempt to forge a lasting solution to the crisis. The initiative also recommended a dialogue between Sudan’s civil forces and the opening of humanitarian corridors.

 

Malik Agar, the new deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, has visited several regional countries as well as Moscow, seeking assistance and mediation. The move may be interpreted as an attempt to alleviate US, European, African, and Saudi pressures, though the step is unlikely to achieve the changes desired by the Sudanese army.

 

The army is perturbed that the RSF is being treated as an equal partner in the proposed initiatives. The SAF describes the RSF as a rebel force and as the vanguard of a foreign invasion, alluding to the RSF’s use of fighters from neighbouring African countries.

 

The SAF has welcomed Turkey’s involvement in mediation efforts. Media outlets aligned with the army have expressed optimism that Turkey will provide support, just as it did to the Libyan government in Tripoli.

 

During its latest session, the African Peace and Security Council endorsed the IGAD initiative. IGAD’s plan calls for the demilitarisation of Khartoum, an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the initiation of a comprehensive political process. While stressing that a political solution is the only exit from the current impasse, the 15-member-State Council warned that violators of international human rights laws in Sudan would be held accountable for their actions.

 

IGAD has proposed a 50 km buffer zone around Khartoum and the deployment of African forces to safeguard key institutions in the capital, with the police and security forces responsible for securing key public facilities. Agar dismissed the proposals as an occupation rather than a solution to the crisis. He emphasised his government’s opposition to any initiative that does not respect Sudanese sovereignty.

 

Following SAF and RSF responses to the Jeddah initiative, the US has indicated it will adopt stricter measures to stop the war in Sudan. The European Union is also speaking about imposing sanctions against parties involved in the conflict.

 

Some observers anticipate international intervention — involving a collaboration between Western powers, the African Union, and IGAD — under Chapter VII if the warring factions do not heed calls for peace. Others believe Russia and China may veto such intervention unless it is mediated by the African Union given that the Sudan war threatens regional security and international interests, including those of Moscow and Beijing.

 

Meanwhile, Sudan’s civil forces are busy holding meetings of their own to launch initiatives and form a unified civil front to end the war and restore the country to a democratic course.

 

Al-Baqir Al-Afif, a Sudanese writer and representative of the Civil Front to Stop the War and Restore Democracy, told Al-Ahram Weekly a unified front could help fill the void and prevent armed groups from determining Sudan’s future in the absence of a strong civil force. To this end, steps are being taken to convene a meeting that includes political parties, trade unions, professional federations, resistance committees, civil society organisations and public figures in Sudan with the goal of agreeing a declaration of principles.

 

“There are proposals to create a representative committee to join international initiatives aimed at ending the war and kickstarting the political track. Some have suggested the formation of a shadow government or a government in exile,” he said.

 

“Having a group representing the civilian voice in Sudan is crucial. It will help convey the Sudanese people’s point of view to the world and be part of these international initiatives, which must also be unified.”

 

The priority is to end the war and the bloodshed and brutal massacres in Khartoum and Darfur, added Al-Afif. Regional and international communities should collaborate to exert pressure to stop the conflict and establish mechanisms to effectively monitor the ceasefire. It is also essential to provide urgent relief to those affected by the war, including displaced persons, refugees and those stranded at crossings.

 

It is also essential to engage civilians in future peace negotiations to ensure a democratic transition led by civil forces, he said.

 

Major General Kamal Ismail, head of the Sudanese National Alliance and leader of the Forces for Freedom and Change, told the Weekly meetings to unify Sudan’s civil forces have already taken place in an attempt to restore stability and advance a democratic civil path.


* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 July, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly


View original:  https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/504119.aspx


[Ends]

Thursday, May 25, 2023

UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa: Financing of AU-led peace support operations

THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. 


Report at What's In Blue

Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):

Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa


Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa. 


Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May. 


The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).


Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007. 


Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent. 


Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.


The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)


The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)


At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.


The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million. 


Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.


Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February. 


The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.


In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.


One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions. 


This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.


In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.


The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission. 


As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. 


Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements. 


Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php


[Ends]

Monday, March 23, 2020

Proposed UN resolution on UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) would support Sudan’s peace efforts - Possible implications of COVID-19

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: This is worrying. 17 years ago it took much work by thousands of people around the world to get peacekeepers into Darfur, western Sudan to help protect civilians and humanitarian aid. This month China has the presidency of the UN Security Council during which time several meetings on Sudan and South Sudan are expected. Reportedly, the Council is likely adopt a resolution establishing a follow-on presence of the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by 31 March

The proposed resolution (I cannot find the draft resolution) would eliminate the main mission of UNAMID — the protection of civilians in Darfur. Here is the most worrying part: that responsibility would be handed over to the transitional government formed last August by the military and civilian protesters following the ouster of Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir. Read more below including possible implications of 2019–20 coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019–20_coronavirus_pandemic] on International Peace and Security.

Let's hope that the flow of humanitarian relief to people in need is not adversely affected. At least 5m people in South Sudan are suffering terrible poverty.

Apart from feeling sad about the pain and suffering caused by poverty and COVID-19, I hope that the pandemic will reset the world and peoples' hearts.

Astronaut Chris Hadfield, the first Canadian to walk in space who has flown two Space Shuttle missions and served as commander of the International Space Station (ISS), once said that what they think about when gazing out of the windows of their spaceship is where their loved ones are. Not worldly goods, only love.

Incidentally, according to Wikipedia [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Hadfield ] Chris Hadfield is enthusiastic about the prospects for a manned mission to Mars, and when asked in 2011 if he would consider a one-way journey to Mars to be the first to visit, he said "I would be honoured to be given the opportunity."

On May 12, 2013, after handing over command of the ISS, but before returning home, Chris released a music video recorded on the ISS of a modified rendition of "Space Oddity" by David Bowie. As of January 2020, the video has over 45 million views on YouTubeHere is the video, filmed at a time when he could not be sure of his safe return to Earth. The lyrics are out of this world.



Proposed UN resolution would support Sudan’s peace efforts
Report from The Associated Press (AP)
By EDITH M. LEDERER and JUSTIN LYNCH
Dated Thursday 19 March 2020

UNITED NATIONS (AP) — A proposed U.N. Security Council resolution would replace the joint U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force in Sudan’s restive Darfur region with a U.N. political and peace-building mission whose primary aim would be to support Sudan’s fragile transition to democracy including in drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections.

The draft resolution, obtained Wednesday by The Associated Press, would basically eliminate the main mission of the U.N.-AU force known as UNAMID — the protection of civilians in Darfur. That responsibility would be handed over to the transitional government formed last August by the military and civilian protesters following the ouster of the country’s longtime autocratic ruler Omar al-Bashir.

The proposed resolution would establish “a political, peace support and peace-building mission,” to be known as the United Nations Political and Peace-building Integrated Mission in Sudan or UNPPIMS, starting May 1 for an initial period of one year.

It would authorize the deployment of up to 2,500 international police and one battalion for a quick reaction force — usually between 500 and 800 troops — to protect U.N. personnel, facilities and humanitarian workers. The police and troops would also be authorized “to help create a protective environment by protecting civilians being subjected to or under imminent threat of physical violence, particularly in the hot spot areas of the Darfur states” — but the draft stresses that the government has primary responsibility for protecting its people.

The draft resolution largely follows the recommendations in a report to the council earlier this week by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki.

Human Rights Watch criticized the report, saying withdrawing peacekeepers threatens the safety of civilians in Darfur.

Kenneth Roth, its executive director, said the council should recognize “that Darfur requires a far more gradual withdrawal” because “past and ongoing violence there means civilians can’t trust Sudanese security forces alone and still look to peacekeepers for protection.”

The Darfur conflict began in 2003 when ethnic Africans rebelled, accusing the Arab-dominated Sudanese government of discrimination. The government in Khartoum was accused of retaliating by arming local nomadic Arab tribes and unleashing them on civilian populations — a charge it denies.

In recent years, as the result of a successful government military campaign, the rebellion has been reduced to a rebel Sudan Liberation Army faction headed by Abdul Wahid Elnur in Jebel Marra.

There has been pressure, including from the Trump administration, to scale down the UNAMID force, which was established in 2007 and was one of the U.N.’s most expensive operations. In June 2016 it had a ceiling of 15,845 military personnel and 3,403 police.

In July 2018, the Security Council voted to dramatically cut the force in response to reduced fighting and improved security conditions.

The target then was to end the mission in June 30, 2020. But the mass street protests by a pro-democracy movement which began in late 2018 and led to last year’s ouster of Al-Bashir caused a delay.

A power-sharing agreement signed in August 2019 between the military and protesters called for the government to reach a peace agreement with armed groups within six months. The military-civilian government, which is facing an economic crisis, has been engaging in peace talks with rebel groups since October, hoping to end the insurgencies in order to slash military spending, which takes up much of the national budget.

The draft resolution would authorize the new U.N. mission, if asked, to support implementation of any future peace agreements including monitoring cease-fires, and supporting disarmament, demobilization and measures promoting accountability and transitional justice, not only in Darfur but also in conflict-wracked Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.

The report by Guterres and Faki said the overall security situation remained unchanged in most parts of Darfur, except West Darfur which experienced a series of violent incidents, though they reported “civil unrest” throughout the vast western region.

According to the report, UNAMID has developed “a drawdown and liquidation plan” that envisages the closure of its 14 bases between April and Oct. 31, the repatriation of military and police personnel, and a significant reduction of its civilian staff. It said this will be followed by administrative and logistical liquidation activities for a period of at least six months.

As of January, UNAMID had over 4,300 military personnel, over 2,100 international police, and about 1,500 civilian staff.

The draft resolution “underlines that a continued strategic and political partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Sudan remains critical” and calls for close cooperation between UNPPIMS and UNAMID as well as with U.N. missions in South Sudan, Libya and in the disputed Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan.

Lynch reported from Khartoum, Sudan
View Original: https://apnews.com/439923c48764b6d9470ac646fb69990c
- - -


UN SECURITY COUNCIL MONTHLY FORECAST MARCH 2020
In March, China has the presidency. Several meetings on Sudan are expected. The Council is likely to adopt a resolution establishing a follow-on presence to UNAMID by 31 March

Prior to this, the Council expects to receive a briefing on the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, followed by consultations. 

In addition, the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sven Jürgenson (Estonia), will provide the quarterly briefing on the committee’s work. 

Other meetings on African issues include South Sudan [ https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-03/south-sudan-7.php ] an update on UNMISS and the renewal of the mission’s mandate.

- - -

THE WEEK AHEAD AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
23 - 27 March 2020
On Thursday (26 March), the Council is scheduled to adopt several resolutions, although it is unclear whether (due to Coronavirus Covid-19 - see more below) this will be done via videoconferencing or in person. These include resolutions on the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
- - -

FROM THE ARCHIVES OF Insights Sudan (Darfur):
  • UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): Mandate Renewal
    Tomorrow (31 October), the Security Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 October 2020. The initial draft was circulated by the UK and Germany, the penholders on...
    posted on WED 30 OCT 2019

    UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Mandate Renewal
    Tomorrow (27 June), the Security Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 October. The initial draft was circulated by the UK and Germany, the penholders on Darfur,...
    posted on WED 26 JUN 2019

    AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Briefing and Consultations
    Tomorrow (14 June), Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix is scheduled to brief the Security Council on the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General on...
    posted on THU 13 JUN 2019

    AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Briefing and Consultations
    Tomorrow (17 April), the Security Council will be briefed on the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report (S/2019/305) on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by Joint Special Representative and head of UNAMID Jeremiah Mamabolo (via video-teleconference from Khartoum). Assistant Secretary-General...
    posted on TUE 16 APR 2019

    AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Briefing and Consultations
    On Monday (25 February), the Security Council will be briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Africa Bintou Keita on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report (S/2019/44) on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The briefing will be followed by consultations, which may...
    posted on SUN 24 FEB 2019

    Sudan Sanctions Regime Renewal
    This afternoon (7 February), the Security Council is set to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2020. The US, the penholder on Sudan sanctions, circulated a...
    posted on THU 7 FEB 2019

    Sudan Sanctions Committee Briefing
    Tomorrow (17 January), Ambassador Joanna Wronecka (Poland), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to provide the quarterly briefing to the Security Council on the work of the Committee. The briefing will be public, continuing Poland’s practice of...
    posted on WED 16 JAN 2019

    AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Briefing and Consultations
    On Monday (22 October), Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix is scheduled to brief the Security Council on the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Secretary-General’s 90-day report (S/2018/912). The briefing will be followed by consultations. The Secretary-General’s...
    posted on FRI 19 OCT 2018

    UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Mandate Renewal
    Tomorrow (13 July), the Security Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2019. This follows the 29 June adoption of resolution 2425, a technical rollover of...
    posted on THU 12 JUL 2018

    Central African Republic and Sudan: Informal Interactive Dialogue on Joint AU-UN Visit
    Tomorrow (18 April), Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui (via VTC) are expected to brief Council members in an informal interactive dialogue on their joint visit to Sudan and the Central...
    posted on TUE 17 APR 2018

  • Sudan (Darfur): Briefing and Consultations on UNAMID and the 1591 Sanctions Committee
    Tomorrow morning (14 March), the Security Council is expected to hold a briefing on the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID Jeremiah Mamabolo is expected to brief (via VTC) on the...
    posted on TUE 13 MAR 2018

    AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): Presidential Statement
    Tomorrow (31 January), the Security Council is scheduled to adopt a presidential statement on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The initial draft was circulated by the UK as penholder to the full Council on Monday (22 January). After...
    posted on TUE 30 JAN 2018

    UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur Mandate Renewal
    Tomorrow (29 June), the Security Council is scheduled to renew the mandate of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for an additional year. The draft was initially scheduled for adoption on 27 June; however, adoption was delayed due to...
    posted on WED 28 JUN 2017
UN DOCUMENTS ON DARFUR

Selected Security Council ResolutionsView All
11 FEBRUARY 2020S/RES/2508This resolution extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for one year.
31 OCTOBER 2019S/RES/2495This resolution renewed UNAMID’s mandate until 31 October 2020. 
27 JUNE 2019S/RES/2479This resolution extended the mandate of UNAMID until 31 October 2019. 
- - -





Possible implications of COVID-19 on International Peace and Security
Report from and by WHAT’S IN BLUE.org - Insights on the work of the UN Security Council
Dated Saturday 21 March 2020. Excerpt:

The novel coronavirus COVID-19 has since January already claimed over 12,950 lives globally and has had an impact on more than 180 countries and territories.

Since the highly contagious nature of this virus has prompted social distancing, the Council decided to postpone all of its meetings scheduled for the week of March 16. While the Council members made only one public statement during that period—a press statement on Central African Republic, agreed electronically—they spent the week testing video-conferencing. It remains unclear whether Council members will seek to meet in person during the current crisis.

Aside from its impact on the Council’s functioning, the current crisis has other potential impacts on international peace and security. First, the health of UN peacekeepers in missions that the Council authorises is likely to become a significant concern. This was the case with the two health crises that the Council has grappled with previously: HIV/AIDS and Ebola. 

However, unlike Ebola, which was concentrated in a specific region (West Africa in 2014-2015) or country (the Democratic Republic of the Congo more recently), COVID-19 is a global pandemic, and unlike HIV/AIDS, the onset of dire symptoms occurs within days or weeks. To help maintain the safety of peacekeepers, it may become essential to enhance the capacity in different missions to provide care in the field or medical evacuation as needed. Read more: https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/03/possible-implications-of-covid-19-on-international-peace-and-security.php

Sudan: Russia opposes a UN peacekeeping in Darfur


Friday, March 20, 2020

Sudan: Blood, sand and gold: victor’s city rises from ashes of Sudan’s civil war

The ruthless leader of country’s Arab militia has grand plans for the remote western province. But the transformation of Zurrug risks more unrest. Full story:

Blood, sand and gold: victor’s city rises from ashes of Sudan’s civil war
Report from the The Observer - www.theguardian.com
Observer dispatch Darfur
By KLAAS VAN DIJKEN
Dated Saturday 29 February 2020, 17.05 GMT
Photo: Children at the school in Zurrug sing anti-racism songs that praise the Rapid Support Forces. Photograph: Klaas van Dijken/Lighthouse Reports

Zurrug is one of the few towns on Earth that has yet to appear on Google maps. After nightfall, its sparse shacks are illuminated by campfires that throw shadows over pick-up trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns – the only hint of the violent past of this outpost in Darfur, Sudan’s troubled western province.

The town is being built on the spoils of a brutal war that once tore at the conscience of the world. The victors in that conflict have grand plans for this settlement based on a winner-takes-all vision for their home region – a vision that clouds the future of the whole of Sudan.

The Observer was given unprecedented access to this remote area of Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group whose influence stretches from Sudan’s borderlands with Chad and Libya to the capital, Khartoum, where protesters last year toppled 30-year dictator Omar al-Bashir.

The RSF wants to show off a future city as evidence of the peace it has brought to this contested land. To the vanquished – scattered in their millions across desperate refugee camps within and beyond Sudan’s borders – Zurrug is an insult being built on stolen land.

Darfur and Bashir were back in the headlines last month when Sudan’s transitional government agreed to hand over the ousted president to the international criminal court to face charges of crimes against humanity. These crimes took place in Darfur from 2003, when Bashir unleashed Arab militia, with the backing of the Sudanese army, to crush an insurgency by black African tribes. What began as ethnic clashes over land and water escalated into a crisis that prompted western public demonstrations, celebrity activism and a genocide investigation.

Those armed herders were known at the time as the Janjaweed, or “devils on horseback”. Today they are called the RSF. Their leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – long referred to as Hemedti – is Bashir’s heir apparent. A renowned and ruthless commander, he was called by Bashir “my protector”, a role that helped him become the wealthiest man in Sudan.

Zurrug is a world away from Khartoum, where riverine Arab elites created a metropolis thanks to their dominance of politics and economy. This makeshift town is a 10-hour drive across the vast plateau from Darfur’s northern city of El Fasher.

In its current form, Zurrug’s market has stalls hawking anything from Chinese phones to sacks of beans. The prefab clinic and school are speckled with the letters “UN”, a reminder that they have been jerry-built from the wreckage of the shrinking peacekeeping mission to Darfur, Unamid.
Photo: Rapid Support Forces on the way from Kutum towards Zurrug. Photograph: Klaas van Dijken/Lighthouse Reports

According to plans seen by the Observer, Zurrug will become a city. The documents call for residential areas, a hospital and town squares. Officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates visited in 2018 promising to help finance the work, including an international airport.

For now, two water towers mark the entrance to the town, placed there to slake the thirst of the camels, which vastly outnumber either people or vehicles. The largest house belongs to Juma Dagalo, the area’s chief and Hemedti’s uncle. “We were nomads, but now we want to develop ourselves, so we have to settle and send our children to school,” he said.

In his telling, Zurrug belongs to his ethnic group, the Mahariya, having been gifted to them by their former colonial masters, the British. The chief, who brought Hemedti up, says the land was empty.

This story of empty land is bitterly disputed by community leaders in the camps in north Darfur. They claim Zurrug is on land they inhabited for centuries before being forced to leave by the RSF, who used the same tactics – murder, rape and robbery – as the Janjaweed. One of these communities is the Zaghawa, a black African ethnic group who bore much of the brunt of the war crimes alleged in Bashir’s ICC indictment.

Mohamed Ibrahim, a Zaghawa chief or umda, said: “What Juma Dagalo is saying is not true. Zurrug was not empty land. We have our farms there but we cannot harvest. The RSF denies us access.”

Injustice and asymmetric war on civilians dominated much of the three decades that Bashir spent in power. His hold on office relied on a complex of alliances that spanned the Islamists, the army and support among the Arab middle class. Last year the regime collapsed as demonstrators in the cities demanded a civilian government. But insiders claim that Bashir stepped down only when Hemedti refused to use the RSF to crush the demonstrations. The protector switched allegiances from Bashir to the protestors in a move that saw him expand his support base far beyond Darfur.

“I stood beside the Sudanese people,” Hemedti told the Observer from his gilded residence in Khartoum. “A massacre would have happened herein Khartoum, a genocide would have happened on 11 April without our existence.”

The RSF is sanctioned by the state but its allegiance is to Hemedti, not Sudan’s army. His leadership of what is effectively a private army has reportedly helped him make a fortune from gold, construction and alleged smuggling. Hemedti denies that the men he commands perpetrated atrocities, either in their former guise as the Janjaweed or more recently as the RSF.

Today, Hemedti, whose Mahariya clan is part of the populous Rizeigat tribe, is vice-chairman of the sovereign council, the transitional body that is meant to guide Sudan to a new civilian government. But his credentials as protector of the people were stained in June last year when soldiers – many in RSF uniforms – attacked a civilian sit-in in the capital. More than 150 people were killed and many woman were raped. Hemedti denies ordering the violence and blames elements of the former regime seeking to discredit him. His denial is dismissed by most of the protest groups.
Photo: Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, the RSF leader. Photograph: STR/AP

Meanwhile, a struggle is being waged inside the Sovereign Council, and on the streets, to make good on the promise of a transition to civilian rule. The army retains a powerful, possibly decisive voice on the council. Straddling it all is Hemedti, not beholden to Sudan’s army, confident in his wealth and political support. He has the backing of influential Gulf States, cemented by sending the RSF to fight in Yemen alongside Saudi proxies in yet another gruesome conflict.

For now, Hemedti prefers to whitewash the RSF’s recent and deeper past, saying his forces have brought safety and stability to Darfur. On the issue of land, he appears magnanimous: “Whoever took land or built anything on land which is not his, he has to leave it. Everybody has to take his own old land.”

But those who have done the taking in north Darfur are overwhelmingly Hemedti’s own Mahariya people. His uncle, Juma Dagalo, has toured the region enticing members of his own ethnic group to come and settle in Zurrug and six other proto-towns around it. Each one has the same school and clinic, recycled from the UN bases. The teachers and doctors are on Hemedti’s payroll. Water towers, a practical and symbolic way of staking claim to land, have started to appear – all financed by the RSF.

A report last year from the UN panel of experts for Darfur concluded that development around Zurrug was meant to lure people from the cities. It also warned that it had the potential to “become a new source of conflict”.

The land issue is far from buried, and Darfur is part of the same negotiations between Sudan’s transitional government and various rebel groups that saw Bashir offered up to the ICC. Whatever those talks conclude, the facts on the ground are already being changed, with mono-ethnic settlements expanding every day.

After dark in Zurrug the children of the Mahariya gather around a single lightbulb to recite passages from the Qur’an. During the day they sing songs that mash up anti-racism slogans with praise for the RSF. These anthems would ring hollow with the disenfranchised Zaghawa, who have formed committees in their camps and written letters to Sudan’s new leadership. They have had no response and their leader, Mohamed Ibrahim, warns: “If we can’t solve this peacefully, we will take up arms again.”